THE PROFESSIONS OF SOLIDERS: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE ASSIGNMENT OF MILITARY TASKS SINCE WORLD WAR II

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by

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THE PROFESSIONS OF SOLDIERS

Abstract

by

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Since the end of the Second World War in the United States, an increased number of public sector employees and private contractors have been engaged in tasks that historically were the sole purview of the soldier. Why do civilians gain responsibility for some military tasks, the military for others and for still others there is a mixed outcome? The literature on private security companies examines the role of civilians in military operations, while the literature on military professionalism examines the role of soldiers in military operations. In this dissertation, I bridge the gap between these two literatures by considering civilian and military professions on equal terms: I suggest civilian professionals compete with one another over military tasks to be recognized as expert authorities on these tasks. If a profession has a significant comparative advantage, then it will be considered the expert authority on the task. To test this theory, I use a combination of congruence testing and process-tracing in two case studies: nuclear weapons strategy, 1945-1960 and countering insurgents in Vietnam, 1960-1968.

To Professor James M. Banovetz

with deep gratitude
and profound admiration

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CHAPTER 1:

INTRODUCTION

> "The nuclear age has witnessed a growing military influence in areas that were once regarded as civilian. Conversely, there has been a certain 'civilianizing' of the military as no military expertise has become essential to military planning and operations"
>
> Bruce L.R. Smith, 1966[1]

> "My job was to prevent this [Burundian] genocide from happening. I was to keep the president alive and in public view...This I did. Curiously, I was not a member of the CIA or part of a covert military unit or even a government employee. I was from the private sector—a 'contractor' to many and a 'mercenary' to some—working for a large company called DynCorp International."
>
> Sean McFate, 2014[2]

1.1 Soldiers, Civilians, and Military Tasks

What does it mean to be a soldier? Historically, soldiers controlled the legitimate use of force on behalf of the state. Yet since the end of the Second World War in the

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[1] Smith, Bruce L. R. (1966) *The RAND Corporation: Case Study of a Nonprofit Advisory Corporation*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p 297

[2] McFate, Sean (2014) *The Modern Mercenary: Private Armies and What They Mean for World Order*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. xi.

United States, an increased number of public sector employees and private contractors have been engaged in tasks that were previously the sole purview of the soldier.

During the height of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, civilian contractors were being employed in large numbers. In fact, "more than one-half of the personnel the United States has deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003 have been contractors."[3] Typically, one would expect that the U.S. government would bring in civilians to work on reconstruction, freeing its soldiers to focus on defending and protecting its interests. However, contractors were being employed to train local police and army, to guard government facilities and oil fields, and to protect U.S. citizens residing in those countries.[4] Concurrently, soldiers were working as peacekeepers, building schools, digging wells, arbitrating local disputes, and completing other reconstruction projects.[5]

Such a puzling blurring of responsibilities is also occuring in the public sector, specifically in the Department of Defense. Because we typically think of soldiers as professionals who defend and protect the United States, one might expect them to focus on defensive cyber operations. Yet, according to a Department of Defense Report on Cyber Operations Personnel, "Defensive Operations" is made up of predominately civilian employees, who constitute 78% of the total workforce. In contrast, military

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[3] Avant, Deborah and Renee DeNevers (2013) "Military Contractors and the American Way of War." *The Modern American Military*. David M. Kennedy, ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 135.

[4] Avant, Deborah (2005) "Private security companies." *New Political Economy* 10:1, pp. 121-131.

[5] Dao, James (2002) "Threats and responses: Reconstruction: U.S. shifts emphasis in Afghanistan to security and road building." *The New York Times*; Waldman, Amy (2002) "A nation challenged: Kandahar: U.S. soldiers wearing many hats as Afghans look to them for help." *The New York Times*; Wong, Edward (2004) "The struggle for Iraq: The soldiers; divided mission in Iraq tempers views of G.I.'s." *The New York Times*.

personnel dominate the "Operations and Maintenance" workforce, making up 81% of that total workforce.[6]

These surprising patterns in task assignments are not new. In fact, over the past fifty years, the United States has consistently employed more civilians and fewer soldiers, despite the relative costs.

In 1967, active duty military made up 59% of the total Department of Defense manpower in the United States, but by 1987 that number had dropped to 52% and by 2007, it had dropped to 46%. Meanwhile, the total number of civilians and contractors increased from 36% in 1967, to 41% in 1987, and then to 47% in 2007. In short, over time the United States has employed more and more civilians and contractors and fewer and fewer soldiers.

The most plausible explanation for this change in manpower mix is that civilians and contractors must be relatively less expensive to employ than active duty military. However, such is not the case. In 1967, the Department of Defense spent 49% of their budget on active duty military,[7] and 48% of their budget on contractors and civilians. In 1987, the Department spent 46% on active duty military, 48% on contractors and civilians. Then, in 2007, it spent 41% on active duty military, 53% on contractors and

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[6] Department of Defense. 2011. *Department of Defense Cyber Operations Personnel Report.* Washington D.C.: Department of Defense.

[7] The cost percentages for active duty military include DHP, Retired Pay, and Family Housing costs.

civilians.[8] It is clear that over time, the cost of employing civilians and contractors has remained steadily more expensive than employing soldiers.

In sum, not only are there more and more civilians being employed by the United States to work on defense and protection of the nation, but these civilians are doing work that one would expect to be done by soldiers. Meanwhile soldiers are beginning to do work that one would expect to be done by civilians.

1.2 Who is a Military Professional?

In this dissertation, I explore the question of who has responsibility for the legitimate use of force on behalf of the state: who is a military professional in the modern world. Specifically, I ask why civilians gain responsibility for some military tasks, the military for others, and for still others there is a mixed outcome.

Extant theories of military professionalism cannot explain these developments due to their focus on military officers. Some scholars of military professionalism have depicted the military role as expanding in scope.[9] Yet as evidenced above, while the military is indeed taking on new roles, civilians are now gaining responsibility for tasks that were previously the exclusive purview of the military, particularly in the area of combat. In short, the role of the military is changing—not expanding. In order to fully

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[8] Robbins, Rich (2011) *Total Force Demand and Resourcing Workforce*. Washington D.C.: Department of Defense.

[9] See for example: Janowitz, Morris (1960) *The professional soldier, a social and political portrait* Glencoe, Ill., Free Press; Stepan, Alfred (1973) "The new professionalism of internal warfare and military role expansion" In *Armies and Politics in Latin America.* New York: Holmes & Meier.

understand these changes, it is necessary to look at both the military profession and civilian professions.

1.3 Competition for Military Tasks

To answer the question of why the military gains responsibility for some tasks, civilians for others, and for still others there is a mixed outcome, I break with past scholarship by examining civilian and military professions on equal terms. I argue that the military and civilian personnel are professionals competing for responsibility over tasks. Professions desire responsibility for new tasks because new tasks are accompanied by increased influence and budgetary priority.

Full rights and responsibility for a task is gained when a profession demonstrates a competitive advantage in accomplishing the task. Competition favors the profession that can provide a superior value in completing the task. Therefore, the president of the United States, nearly always the final arbiter, assigns the task to the profession that demonstrates a higher level of competence, efficiency, and commitment in accomplishing the task.

1.4 Roadmap of the Dissertation

When considering civilian professions that interact with the U.S. military, the two that most often come to mind are physicians and lawyers: the Medical Corps and the JAG Corps. However, these two professions have interacted with the military in strikingly different ways. In Chapter 2, I use the differing interactions between physicians and the military and lawyers and the military to explore the concepts utilized in this dissertation,

including "profession," "new military task," and "task assignment." I conclude that while lawyers did in fact compete with soldiers for control of task of military justice, physicians did not engage in the same type of competition.

I then turn to explore why competition occurs between professions and what drives task assignment. I present my theory of competitive advantage in Chapter 3. The chapter begins by exploring how other scholars have approached the study of military professionals and civilian penetration into military tasks. However, no scholar has as yet, explored the intersection of civilian and military professionals in a single work. Therefore, I present a new theory that posits that task assignment is a function of competition between professions. Professions gain rights and responsibilities for tasks based on their relative competitive advantage.

In chapter 3, I also present an alternative explanation. As policy-makers are the agents in deciding which profession will gain responsibility for a task, I propose bureaucratic politics as the most salient alternative explanation for my question. The literature on bureaucratic politics theory[10] does not provide a satisfying way to predict outcomes in a given case, and is mostly focused on elucidating the process that leads to a given decision. In response, I add to the literature on bureaucratic politics by offering a way to conceptualize bureaucratic politics in such a way as to allow me to make predictions about variation in outcomes. I conclude the chapter by explaining my case selection strategy and methodology.

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[10] I focus on the work of Graham Allison and Morton Halperin (1972) as their theory has been argued to be the best alternative. See page 57.

In this dissertation, I explore two cases of military task assignment: Nuclear Weapons Strategy, 1945-1960; and Countering Insurgents in Vietnam, 1960-1968. In testing these two cases, I use a combination of congruence tests and process tracing to determine whether my theory of competitive advantage or the bureaucratic politics theory is better suited to explain the assignment of military tasks.

Examining nuclear weapons strategy, 1945-1960, in Chapter 4, allows me to examine a case where independent contractors—civilian strategists of the RAND Corporation—compete with the United States Strategic Air Command for rights and responsibilities for the task of nuclear strategy. In this chapter, I explore three issue areas where the civilian strategists and airmen disagreed regarding nuclear strategy, and explore why the Eisenhower administration sought and utilized the expertise of both professions when creating the national nuclear strategy. For this case, I utilize a congruence test to examine the plausibility of my theory. I find that my theory of competitive advantage is consistent with the case while the bureaucratic politics theory is not. This allows me to conclude that my theory has greater causal significance in this case because it better predicts the observed outcome than the most salient alternative.

In Chapter 5, I turn to the examination of competition between the U.S. Army and civilian governmental agencies—USAID, CIA, and the State Department—over the task of countering the Viet Cong Insurgents in Vietnam. In this case, I explore the ever-increasing responsibility placed upon the U.S. Army for all programs relating to countering the insurgents, despite the protests of the civilian agencies. Similarly to the nuclear weapons case, I begin the chapter with a congruence test of my theory of competitive advantage and the bureaucratic politics theory. However, in this case, both

theories are consistent with the observed outcome. In order to further test which theory provides a better explanation for the case, I test an additional two hypotheses dealing with the processes underlying the decisions made by the policymakers. In tracing the process underlying the decision, I discover evidence that supports my theory's hypothesis that competitive advantage and capacity to undertake the task matter more to policymakers than does bureaucratic bargaining.

The dissertation concludes by considering the significance of my findings. I extend the analysis of my theory by examining the possibility that some of the indicators of competitive advantage are more critical than others in determining outcomes. I also address a few unanswered questions regarding the scope of my theory. Then, I turn to examine the implications of my findings for both policy and scholarship. I draw the chapter to a close by considering areas for further research.

1.5 Conclusion

This dissertation fills a significant gap in the literature on military professionalism and will bridge the gap between military professionalism and the study of civilian contractors. By exploring the question of why civilians gain dominant responsibility for some military tasks, the military for others, and for still others, there is a mixed outcome, I apply the sociological concept of a "system of professions" to the military case for the first time. In contrasting my competitive advantage theoretical explanation with the bureaucratic politics theory, I also test the claim that bureaucratic politics is a better explanation for governmental decisions regarding military tasks.

More practically, the research I propose may have broader policy implications. By understanding how and why civilians and soldiers are assigned tasks in defense of the nation, it is possible to gain greater understanding of civil-military relations (particularly where convergence/divergence of preferences may exist), and combat effectiveness (knowing who exactly is engaged in combat). Further, understanding who is making war in defense of the nation and why can also lead to significant policy implications for strategic wartime decisions, broad compulsory and specific military education requirements, and the use of the military in nontraditional (other than war) operations.

Failure to understand this puzzle has the potential to lead to misalignment of the force structure and problems with force projection. The assumption that a professional in military affairs is a soldier who engages in combat is incomplete. Yet, if policy makers continue to make that assumption, they will fail to recognize the entirety of what constitutes the U.S. forces. Unless the understanding of a professional in military affairs expands to include all those engaged in military tasks, the conceptualization of force structure will be inadequate and the ability of the government to properly project that force will be stymied. Such failure can also lead to compromised national security goals and objectives. If the government is not making decisions with the proper understanding of force structure, then the ability of the United States to use its military force to meet its national security goals is undermined.

In the chapters that follow, I explore and address these issues, shedding light on how the United States government composes its modern—and diverse—manpower mix.

CHAPTER 2:

BACKGROUND AND CONCEPTS

2.1 Introduction

Since the United States became more consistently internationally engaged following the end of the Second World War, the diversity of individuals who work on tasks related to the defense and protection of the nation has increased. As discussed in chapter one, contractors, academics, and public employees are all engaged in tasks that historically would have been considered the sole purview of the soldier.

Such diversity means that selecting a suitable unit of analysis can be difficult. Sometimes these individuals are part of a single organization, but sometimes they are spread across different firms. Thus, using "organization" as a unit of analysis would be useful in describing cases where public employees are the focus. For example, consider the recent case of competition between the CIA and the United States Special Forces over control of paramilitary activities.[11] However, "organization" as a unit of analysis would prevent the study of contractors as who work for a number of different organizations as a unit.

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[11] After 9-11, the United States government faced the task of using paramilitary forces for combatting terrorism. The CIA and the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) competed for responsibility of the task. For an overview of the two approaches, see Best Jr., Richard A. and Andrew Feickert (2006) *Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA Paramilitary Operations: Issues for Congress*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Services Report for Congress. Accessed on June 15, 2016. Available at: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RS22017.pdf

What does tie these individuals together is the abstract knowledge they apply to a case. To capitalize on this commonality and to account for the diversity of organizations that might be involved, I use "profession" as my unit of analysis.

I also limit the scope of the cases under consideration to those that involve a "new" military task. Competition over task assignment is most likely to occur in cases of "new" tasks, or those that have not yet been initially assigned to a particular profession. If the theory I describe in chapter three is correct, then it is most likely to occur in tasks that are novel and not yet assigned.

In this chapter, I explore the concepts and population of cases under study in this dissertation. I begin with a brief look at two civilian "professions" most commonly associated in working alongside the military: physicians and lawyers. Then, I go on to specify my conceptualization of "profession," particularly noting how it differs from other definitions in the literature, and in some ways, the colloquial usage. Next, military tasks are examined. Specifically, I describe my conceptualization of both "new military tasks" and "task assignment," as well as how these two concepts frame the population of cases under examination in this dissertation. Throughout the chapter, I return to the interaction of physicians (specifically, the medical corps[12]) and lawyers (specifically, the judge advocate general corps[13]) with the military to illustrate and enhance the conceptual description.

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[12] In this chapter, "medical corps" refers to the medical corps of all three branches collectively. At times, I will and do specify a particular branch, and do so by name.

[13] In the same manner as above, I refer to the judge advocate general corps or JAG corps as the three branch corps collectively, and specify when discussing a particular branch.

2.2 Civilian Professions in the Military Context: Physicians and Lawyers

To illustrate both how professions can work as a unit of analysis and how my scope condition functions, I examine two civilian professions most commonly associated with the U.S. military: physicians and lawyers. Examining the history of these two professions and their association with the U.S. military allows me to enhance and exemplify my conceptual descriptions.

In this section, I briefly describe the Medical Corps and Judge Advocate General Corps of each branch in the military, and review their histories. Then, I identify the puzzling aspects of how these professions are regarded in relation to the military.

2.2.1 Medical Corps

Each of the three branches of the U.S. military has its own medical department: the Army Medical Department, the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) for the Navy,[14] and the Air Force Medical Services (AFMS).[15] Multiple corps, including medical, dentistry, nursing, and administration staff these medical departments. Physicians are assigned to the medical corps.[16]

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[14] Physicians attached to the Marine Corps are under the Navy's BUMED.

[15] Greenwood, John T., and F. C. Berry (2005) *Medics at war: Military medicine from colonial times to the 21st century* Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press.

[16] Ginn, Richard V. N. (1997) *The history of the U.S. army medical service corps* Washington, D.C.: Office of the Surgeon General and Center of Military History, United States Army: For sale by the U.S. G.P.O., Supt. of Docs; Hartwick, Ann M. Ritchie (1995) *The army medical specialist corps: The 45th anniversary* Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army: For sale by the U.S. G.P.O., Supt. of Docs; Ireland, M. W., and Charles Lynch (1921) *The medical department of the united states army in the world war* Washington, U.S. Govt. print off;

In its earliest form, the medical corps for the Army and Navy were established in 1775, under order from the Continental Congress to care for revolutionary soldiers wounded in battle. Formal establishment of the medical department occurred in 1818 for the Army and 1842 for the Navy. Relative rank, pay, and position to line officers were conferred upon military physicians in the 1840s.

From the War of 1812 to the end of World War II, the Medical Corps mobilized during times of war and demobilized during times of peace. The absence of an institutionalized or standing cohort of military physicians combined with the unwillingness of line officers to heed medical advice meant that during each war, both medical and logistical[17] lessons had to be relearned.

After the Second World War, the increased global involvement of the United States meant that the military was consistently short physicians. The Physician Draft was the primary means of recruitment, but, "few, if any of the new physician draftees had experience in combat medicine."[18] A solution, proposed in the 1950s, by a physician named Frank Berry, offered drafted medical students three options: join after the internship; complete a partial residency, serve, then complete the remaining residency years; or complete full residency in a specialization, then serve. The "Berry Plan" both

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[17] By logistical, I mean an understanding of where to put military hospitals, evacuation practices, etc.

[18] Greenwood and Berry, 2005, p. 128

alleviated the shortages faced by military hospitals and ensured the supply of fully specialized physicians to the military.[19]

In 1973, the draft was eliminated and the All Volunteer Force took effect. Three years later, a medical school opened at the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, with the express purpose of training physicians to work for the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Today, graduates make up about twenty-five percent of the active duty medical officers.[20]

2.2.2 JAG Corps

The Judge Advocate General Corps (JAG corps) of the Army, Navy, and Air Force are designed to provide legal counsel to the military, and full spectrum legal capabilities to command.[21]

The Army's first legal system was set in place in 1775 by the Continental Congress, and was run by military officers: "the majority of [JAG] officers retained commissions in regiments of the line while serving as judge advocates, being commonly referred to by the titles of their grade in line."[22] JAG appointments were made during times of war, but no stable JAG corps was developed until the late 1880s. The process of

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[19] Berry, F. B. (1970) How the berry plan got started. *Medical Times* 98 (6): 104; Berry, F. B. 1976. The story of "the berry plan". *Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine* 52:3, p. 278.

[20] Greenwood and Barry, 2005

[21] U.S. Air Force JAG Corps. *JAG corps values and vision*.

[22] United States Army Judge Advocate General (1975) *The army lawyer a history of the judge advocate general's corps, 1775-1975,* Washington: U.S. G.P.O.

bringing the JAG practices in line with civilian practices (e.g. right to counsel) evolved over time via congressional acts.

The first U.S. Naval Code, adopted in 1797, was described as being simple enough for there to be, "no need for lawyers to interpret these simple codes, nor was there a need for lawyers in the uncomplicated administration of the Navy prior to the Civil War."[23] Yet, about fifty years later, the first Naval Judge Advocate was authorized (1865), and in 1880, the bill creating the Judge Advocate General was passed.

After the Second World War, the Army's office of the judge advocate general expanded to encompass military justice matters, civil matters relating to the department of the Army, and justice for war crimes.[24] The Air Force was established in 1947, and with it, the Air Force Office of the Judge Advocate General.[25] At the same time, "the Navy created a 'law specialist' program to allow line officers restricted duty to perform legal services."[26]

The mid-twentieth century was an era of change for the JAG corps both in its function and its personnel makeup. In 1950, the Navy JAG officer was required by law for be a lawyer;[27] the Judge Advocate General's school was opened and began to steadily expand. But most critically, in 1951, the Uniform Code of Military Justice was enacted,

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[23] U.S. Navy Judge Advocate General's Corps. Navy JAG history. Accessed on May 20, 2015, Available at: http://www.jag.navy.mil/history.htm.

[24] United States Army Judge Advocate General, 1975

[25] U.S. Air Force JAG Corps. *JAG corps values and vision*.

[26] U.S. Navy Judge Advocate General's Corps. Navy JAG history. Accessed on May 20, 2015 Available at: http://www.jag.navy.mil/history.htm.

[27] ibid

"providing for the first time, one criminal code applicable to all of the services and a military criminal justice system containing safeguards for the soldier not yet enjoyed by his civilian friends."[28] In 1968, the Military Justice Act was passed, which, "more closely aligned military justice with [the] federal criminal justice system."[29]

Today, JAG officers in the Army, Navy, and Air Force are recruited primarily during or immediately following law school. All JAG officers are required to attend officer training, wherein they are introduced to basic military skills and customs.[30] Then, all JAG officers are additionally required to enroll in a JAG basic course, where they receive instruction in military law.[31]

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[28] United States Army Judge Advocate General, 1975. p 203

[29] U.S. Air Force JAG Corps. *JAG corps values and vision*.

[30] Army JAG officers are required to attend the Officer Basic Course at Fort Benning, Georgia, a six week long course introducing new officers to military skills. The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School (2015) "Judge Advocate General Basic Course," Accessed on May 20, 2015; available at: https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/Sites/tjaglcs.nsf/homeContent.xsp?open&documentId=1AA8592B56D0ADE585257BB1006B8FA4. Navy JAG officers are required to attend the Officer Development School (ODS) in Newport, RI, a five week long course designed to initiate newly commissioned officers with the customs and traditions of naval service. U.S. Navy Judge Advocate General Corps (2012) *Guide to the U.S. Navy JAG Corps*. United States Navy. Air Force JAG officers are required to attend the Commissioned Officer Training at Maxwell Air Force Base in Montgomery, AL, a four and one half week course consisting of military training, leadership seminars, and classroom studies. United States Air Force (2014) Judge Advocate General "FAQs," Accessed on May 20, 2015, available at: http://www.airforce.com/jag/FAQs.

[31] Upon completing the Officer Basic Course, Army JAG officers are required to complete the Judge Advocate Basic Course in Charlottesville, VA, a ten and one half week course on military law. The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School (2015) "Judge Advocate General Basic Course," Accessed on May 20, 2015, Available at: https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/Sites/tjaglcs.nsf/homeContent.xsp?open&documentId=1AA8592B56D0ADE585257BB1006B8FA4. For Navy JAG officers, after completing the Officer Development School, they must attend the Basic Lawyer Course at the Naval Justice School in Newport, RI, a ten week course covering military law. U.S. Navy Judge Advocate General Corps (2012) *Guide to the U.S. Navy JAG Corps*. United States Navy. Air Force JAG officers are required to attend the Judge Advocate Staff Officer Course (JASOC) at Maxwell Air Force Base, after completing the Commissioned Officer Training. The

2.2.3 The Puzzle

Both physicians and lawyers have worked with the military for many years. The medical and legal tasks essential to the military have distinctive characteristics, which at least suggest these as areas of specialization and at most might classify individuals who complete these tasks to be considered members of distinct professions. Yet, the way in which physicians and lawyers interacted with military tasks is strikingly different.

Physicians interacted with the military in a way best described as "outsourcing." These individuals served for periods of time within the military often via the draft, before returning to civilian medical practices. Drafted for service, physicians learned necessary skills in the field, and until very recently, were predominantly only utilized during times of war.

In contrast, judge advocate generals were originally line officers who were given additional responsibilities. These individuals were not lawyers by training, nor did they identify themselves uniquely by this position. Yet, by the mid-twentieth century, the JAG corps underwent a massive overhaul wherein trained lawyers not only dominated the corps, but also were the only individuals allowed to serve in that capacity. Further, these officers were permanently embedded down to the company level, and received military specific training as part of their assignment.

JASOC is a nine-week course that covers many areas of military law. United States Air Force (2014) Judge Advocate General "Judge Advocate Staff Officer Course," Accessed May 20, 2015, available at: http://www.airforce.com/jag/careers/JAG_training/judge_advocate_staff_course.

How is it that two long-standing civilian professions interacted so differently with the U.S. military? Why did the medical community never seek out "military medicine" as an area over which to exercise control, particularly when they would have had the expertise to do so? In contrast, why did lawyers come to dominate the judge advocate general corps, when the military (up until the 1950s) saw this as an area that required military, not legal, expertise?

In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to develop, first, an understanding of what it means to be a "profession," what precisely "new military tasks" are, and finally, what types of "task assignments" are possible.

2.3 The Concept of Profession

Over time, our understanding of a profession has changed. In this section, I review the changing definition of "profession" over time, with specific reference to the sociological literature.[32] Then, I propose my new conceptualization of a profession.

2.3.1 A Changing Definition over Time

Two sociologists in Great Britain, Carr-Saunders and Wilson, conducted one of the first comprehensive surveys of professions. After comparing nearly thirty professions,[33] Carr-Saunders and Wilson concluded: "we have found that the application

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[32] Sociology has devoted an entire subfield to the study of professions and professionals. This broad understanding underpins both society's grasp of what a profession is, as well as its commonly understood meaning across social science.

[33] It should be noted that these scholars based their survey selection on those industries, which claimed to be, or were called professions. It should also be noted that they did not include the Church or the Army in their survey. The Church was omitted because its function was spiritual; the Army was omitted because "the service which soldiers are trained to render is one which it is hoped they will never be called

of an intellectual technique to the ordinary business life, acquired as the result of prolonged and specialized training, is the chief distinguishing characteristic of professions."[34] These scholars defined professions in a way that highlighted their function: "a means to control the asymmetric expert-client relation."[35]

In contrast, a later generation of scholars argued that it was not the function of a profession that was its defining characteristic. Rather, a profession's defining characteristic was the way society viewed the group. Geoffrey Millerson argued that organized occupational labor differed from a profession. For Millerson, a profession was characterized by non-manual labor and achieved high societal status by undergoing a process of professionalization. In other words, professions were composed of an educated work force that conformed to specific standards of proper or acceptable behavior.[36]

A third understanding of professions was introduced in the 1970s. These scholars argued that professions gained their privileged social status through a desire to maximize profits. Achieving the ability to autonomously define who was and was not a professional allowed the profession to translate knowledge and expertise into economic payout.[37]

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upon to perform" Carr-Saunders and Wilson. 1933. *The Professions The professions,* Oxford, The Clarendon Press. p. 3

[34] Carr-Saunders, A., and P. A. Wilson. 1933, p.491

[35] Abbott, Andrew Delano (1988) *The system of professions: An essay on the division of expert labor* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 15

[36] Millerson, Geoffrey (1998) *The qualifying associations a study in professionalization* London: Routledge, p. 9-10

[37] Larson, Magali Sarfatti (1977) *The rise of professionalism: A sociological analysis* Berkeley: University of California Press.

The fourth understanding of professions defined a profession by its cultural legitimacy rather than occupational similarity. These arguments, led by Bledstein, centered around the impact of professionalism as a culture on the American people, particularly the middle class. He argued that the culture of professionalism in the United States undermined individual integrity.[38]

In short, Sociologists' understanding of professionalism has shifted over time, moving from a definition centered on the function of professions in society, to a definition that emphasized the cultural impact of professions in society.

2.3.2 A New Conceptualization

Today, the commonly accepted understanding of a profession in academia is taken from the work of Andrew Abbott. Rather than define a profession based on the group characteristics or on the abstract impact on society, Abbott argued that professions could and should be defined based on the work (or the tasks) that they accomplish. Abbott argued that a profession could best be defined as, "an exclusive occupational group applying somewhat abstract knowledge to a particular case."[39]

However, Abbott never moved beyond this one sentence definition. In fact in his work, he actually spends more time debating the meaning of professionalization than the

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[38] Bledstein, Burton J. (1976) *The culture of professionalism: The middle class and the development of higher education in America*. 1st ed. ed. New York: Norton, p. xi

[39] Abbott, 1988, p. 8

meaning of profession.[40] In this section, I expand upon Abbott's definition, and explore its constituting pieces.

In Abbott's definition, there are two main pieces: an exclusive occupational group, and applied abstract knowledge. In addition to these two components, I argue that self-perpetuation and growth must also be added. Thus, profession can be defined as "an exclusive occupational group applying somewhat abstract knowledge to a particular case"[41] that seeks to self-perpetuate and grow. From this, we can create the following concept map:



Figure 1: Solid Lines indicate necessity.

[40] ibid, p. 9-20

[41] ibid, p. 8

The above map depicts the four constituting components or elements of a profession: exclusive occupational group, applied abstract knowledge, self-perpetuation, and growth. All of these components can be considered necessary for a profession to exist, and jointly sufficient for the profession to exist. Without any one element, the subject in question would cease to be a profession

The constituting elements, "exclusive occupational group," "abstract knowledge," "self-perpetuation," and "growth" are explored in depth below.

Exclusive occupational group. An exclusive occupational group means an informal or formal social network that is limited in its membership to individuals who share a common skill/knowledge base. It is exclusive, or limited to the object or objects designated, in the individuals who may be labeled "professionals." The inherent social nature of the network allows the group to naturally limit its membership.[42] I argue that an exclusive occupational group is a necessary component of a profession because it is what allows the profession to act as a unit.

Applied Abstract knowledge. Applied abstract knowledge can be recognized as understanding derived from education or training that is easily adaptable to multiple scenarios or tasks and is applied to at least one particular case. In other words, the knowledge is abstract in that its meaning is apart from concrete realities or objects. I

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[42] Balance Theory from Social Psychology postulates that: a) people prefer balances (reciprocal) relationships; b) people prefer to interact with individuals with whom they share strong attachments to one or more shared characteristics; c) unbalanced relationships produce discomfort; d) people will move from unbalanced to balanced relationships. It is the desire for balanced relationships combined with the preference for shared characteristics that allow cliques, or groups to form. Kilduff, Martin and Wenpin Tsai (2003) *Social Networks and Organizations*. London: Sage Publication Ltd. In this context, the shared characteristic is the occupation, which combined with the preference for balanced relationships create the exclusionary nature of the group.

argue humans have the ability to think abstractly based on the abilities of self-awareness and imagination.[43] As such, abstract knowledge may be derived from skills. However, this leaves open the possibility that all skills are abstract knowledge. In contrast, I argue that the potential for abstraction depends on the adaptability of the skill to a variety of cases. I argue that applied abstract knowledge is a necessary characteristic of a profession because it is what endows the profession with the ability to claim responsibility for tasks in society.

Self-perpetuation. Self-perpetuation is something capable of indefinite continuation. I argue that self-perpetuation is a necessary characteristic of a profession because if the profession is to survive for any length of time, it must have a personified desire to recreate itself, its structure, across generations.

Growth. Growth is the act or process of development. I argue that growth is a necessary characteristic of a profession because in order for the profession to remain relevant, it must be willing to adapt to the changing tasks and technology that emerge.

2.3.3 Examples of the New Conceptualization

Below, I examine two examples of professions, as understood by the new conceptualization posed above. One is a traditionally accepted profession: physicians. The second is a nontraditional profession: computer hackers.

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[43] Covey, Stephen R. (2004) *The 7 habits of highly effective people: Restoring the character ethic* New York: Free Press.

Example 1: Physicians. In the United States, all practicing physicians are required to pass the United States Medical Licensing Examination, a three-step exam for medical licensure.[44] Additionally, most physicians also seek an American Board of Medical Specialties certification in one of twenty-four areas of specialty.[45] The licensing requirements allow only certain individuals to seek employment as "physicians" by virtue of their education and training. Thus, Physicians fulfills the necessary condition of "exclusive occupational group." When considering training, physicians must complete a four-year baccalaureate degree followed by an additional four years of medical school. Then, they are required to enter into a three to seven year training program wherein they gain professional practice training under a senior physician.[46] The exam required for practice "assesses a physician's ability to apply knowledge, concepts, and principles, and to demonstrate fundamental patient-centered skill, that are important in health and disease, and that constitute the basis of safe and effective patient care."[47] Thus, physicians fulfill the necessary condition of "abstract knowledge."

The American Medical Association has a specific council, founded in 1904 that focuses on medical education, specifically, it looks into transformation of medical

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[44] United States Medical Licensing Examination (2015) "About the USMLE" Accessed on May 20, 2015, Available at: http://www.usmle.org/about/.

[45] Thus the term "Board Certified"

[46] American Medical Association (2015) "Requirements for Becoming a Physician" Accessed onMay 20, 2015, available at: http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/education-careers/becoming-physician.page?.

[47] United States Medical Licensing Examination (2015) "About the USMLE" Accessed May 20, 2015, available at: http://www.usmle.org/about/.

education and the physician workforce.[48] Thus, the medical community organizes educational programs that facilitate entrance into the exclusive occupational group (i.e. through medical schools), fulfilling the necessary condition of self-perpetuation. Finally, the medical community has grown over the past five years; in 2010, 16,836 individuals graduated from American Association of Medical Colleges, while in 2014, that number grew to 18,078.[49] Additionally, the number of physicians in the U.S. grew from approximately 822,000 in 2011 to 1,014,00 in 2014.[50] These numbers illustrate growth, fulfilling the necessary condition of growth.

Example 2: Computer Hackers. The informal social network that exists online in chat rooms allows for a socialization process to emerge. For example, *2600*, a magazine begun in the 1980s for computer hackers organizes meetings and passes along "hacking tips" to its readers.[51] This kind of informal social network becomes an exclusive occupational group. The common characteristic of computer hacking skills and the self-limitation through connections made at meetings ties the group together. The exclusive occupational group also manifests itself in more formal ways. For example, the website

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[48] American Medical Association (2015) "About the Council on Medical Education" Accessed on May 20, 2015, available at: http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/about-ama/our-people/ama-councils/council-medical-education.page?.

[49] American Association of Medical Colleges (2015) "Total Graduates by U.S. Medical School and Sex, 2010-2014," Accessed on May 20, 2015, available at: https://www.aamc.org/download/321532/data/factstable27-2.pdf.

[50] United States Department of Labor. "Employed—Physicians and Surgeons" *BLS Data Viewer*, Accessed on May 20, 2015, available at: http://beta.bls.gov/dataViewer/view/timeseries/LNU02038328;jsessionid=967A67BA4AFCAD254863891471804307.tc_instance6.

[51] 2600. "2600 Meeting Guidelines," Accessed on May 20, 2015, available at: http://www.2600.com/meetings/guidelines.html.

"Hacker's List" is an online forum that allows hackers to bid for hacking jobs. Hackers employed by the site go through an approval process, must maintain a 3/5 star customer satisfaction rating and are charged a percentage of each bid, with lower ratings requiring higher percentages.[52] Computer hackers also fulfill the necessary component of "abstract knowledge" because computer programming can be considered abstract. In 1998, when L0pht testified before Congress that they could bring down the Internet in 30 minutes, hacking became a desired skill for application. A black market for the application of hacking techniques, to steal or use malware to infect computers emerged. Computer hackers could apply their skills to secure or to make insecure systems and information.[53] The hacking community also engages in self-perpetuating actions. *2600* facilitates local hacker meetings by posting meeting locations in different cities all over the world. In addition, the conferences hosted by the magazine advertise individuals willing to teach new hackers hacking skills.[54] Finally, because technology creates both new tasks and new tools, the hacker profession is one of inherent growth.[55]

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[52] Hacker's List (n.d.) "Frequently Asked Questions," Accessed on May 2, 2015, available at: https://hackerslist.com/faq.

[53] Ward, Mark (2011) "A brief history of hacking." *BBC News*, Accessed on May 20, 2015, available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-13686141.

[54] 2600 (n.d.) "2600 Meeting Guidelines," Accessed on May 20, 2015, available at: http://www.2600.com/meetings/guidelines.html; Hope X (n.d.) "Hope X Projects," Accessed on May 20, 2015, available at: http://x.hope.net/projects.html.

[55] Attribution problems will always make measuring these individuals nearly impossible. However, as websites like Hacker's List continue to populate E-commerce, it will eventually become possible to track trends in hacker numbers.

2.4 Professional Tasks

Critical to the understanding of professions are the tasks to which they apply their abstract knowledge. Below, I examine two conceptual pieces of professional tasks: "new military tasks" and "task assignment." In this dissertation, "new military tasks" are a critical piece of each case in the population, and "task assignment" functions as the dependent variable.

2.4.1 "New Military Tasks"

In this dissertation, I define a "new military task" as an effort for the purpose of defending the national interest that is driven either by technology creation or by a change in demand for the type of service provided. This definition produces the following concept map:



Figure 2: Dashed lines indicate sufficiency.

The two components of the definition, "technology creation" and "change in demand for type of service provided" are considered sufficient components. If either one is present, then a "new military task" can be said to exist. However, neither is necessary for a "new military task" to exist.

In order to fully understand the conceptualization of a "new military task," "technology creation" and "change in demand for type of service created" must both be analyzed.

Technology creation. The technology in this condition refers to the creation of any/all technology and is not limited to technology created or used solely for military purposes. For example, both fighter jets and the Internet may be considered cases of a "new military task" by technology creation.

Change in demand for type of service provided. A change in demand for type of service provided refers to a government request for a heretofore-unpracticed type of service. Examples would include a change in the area of operation, a change in the skill required, a change in overall goal. Important to note, a change in demand is easy to confuse or conflate with the economic terms "shifts in the demand curve" or "increases in demand." An increase or shift in demand negates the "new" piece of "new military task" because it is simply referring to a change in amount instead of a change in type. The key is that the type of service is changing.

2.4.1.1 Examples and Counterexamples of "New Military Tasks"

In this section, I examine two examples of "new military tasks," representing "technology creation" and "change in demand for type of service provided" respectively.

In addition, I examine a counterexample that depicts a change in the amount of service demanded.

Example 1: Technology Creation as a sufficient condition of "new military task:" Nuclear strategy. In this example, the new technology that was created was nuclear weapons. The creation of this new technology created a new military task: nuclear weapons strategy. The emergence of nuclear weapons meant that the U.S. government needed to know how to effectively use and defend against nuclear weapons.[56]

Example 2: change in demand of type of service provided as a sufficient condition of "new military task:" counterinsurgency. In this example, the type of service demanded changed to include aiding another state in countering an insurgent threat (1961 at the beginning of the Vietnam War). The United States had not engaged in this type of counterinsurgency operation before.[57] In the past, most military engagements of the United States occurred between soldiers of two opposing societies. The U.S. military had never before been called upon to counter an insurgent threat to aid another state. Thus, this counterinsurgency was a new type of service demanded by the government.

Counterexample: U.S. military medical needs after World War II. In this example, both "technology creation" and "change in demand for type of service provided" are considered. When examining "technology creation" in this case, it is evident that medical technology has steadily improved throughout U.S. history. However,

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[56] Kaplan, Fred (1983) *The wizards of Armageddon*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

[57] Blaufarb, Douglas S. (1977) *The counterinsurgency era: U.S. doctrine and performance, 1950 to the present* New York: Free Press.

this did not change the overarching task or goal of the U.S. Army Medical Corps, BUMED, or AFMS. The task has always been and so remains, the effective and efficient treatment of the wounded and the promotion of sanitation and nutrition to prevent disease among the troops. When considering "change in demand of type of service provided," it is clear that the location of service has often changed (i.e. movement from Europe to Southeast Asia); however, the service provided has remained the same. The overarching goal remains consistent.[58]

2.4.2 "Task Assignment"

In addition to conceptualizing a "new military task," in this section, I also describe the task assignment. A "new military task" is the scope condition for the population of cases under study in this dissertation, and "task assignment" is the dependent variable. "Task assignment" represents the potential outcomes or commission of authority. There are three potential outcomes: civilian authority, military authority, or mixed authority.

Civilian authority occurs when a civilian profession is considered the sole expert authority on the task. For example, when the systems analysts were given full control over the budgetary operations in the Department of Defense, they gained full authority over the task of the military budget.[59]

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[58] Greenwood and Barry, 2005

[59] Enthoven, Alain C., and K. W. Smith (2005) *How much is enough? Shaping the defense program, 1961-1969,* Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp.

Mixed authority occurs when two or more professions are considered authorities on the task. Mixed authority can be depicted by either a division of labor between professions or the acknowledgement of the expert knowledge of both professions. For example, when academics and Air Force Commanders were both struggling to assert authority over nuclear strategy, the president acknowledged contributions by both and continued to solicit advice from both professions.[60]

Military authority occurs when a military profession is considered the sole expert authority on the task. For example, Dr. Vladimir Zworykin developed electron imaging-tub technology while working on television technology at the Radio Corporation of America. Yet, this technology eventually came under the full authority of the military that used it as a basis for the "snooperscope," or what would be recognized today as night vision goggles.[61]

2.5 Conclusions

In this dissertation, "professions" are the unit of analysis. A "new military task" that is ultimately assigned to a profession, frames the population of cases under observation. This allows us to return to the question of why the medical corps and the JAG corps followed different paths when interacting with the military.

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[60] Kaplan, 1983

[61] Smith, Stephon W. (2007) "Zworykin, Vladimir." Accessed on February 13 2015, Available at http://pabook.libraries.psu.edu/palitmap/bios/Zworykin__Vladimir.html.

As evidenced above, physicians can be considered a profession by this study. There are two events that might be considered "new military tasks" when considering the interaction of physicians and the military. First, some might argue that the United States' increased international engagement that resulted in a lack of qualified physicians in the military was a change in demand, thus qualifying it as a "new military task." As discussed above, a "change in demand for the type of service provided" is a sufficient for a "new military task" to exist. However, the demand after World War II was for an increased number of physicians doing military work. The actual substance of the work itself did not change. In other words, there was a change in the amount demanded, not a change in the type of service demanded.

Second, the establishment of the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences might be considered a change in demand. In this case, the change in demand would be for physicians who had a particular specialty in military medicine. The establishment of the Uniformed Services Health Professional Scholarship Program, wherein the government covered the expenses of medical school and in return physicians would serve as officers in the medical corps, would further support such an argument. A demand for specialized military medicine would constitute a change in the type of service provided. However, it is unclear if such a change in demand actually occurred. While the university was established, its graduates make up only twenty-five percent of the physicians in the medical corps. In addition, it is unclear that the scholarship program provides any specific instruction in military or battlefield medicine.

When considering the JAG corps, it is fairly clear that during the Second World War, the increase in the type of tasks demanded by the United States government

changed. Instead of demanding only legal counsel for court-martialing, the U.S. government also demanded legal advice on such diverse topics as government defense contracts, army patents, real estate, taxes, and war crimes. Therefore, it is unsurprising that by the 1950s, trained legal professionals took an active role in filling JAG positions. The movement towards having only qualified lawyers serve in the corps was begun in the early 1950s, and was finally instituted in the Military Justice Act of 1968. Civilian-trained professionals had gained full responsibility for a military task.[62]

The above comparison helps to illustrate the impetus behind examining "new military tasks" as a scope condition or catalyst for the puzzling assignment of civilians to tasks historically the purview of the military. However, the case of the JAG corps still leaves us with the question: when the military saw military justice as the purview of the commander, why did civilian lawyers end up gaining full responsibility in the office of the judge advocate general?

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[62] While the JAG corps members consider themselves as members of two distinct professions, the legal profession and the military profession, from various government documents and histories, it is clear that civilian lawyers drafted during the Second World War, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War were crucial in the movement towards hiring only legally trained professionals to serve in the corps.

CHAPTER 3:

COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE IN MILITARY TASKS

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I present a theory of competitive advantage that I argue explains why civilians gain responsibility for some military tasks, the military for others, and for still others, civilians and military share the responsibility. I begin by reviewing the literature that has dealt with questions of professionalism of both civilians and soldiers in the military context. Then, I present my new theory of competitive advantage and an alternative explanation: bureaucratic politics. Finally, I explain my methodology and my case selection strategy.

3.2 Grounding in the Literature

While several scholars have recently begun to explore Private Military Companies (PMCs) and their impact on U.S. military operations, none have addressed the question of why civilians gain dominant responsibility for some military tasks, the military for others, and in still others, there is a mixed outcome. Deborah Avant's work deals primarily with the legal and ethical effects of using PMCs.[63] P.W. Singer works primarily with the

[63] Avant, Deborah D. (2000) "Privatizing Military Training" *Foreign Policy in Focus.* 5:17; Avant, Deborah (2005) Private security companies. *New Political Economy* 10 (1): 121; Avant, Deborah. 2007. Contracting for services in U.S. military operations. *PS, Political Science Politics* 40 (3): 457-60;

concept of PMCs, developing a framework in which to define the work that they do.[64] These scholars approach the study of PMCs from a company or industry perspective, meaning that the unit of analysis must either be the individual company or a subset of the industry (i.e. Singer's typology). While these authors provide critical service in exposing the issue of PMCs in U.S. military operations, neither offers a convincing answer to the question of *why* PMCs, and civilians more generally, are given rights and responsibilities for tasks that historically have been the sole purview of the military.

To gain a more in depth understanding of why civilian penetration has occurred in military tasks, I turn to the literature on military professionalism. Early scholars sought to ask and answer questions regarding the role and responsibility of the soldier. As such, they can provide additional theoretical insight as to why certain tasks may fall to the military while others fall to civilians.

Samuel P. Huntington's 1957 book, *The Soldier and the State,* sparked a new literature and understanding of professionalism in a military context. Huntington defined military professionals as individuals whose expertise centered on "the direction, operation, and control of a human organization whose primary function is the application of violence."[65] Huntington's definition restricted military professionals to the unified

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Avant, Deborah, and Renee de Nevers (2013) "Military Contractors and the American Way of War." In *The Modern American Military*, by David M. Kennedy, 135-152. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[64] Singer, P.W. (2005) Outsourcing War. *Foreign Affairs* 84:2, p. 119; Singer, P.W. (2002) "Corporate Warriors: The rise of the privatized military industry and its ramifications for international security" *International Security* 26 (3): 186; Singer, P.W. (2003) *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

[65] Huntington, Samuel P. (1957) *The soldier and the state; the theory and politics of civil-military relations* Cambridge, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, p11

hierarchy of officers over soldiers, all of whom were focused on traditional combat. Such a description did not accurately reflect the security environment of the late 1950s and in many ways is completely foreign to the current manpower mix.

In 1960, Morris Janowitz's book *The Professional Soldier* noted the swiftly changing mix of men (soldier and civilian) involved in military affairs. Janowitz believed these changes in twentieth century warfare did not allow for professional soldiers to be defined via a strictly technological, military operational realm. Rather, he believed the military organization was transforming into a constabulary force that would be "continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations because it has incorporated a protective military posture."[66] According to Janowitz, the professional soldier was a managerial officer whose professionalization should be geared toward effective oversight of both soldiers and civilian specialists to establish occupational control. Yet, Janowitz's understanding of the professional soldier failed to consider anyone working outside of the unified bureaucracy. By the mid 1960s, the counterinsurgency operations being conducted in Vietnam included members of the intelligence community and USAID—civilian professionals who were working beside rather than within the military's bureaucratic hierarchy.[67]

In 1973, Alfred Stepan argued that the increasing need to counter guerilla tactics and other internal security issues was causing militaries to "play a key role in interpreting

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[66] Janowitz, Morris (1960) *The professional soldier, a social and political portrait* Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, p 417-418

[67] Blaufarb, Douglas S. (1977) *The counterinsurgency era: U.S. doctrine and performance, 1950 to the present* New York: Free Press.

and dealing with domestic political problems owing to its greater technological and professional skills in handling internal security issues."[68] He noted that despite the U.S. military's original intent to use these political skills abroad, they were increasingly using them at home as well. While Stepan's "new professionalism" helped explain how the military professional may have related to other civilian professionals outside the military's hierarchy, it fails to explain what civilians were doing in military operations in the first place. Stepan writes that the new professionalism will actually cause role expansion for the military.[69]

I argue that while the military may have gotten more political, that did not necessarily lead to an increased number of tasks upon which they were the expert authority, at least in the United States. For example, by the 1990s, the Private Military Companies were experiencing a boom to the extent that analysts were predicting that by the new millennium, the U.S. Military would be unable to go to war without employing these companies.[70]

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[68] Stepan, Alfred (1973) "The new professionalism of internal warfare and military role expansion" In *Armies and Politics in Latin America.* New York: Holmes & Meier, p. 51

[69] In a short aside, it should be noted that Huntington, Janowitz, and Stepan all stated that military professionals were limited to the Commissioned Officer class. However, limiting the definition of a military professional to this small group of individuals discounts the expert knowledge held by soldiers who are not commissioned officers. As such, this dissertation adopts a broader definition of "profession" such that any Active Duty member of the U.S. Armed Forces would be considered a "military professional."

[70] Kidwell, Deborah C. (2005) *Public war, private fight? The United States and private military companies* Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: Combat Studies Institute Press.

3.3 Competitive Advantage in Military Tasks

The literature on PMCs examines the role of civilians in military operations, while the literature on military professionalism examines the role of soldiers in military operations. In this dissertation I bridge the gap between these two literature by considering civilian and military professions on equal terms by asking: why, when the United States possesses an elite "profession of arms," are civilians being given legitimate authority to engage in combat while trained soldiers are being utilized in non-combat roles?[71]

To gain greater understanding of how professions generally attain rights and responsibilities for various tasks, I draw on literature in sociology, which studies "professionalism"[72] Using what sociologists have learned about "professionalism" in general should bring greater insight into the current nature of contemporary military professionalism in particular.

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[71] As discussed in the introduction, soldiers in non-combat roles might include tasks like those done by soldiers in Afghanistan, digging wells and building schools. Other examples might include soldiers being deployed to aid in the efforts against the spread of Ebola in West Africa in Operation United Assistance in 2014. Freedom Du Lac, J. (2014) "The U.S. military's new enemy: Ebola. Operation United Assistance is now underway." *The Washington Post*. Published October 13, 2014. Accessed June 4, 2016. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2014/09/30/the-u-s-military-forces-fighting-the-war-on-ebola/

[72] Carr-Saunders, A., P. A. Wilson (1933) *The Professions,* Oxford: The Clarendon Press; Wilensky, Harold L. (1967) *Organizational Intelligence; knowledge and policy in government and industry,* New York: Basic Books; Larson, Magali Sarfatti (1977) *The Rise of Professionalism: A sociological analysis* Berkeley: University of California Press.

3.3.1 The System of Professions

Specifically, Andrew Abbott's innovative book: *The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor*,[73] theorized that there existed a "system of professions"[74] wherein professions, defined as, "an exclusive occupational group applying somewhat abstract knowledge to a particular case," competed over rights and responsibilities to tasks.[75] If a profession wanted to win the competition and receive full control over the task, it needed to have a competitive advantage over the other professions.

The theory functions similarly to the market theory of firms. Professions, like firms are considered unitary actors who want to self-perpetuate and grow. As such, they seek to gain control over emerging tasks. Professions gain control over these tasks when they have a competitive advantage relative to other professions who are also attempting to gain control of the task.

When considering how civilians and military professions gain rights and responsibilities in the military case, I make three major contributions to this theoretical argument. First, I explain why competition between professions occurs. Second, I reassess the theory's implicit assumptions that undermine the ability to assess the military case and provide a set of explicit assumptions that allow me to test whether a profession's competitive advantage leads to its gaining responsibility for a military task. Finally, I

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[73] In Sociology, Abbott's work is widely considered the latest definitive work on this subject.

[74] Very similar to Waltz's Theory of International Politics, 1979

[75] Abbott, Andrew Delano (1988) *The System of Professions: An essay on the division of expert labor* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p 8

create a clear conceptualization of competitive advantage, which I argue is the driving variable behind task assignment.

3.3.2 Defining Competition

As it is currently described, the "system of professions" theory lacks an explicit cause of competition. In this section, I remedy this omission by exploring the causes of competition between military and civilian professions over military tasks.

There are several ways to think about causes of competition. As political scientists, we are most familiar with Waltz's theory of international politics that posits that competition is a function of anarchy. Because no world government exists, states compete to be the most powerful state in the system in order to ensure their survival. However, anarchy does not function well as a cause of competition amid professions for a variety of reasons, including the fact that professions that compete over military tasks are operating in a monopsony (single consumer) market. The very fact that competition is structured to persuade a single consumer means that the system is not anarchic, per se.

In economics, competition in the market is a function of scarcity. Because goods are scarce, buyers and sellers compete over goods in order to maximize their utility (for sellers, this is their profit; for buyers, this is their savings). This causal understanding of competition comes far closer to the realities of professional competition in the military case. The new tasks, over which professions in the military case compete, are inherently "scarce." As new tasks emerge from technological innovation (e.g. the development of the atomic weapon) or from governmental demand (e.g. the use of counterinsurgency), the number of these new tasks cannot be predicted. As such, the emergence of any new task is inherently scarce in the sense that a profession cannot risk forgoing an attempt to

claim responsibility for it, because there is a high level of uncertainty as to if and when another "new military task" might emerge.

New tasks are attractive because they add to a profession's budget (or budgetary priority) and overall influence. Thus, professions claim responsibility for tasks because it maximizes their utility, or their ability to self-perpetuate and grow.

Thus, I argue that in the military case, the competition of professions over tasks is a function of scarcity.

3.3.3 Assumptions

The "system of professions" theory includes four implicit assumptions that unto now, have prevented the examination of competing professions over military tasks. In this section, I identify those assumptions and provide an alternative set of explicit assumptions that allows for the analysis of competition in the assignment of new military tasks.

TABLE 1

"SYSTEMS OF PROFESSIONS" IMPLICIT ASSUMPTIONS

Implicit Assumptions
1. Professions want to move from a state of pure competition to a state of monopoly over a task.
2. Demand for tasks do not change, or change very slowly over time.
3. Professions self-select into the competition.
4. Individuals do not move between professions.

The theory's first implicit assumption is that there are multiple consumers of the professional expertise. Competition for tasks may be played out in one of three arenas: the pubic sphere, the social sphere, and the workplace. However, the underlying assumption is that the task that is desired by society has multiple consumers within that society.[76] For non-military tasks, this implicit assumption is not problematic. Take for example the treatment of illness, a task that has been competed over by various professions over time. When sick, an individual will utilize the professional services of someone associated with the medical field. In the United States, this often indicates a doctor, denoting the dominating preference for the professional MD in the task of treatment of illness by members of the general public. To maintain this public opinion dominance, MDs must ensure that individual consumers consistently choose to visit them instead of a homeopath or other practitioner. A similar situation occurs within the workplace arena: the professionals must compete to be regarded and referenced as the experts on a given topic by everyone operating within the workplace (i.e. asking an MD rather than an RN). Finally, in the legal arena, MDs need to ensure that their exclusive

[76] In a 2005 article, Abbott amended his theory to include the concept of interacting ecologies: each of his original audiences (or arenas) is itself an ecology: "not only does a jurisdictional tactic like licensing have to succeed in the system of professions, it also has to succeed in the ecology of the state" (247). In other words, Abbott recognized that in order for a profession to win jurisdictional competitions, the profession's success had to benefit not only the members of the profession, but also the members of the given audience (arena). What Abbott proposes in this paper can be thought of in the context of levels of analysis. In many ways Abbott's system of professions is a systemic level theory, and what Abbott is saying in his 2005 article is that the group and individual levels of analysis are important as well. I argue that his emphasis on the lower levels of analysis does not preclude study at the systemic level, particularly where it has not yet been applied. Abbott, Andrew (2005) "Linked Ecologies: States and universities as environments for professions" *Sociological Theory*. 23:4, pp. 245-274.

rights are maintained both by legislation and by the courts. As such, politicians, lawyers, and judges must also acknowledge MD expertise in the area of illness consistently.

This type of competitive arena is one in which professions seek to establish a monopoly. A monopoly is defined as a single firm that dominates an industry. Firms desire to move from a purely competitive market to one in which they are the monopoly because it allows them to set a higher price for their good or service.[77] Similarly, in the system of professions, professions attempt to achieve full responsibility, or a monopoly over the task. Professions want to be the only game in town, giving individual consumers (whether that be in the public, workplace, or legal arena) no other option but to utilize their expertise.

However, when considering military affairs, there exists only one consumer: the government. As such, any profession connected with a military task is subject to the desires and demands of one consumer. This phenomenon is called a monopsony, defined as, "a market structure in which there is only a single buyer of a good, service, or resource."[78] Thus, I make the assumption that professions deal with a single consumer: the U.S. government.

The second implicit assumption is that the demand for tasks is relatively constant; task death occurs only via slow-changing cultural structures or via a strict set of revolutionary external changes, including: technological replacement, organizational change, or natural objects or facts. This specification implies that unless a revolutionary

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[77] McConnell, Campbell R. and Stanley L. Brue (2008) *Microeconomics: Principles, Problems, and Policies*, 17th edition. Boston: McGraw-Hill Irwin.

[78] McConnell and Brue, 2008 p G-13

external change occurs, demand for a given profession for a given task will remain relatively constant.

These types of revolutionary changes can be thought of as market shocks, or changes that shift the demand curve.[79] When the market is not being subject to shocks, it is possible to measure the elasticity, or the magnitude of demand change given the change in price. An elastic good is one whose demand changes greatly as price changes (i.e. when the price of ice cream greatly increases, consumers are less likely to buy it- demand goes down). An inelastic good is one whose demand changes relatively little as price changes (i.e. when the price of gas increases, consumers will still buy it in about the same amount).[80] If tasks die only by a "market shock" or very slowly over a long period of time, then implicitly, the assumption is that tasks are inelastic goods.

Yet in the military case, the demand for military action, particularly in the past twenty-five years, has appeared very elastic. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States' lack of an existentially threatening state has allowed it to shift attention to interests which previously were given lower priority.[81] Such a shift in focus, combined with the prohibitively high costs associated with military affairs in terms of dollars,[82]

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[79] In other words, the actual equation of the demand curve changes, either by shifting the intercept (i.e. moving it up or down), or by changing the slope of the demand (i.e. making the line steeper or flatter).

[80] McConnell and Brue, 2008

[81] For example, an increased focus on international peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention

[82] For 2017, the budget request made by the U.S. Department of Defense was $582.7 billion. Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) Chief Financial Officer (2016) *Defense Budget Overview: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Request*. Washington D.C.: Department of Defense.

political capital, and human lives, has allowed the elasticity of demand in the area of military affairs to be sharply displayed. Thus, I make the assumption that demand for tasks may change rapidly, allowing for new tasks to emerge quickly or for tasks to disappear.

The third implicit assumption is that professions self-select into the competition over tasks. In other words, professions as a unit are not assigned specific tasks by a third party. Rather, professions will choose whether or not to compete for responsibility for a task.

However, given the argument made above about the monopsony structure in military affairs, it is clear that this assumption also provides problems when applying the systems of professions to the military case. The single consumer government would have the power to demand that a given profession participate in the competition for a given task. As such, assignment to the task competition versus self-selection into the competition becomes an important factor in predicting the success rates of professions in achieving full jurisdiction in a given task area. Thus, I make the assumption that some professions self-select into the competition while others may be legally required to participate.

The final implicit assumption is that the personified professions do not trade members between them. In other words an individual professional does not change from the profession of "doctor" to the profession of "homeopath." Rather, the members of these groups are implicitly assumed to be mutually exclusive.

However, the movement of military professionals out of public service and into the private sector does occur. In a 2007 article published in *Parameters*, Captain Mark

Lindermann discussed how in the United States, civilian contractors, like Blackwater USA,[83] who work with the U.S. military have increasingly offered "combat related specialties," and recruit former members of the military.[84] Yet, it would be false to say that the individuals who are employed by the private military companies are of the same profession as military officers. The legal guidelines and specific expertise differ enough that the two can be thought of more as professions competing for similar tasks rather than as a single profession. Thus, I make the assumption that individual professionals may move between professions.

Given the implicit assumptions outlined above, it is clear why scholars have never examined competitive advantage as an explanation for why particular civilian or military professions gain responsibility for military tasks.

My explicit assumptions regarding the structure of competition (#1-3) and the movement of individuals between professions (#4) allow me to develop a new theory of competing professions that can be tested in the military case.

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[83] Blackwater USA now operates under the name Xe, but at the time of writing did not have a functioning website (privatemilitary.org).

[84] Lindermann, Mark (2007) "Civilian Contractors Under Military Law." *Parameters*.

TABLE 2

"COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE" ASSUMPTIONS

Assumptions of the Theory of Competitive Advantage for Military Tasks
1. Professions deal with a single consumer (the U.S. government)
2. Demand may change rapidly, allowing for new tasks to emerge quickly or for tasks to disappear.
3. Some professions will self-select into the competition, but others may be legally required to compete for the task.
4. Individual professionals may move between professions.

3.3.4 A Theory of Competitive Advantage for Military Tasks

Faced with the scarcity of "new military tasks," professions compete with one another to gain responsibility for those tasks. In other words, the causal mechanism of the theory can be depicted as follows:

"New military task" → competition → "task assignment"

Recall from the previous chapter that a "new military task" is defined as a task that is driven either by technology creation or by a change in demand for the type of service provided. The "new military task" is a precondition for the cases in the population. [85]

If a "new military task" exists, my theory posits that competition for responsibility for that task will occur between professions because these new military

[85] Another way of phrasing this would be to say that a "new military task" is a necessary condition for a case, or a scope condition.

tasks are scarce and gaining responsibility for tasks brings the profession added budgetary priority and influence. But simply saying that competition occurs does not explain why the U.S. government assigns a task to a certain profession.

My theory argues that competition favors the profession that possesses a competitive advantage. U.S. government policymakers evaluate the competitive advantage of professions and assign responsibility for tasks to the profession that provides a greater value[86] in accomplishing the task than its competitors. Therefore, the determining factor in the competition is the competitive advantage of the professions.



Figure 3: Diagram of Competition

[86] Greater value can be considered to result from higher competency, greater efficiency, a higher level of commitment, a larger number of available and trained personnel, and a higher level of organizational unity.

I conceptualize competitive advantage through a series of five sufficient indicators: member retention, organizational unity, competency, commitment, and efficiency. Creating a conceptualization of competitive advantage means that my theory has the ability to predict specific assignment outcomes.[87]

The competitive advantage of the profession is what leads to the "task assignment." Recall from the previous chapter that task assignment is a typology, and varies over three potential outcomes: civilian authority, when a civilian profession is considered the sole expert authority on the task; military authority, when a military profession is considered the sole expert authority on the task; and mixed authority, when two or more professions are considered authorities on the task.

3.4 Testing the Theory: Predictions and Operationalization

3.4.1 Predictions

The theory produces two hypotheses:

> *H1: Assignment of responsibility for a task favors the profession that has a competitive advantage over the other profession(s) because competition favors the profession that provides a superior value.*

Testing a series of sub-hypotheses can develop the hypothesis, that military and civilian professions gain expert authority over tasks by having a competitive advantage:

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[87] Previous scholarship examining the "System of Professions" did not attempt to predict which profession would gain control of a specific task. My contribution allows for this type of prediction to be made and tested.

H1a: If a civilian profession has a significant competitive advantage over the other professions, then the outcome will be civilian authority.

H1b: If all professions possess advantages but no profession has a comparatively higher competitive advantage, then the outcome will be mixed authority.

H1c: If a military profession has a significant competitive advantage over the other professions, then the outcome will be military authority.

This hypothesis may be falsified if a profession that does not display a clear competitive advantage gains rights and responsibility to a task. It may also be falsified if a profession that has a clear competitive advantage does not gain rights and responsibilities to a task.

In addition to testing predictions about the specific outcomes, I can also test predictions about the process by which policymakers arrived at the task assignment decision. These predictions are captured by hypothesis 2.

H2: The task assignment process is driven by the U.S. Government's perception of the profession's capacity to fulfill the task.

A further series of sub-hypotheses can develop this hypothesis:

H2a: If the profession that is most capable of fulfilling the task does not pursue the task, they may still be assigned to the task.

H2b: If presidential advisers strongly favor assignment of a task to a profession that does not possess a competitive advantage, that profession is unlikely to be assigned the task.

This hypothesis may be falsified if a profession gains rights and responsibilities for a task despite its lack of competitive advantage and the assignment was driven either

by the professions' pursuit of the task, or lobbying on the profession's behalf by a presidential adviser.

3.4.2 Operationalization

Competitive advantage can be captured via a series of indicators:

Member retention: if a profession retains all or most of its members, then it will have a competitive advantage over a profession that cannot provide sufficient number of professionals. For example, if the U.S. Army retains the soldiers it trains (e.g. they do not leave for the employ of Private Military Companies), then it gains an advantage over professions who lose members or who cannot provide a sufficient workforce.

Organizational unity: if a profession has a single professional group and a hierarchical organizational structure, then it will have a competitive advantage because it will be able to act as a unified group. For example, if all or most academics working on nuclear strategy belong to the same professional organization or lab, then they will be able to act as a single unit more effectively, thus increasing their competitive advantage over a profession whose members are scattered.

Competency: if a profession has high quality and strict licensing, educational, and/or training requirements for members, then it can better demonstrate the capability of its members to effectively complete tasks. For example, the education, training, and oaths required of an airman in the U.S. Air Force can help demonstrate the knowledge and skill with which he can complete the task.

Commitment: if a profession comes to the task of its own volition (i.e. the U.S. government does not ask it to complete the task), then it is more likely to be committed to completing the task effectively. For example, if the intelligence community chooses to

compete for expert authority in counterinsurgency operations, then it should have a higher level of commitment than a branch of the military assigned to the task by the U.S. government.

Efficiency: if the profession can demonstrate its ability to complete a task in less time and with fewer resources, then it gains a competitive advantage over professions who complete the task more slowly or expensively. For example, if private security companies can be contracted to complete the task in a shorter amount of time and do so at a lower cost than it would take the U.S. military, then they have a competitive advantage in efficiency.

Each of the operationalized indicators, above, can be considered a sufficient component of competitive advantage. As such, these indicators can be considered additive. In other words, the presence of any one of the indicators is enough to say that the profession falls within the fuzzy or continuous set of competitive advantage. Most professions will achieve partial membership within the competitive advantage set. Professions whose membership score is more "in" than "out" than other competing professions are more likely to receive responsibility for the task.

TABLE 3

EVIDENCE REQUIRED FOR COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE INDICATORS

Competitive Advantage Indicator	Evidence Required
Member retention	A percentage of professionals that are employed in the given profession for each year of the case. 0-33% = low member retention 33-66% = moderate member retention 66-99% = high member retention
Organizational unity*	Number of professional groups • No professional groups exist = low organizational unity • One professional group exists = high organizational unity • Multiple professional groups exist = moderate organizational unity Organizational Structure • Flat organization = low organizational unity • Flatocracy = moderate organizational unity • Hierarchy = high organizational unity
Competency	Degree requirements • No degree/ high school degree = low competency • Baccalaureate degree/training program = moderate competency • Post-baccalaureate degree/intensive training program = high competency
Commitment	Profession was assigned to the task; does not complete it = low commitment Profession was assigned to the task; completes it = moderate commitment Profession sought to participate in competition = high commitment
Efficiency*	Cost Projections • Profession demonstrates ability to complete the task below estimated cost = high efficiency • Profession demonstrates ability to complete the task at estimated cost = moderate efficiency • Profession demonstrates ability to complete the task over estimated cost = low efficiency Time projections • Profession demonstrates ability to complete the task before deadline = high efficiency • Profession demonstrates ability to complete the task on deadline = moderate efficiency • Profession demonstrates ability to complete the task after deadline = low efficiency

*These sub-indicators are averaged across the low/moderate/high scores to produce a single score for the indicator. In instances where sub-indicators are scored high/moderate or moderate/low, I conservatively select the lower estimate.

I will use the following evidence to test for the validity of H2 and its sub-hypotheses.

TABLE 4

EVIDENCE REQUIRED FOR COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE PROCESS HYPOTHESES

Sub-Hypothesis	Evidence Required
H2a	The profession has adequate members to complete the task The profession has adequate skill to complete the task The profession demonstrates little active pursuit of the task The president demonstrates a high level of interest in the profession's ability to complete the task
H2b	The profession has inadequate membership and/or skill to complete the task One or more presidential advisers highly favors the assignment of responsibility to this profession. The president is unswayed by the opinions of his advisers regarding the assignment of the profession to the task. The president expresses uncertainty about the profession's ability to complete the task.

3.5 Alternative Explanation: Bureaucratic Politics

In addition to my theory, I will be considering the bureaucratic politics theory as an alternative explanation for why civilians gain dominant responsibility for some military tasks, the military for others, and for still others, there is mixed responsibility.

3.5.1 Bureaucratic Politics

Over time, Bureaucratic Politics has come to represent an amalgam of what Graham Allison originally termed Model II, Organizational Process, and Model III, Governmental Politics. Since Allison's publication, other scholars have critiqued, refined, and expanded upon these theories of organizational and politically driven decision-making. Most notable among these are the theories of organizations,[88] and organizational theories that draw on economic theories.[89] However, few of these theories provide a cogent alternative answer to the question I pose. Most of the organizational theory literature covers theories of how organizations operate and how they make internal decisions. These theories do not do a good job of providing an explanation of why some organizations are assigned additional tasks while others are not.

Governmental Politics, or more widely referred to as Bureaucratic Politics, has also grown as a theoretical field of inquiry since Allison's original publication. Most notable in this field is Tara Johnson's work on international bureaucracies,[90] and the

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[88] See for example: Perrow, Charles (1986) *Complex Organizations: A Critical Study*, 3rd ed. New York: McGraw Hill; Finnemore, Martha (1996) "Norms, Culutre, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's Institutionalism" *International Organization*. 50:2, pp. 325-347; Avant, Deborah A. (1993) "The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine: Hegemons in Peripheral Wars" *International Studies Quarterly*. 37:4, pp. 409-430; Landau, Martin (1969) "Redundancy, Rationality, and the Problem of Duplication and Overlap" *Public Administration Review*. Vol. 29, pp. 346-358; Scott, W. Richard (2014) *Institutions and Organizations*, chapter 3.

[89] Moe, Terry M. (1991) "Politics and Theory of Organization" *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization;* Moe, Terry M. (1984) "The New Economics of Organization" *American Journal of Political Science*. 28:4, pp. 739-777; Weingast, Barry R. and William J. Marshall (1988) "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets" *Journal of Political Economy*. 96:1, pp. 132-163.

[90] Johnson, Tara (2014) *Organizational Progeny: Why Governments are Losing Control over the Proliferating Structures of Global Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

extensive literature put forth by David E. Lewis.[91] These scholars have done much to elucidate relationships between bureaucrats and bureaucracies (Johnson), the role of the president and congress in bureaucratic policymaking, and the implications of agency termination (Lewis and various co-authors). However, like the organizational theory literature, none of these provide a satisfying alternative explanation because they do not explain why certain groups (be they organizations, agencies, or professions) gain responsibility for various tasks. In short, the Bureaucratic Politics literature is both broad and diverse, making it difficult to examine it in its entirety.

In my theory, I argue that while not focused solely on the military, Abbott's "system of professions" concept can aid in understanding why civilian professionals are engaged in traditional military tasks. Yet, when asked to apply his theory to military professionalism, Abbott argued that Morton Halperin's theory of bureaucratic politics was a better fit. Therefore, I concentrate on the Bureaucratic Politics Model as originally

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[91] See for example: Lewis, David E. (2002) "The Politics of Agency Termination: Confronting the Myth of Agency Immortality" *The Journal of Politics*. 64:1, pp. 89-98; Lewis, David E. (2004) "The Adverse consequences of the Politics of Agency Design for Presidential Management in the United States: the Relative Durability of Insulated Agencies" *British Journal of Political Science*. 34:3, pp. 377; Hollibaugh, Gary E., Gabriel Horton, and David E. Lewis (2014) "Presidents and Patronage" in *American Journal of Political Science* 58:4, pp. 1024-1042; Clinton, Joshua D., David E. Lewis, and Jennifer L. Selin (2014) "Influencing the Bureaucracy: The Irony of Congressional Oversight" *American Journal of Political Science*. 58:2, pp. 387-401.; Lavertu, Stephane, David E. Lewis, and Donald P. Moynihan (2013) *Public Administration Review*. 73:6, pp. 845-857; Lewis, David E. (2012) "The Contemporary Presidency: The Personnel Process in the Modern Presidency" *Presidential Studies Quarterly*. 42:3, pp. 577-596; Clinton et al. (2012) "Separated Powers in the United States: The Ideology of Agencies, Presidents, and Congress" *American Journal of Political Science*. 56:2, pp. 341-354; Gallo, Nick and David E. Lewis (2012) "The Consequences of Presidential Patronage for Federal Agency Performance" *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 22:2, pp. 219-243; Lewis, David E. (2009) Revisiting the Administrative Presidency: Policy, Patronage, and Agency Competence" *Presidential Studies Quarterly*. 39: 1, pp. 60-73

theorized by Graham Allison and later Morton Halperin as the most salient and satisfying alternative explanation to my question.

Both Halperin and Allison were working on models that specified decision-making in foreign policy as driven by the role of bureaucratic bargaining. These scholars argued that in order to explain decisions, it is necessary to examine the decision-makers, or players. Players come to the bargaining table with a specific viewpoint on the issue at hand that is influenced by the bureaucratic organization to which they belong. The players then engage in political bargaining. This political bargaining leads to a decision.[92]

Over the years, Allison and Halperin's theory of Bureaucratic Politics has been criticized as imprecise and sloppy,[93] too simplistic,[94] overly complex, [95] representing a false dichotomy between the rational and political,[96] and lacking attention to the president

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[92] Allison and Halperin (1972) "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications" *World Politics*. 24:Supplement: Theory and Policy In International Relations, pp. 40-79; Halperin, Morton, and Pricilla A. Clapp with Arnold Kantor (2006) *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*, 2nd Edition. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press; Allison, Graham and Philip Zelikow (1999) *Essence of Decisions: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd Edition. New York: Longman.

[93] Art, Robert J. (1973) "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique" *Policy Sciences*. 4:4, pp. 467-490.

[94] Rosati, Jerel A. (1981) "Developing a Systematic Decision-Making Framework: Bureaucratic Politics in Perspective" *World Politics*. 33:2, pp. 234-252.

[95] Bendor, Jonathan and Thomas H. Hammond (1992) "Rethinking Allison's Models" *The American Political Science Review*. 86:2, pp. 301-322.

[96] Freedman, Lawrence (1976) "Logic, Politics, and Foreign Policy Processes: A Critique of the Bureaucratic Politics Model" *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs)*. 52:3, pp 434-449.

and hierarchy in general.[97] Yet scholars continue to rely upon the original model's propositions.[98]

Despite the growth of the literature on bureaucratic politics and the criticisms leveled against the theory, this theory was the one offered by Abbott as the most likely alternative to his own when explaining professional competition for military tasks. Therefore, I do not simply test the bureaucratic politics model, but the one proposed by Allison and Halperin specifically, as an alternative to my competitive advantage theory.

In testing the bureaucratic politics theory against the military case, I also make a contribution to the literature. Allison and Halperin's theory is focused on the process by which decisions are made, which I capture in hypothesis 4 below. However, Allison and Halperin's bureaucratic politics theory does not provide a clear way to predict the precise composition of the outcome—only that it occurs through bargaining. Therefore, I conceptualize "bargaining" as a series of four indicators: representation, bargaining advantages, skill, and will. By conceptualizing "bargaining" in this way, I can predict the specific outcome likely to be observed in each case if bureaucratic bargaining is driving the decision. I capture this prediction in hypothesis 3 below.

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[97] Bendor and Hammond, 1992; Rosati, 1981.

[98] See for example: Marsh, Kevin P. (2012) "The Intersection of War and Politics: The Iraq War Troop Surge and Bureaucratic Politics" *Armed Forces and Society*. 38:3, pp. 413-437; Blomdahl, Mikael (2016) "Bureaucratic Roles and Positions: Explaining the United States Libya Decision" *Diplomacy and Statecraft*. 27:1, pp. 142-161.

3.5.1.1 Predictions

The bureaucratic politics model is far more concerned with the process of making decisions than predicting actual outcomes. Most scholars testing bureaucratic politics use a set of questions in order to determine if political bargaining is driving the outcome.[99] However, such a device will not aid in comparing the predictive utility of this model to my theory of competitive advantage. It is possible to use assumptions found within the model to predict specific behavior that would drive outcomes. This theory produces the following hypotheses:

> *H3: Assignment of responsibility of a task is a result of political bargaining that can be measured in terms of a profession's representation by policymakers at the bargaining table, bargaining advantages, and skill and will in using bargaining advantages.*

This hypothesis can be further developed through a series of sub-hypotheses:

> *H3a: If a policymaker who represents a civilian profession has skill and will in using his bargaining advantages, then the outcome will be full authority for the civilian profession.*
>
> *H3b: If multiple policymakers have the skill and will in using bargaining advantages, then the outcome will be mixed authority for the professions they support.*
>
> *H3c: If a policymaker who represents a military profession has skill and will in using his bargaining advantages, then the outcome will be full authority for the military profession.*

This hypothesis is falsified if only one policymaker with the skill and will to use his bargaining advantages is apparent, but the profession he represents does not gain rights and responsibilities to the task.

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[99] See for example: Blomdahl, 2016; Marsh, 2012; Marsh, Kevin P. and Christopher M. Jones (2014) "Breaking Miles Law: The Curious Case of Hillary Clinton the Hawk" *Foreign Policy Analysis*.

In addition to testing hypotheses about outcomes, I can also test hypotheses about the specific process by which policymakers arrived at the task assignment decision. This prediction is captured by hypothesis 4.

> *H4: The selection process for the assignment of new military tasks is driven by political bargaining between organizationally influenced policymakers within the U.S. government.*

This hypothesis, that task assignment is a function of bureaucratic politics in the federal government, can be further developed by testing a series of sub-hypotheses.

> *H4a: If policymakers are influenced by their organizational position, then actors will express stands on issues consistent with that organization's preferences.*

This hypothesis captures the organizational preferences described by Halperin, or what Allison terms "Miles Law," the maxim that where you stand on an issue depends on where you sit in government. Halperin argues that organizations want influence, and that organizations influence stands. If these assumptions hold, then we should expect to see players arguing for task assignments that benefit their organization.[100]

> *H4b: If a policymaker possesses superior bargaining advantages or engages in political bargaining, then that policymaker is likely to heavily influence the final decision.*

Halperin argues that once an issue comes into play, players will develop decision strategies. This concrete plan of action is focused on how to make arguments that best support their desired outcome.[101] The set of bargaining advantages influences the level of impact that player will have on the final outcome. If these assumptions hold, then we

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[100] Allison and Halperin, 1972; Allison and Zelikow, 1999; Halperin et al., 2006

[101] Halperin et al., 2006

should expect to see players with better bargaining advantages achieve their desired outcomes.

> *H4c: If bureaucratic bargaining occurs, then evidence of a compromise will be evident.*

Allison argues that decisions, "represent a combination of the preferences and relative influence of central players or subset of players." He also states, that political resultants are characterized by "compromise, conflict, and confusion."[102] If these assumptions hold, then we should expect to see an outcome that reflects multiple points of view: or a compromise.

This hypothesis is falsified if an assignment becomes apparent, but cannot be traced back to bargains between political actors. It may also be falsified if players who have superior bargaining or political advantages do not achieve their desired outcome. In other words, hypothesis 4 is falsified if sub-hypotheses H4b and H4c are found false. If sub-hypothesis H4a is found false, then the theory is weakened, but not falsified.[103]

3.5.1.2 Operationalization

Abbott is on record as stating that he believed his structural theory did not work well for the military, and instead, suggested the theory of bureaucratic politics.[104] To test

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[102] Allison and Zelikow, 1999

[103] This claim is due to the critiques of Miles Law that Allison and Zelikow, 1999, acknowledge. This has been tested by Marsh and Jones, 2014, and they also found that rather than determining player stances, Miles Law should be interpreted as strongly predicting player stances.

[104] Abbott, Andrew (2002) "The Army and the Theory of Professions," in *The Future of the Army Profession*, eds. Don M. Snider, Gayle L. Watkins, 523. Boston: McGraw Hills Primis Custom Publishing; Abbott, 2005.

this argument, this alternative hypothesizes that task assignment is a function of government agency, specifically, the political bargaining around the decision making table.

I capture the independent variable "bargaining" via a series of four indicators:

Representation: if the profession has a supporter at the decision making table, then that profession is more likely to win full authority. For example, the presence of the Secretary of State will aid in the case of civilian professions like humanitarian organizations (which can provide diplomatic expertise).

Bargaining advantages: if the actor has control over information, a personal relationship with the president, the ability to threaten to resign, influence over other governmental actors, the willingness to assume responsibility, a highly skilled staff, or public support, then the profession that actor represents is more likely to gain full authority. For example, if the Attorney General is the brother of the president, then he can use this privileged relationship to aid in bargaining for the profession he supports.

Skill: If the actor makes good use of his bargaining advantages, then the profession that actor supports is more likely to gain full authority. For example, if the congressman is also chair of his party, then his arguments may carry more weight around the table.

Will: if the actor is willing to effectively use his bargaining advantages, then the profession that actor supports is more likely to gain full authority. For example, if a congressman has an election coming up, he may be more likely to use every bargaining advantage he possesses to gain political favor in his district.

TABLE 5

EVIDENCE REQUIRED FOR BARGAINING INDICATORS

Bargaining Indicator	Evidence Required
Representation	The profession is not represented in the bargaining process = low connection to actors The profession is represented by high level political actors in the bargaining process = moderate connection to actors The profession represents itself in the bargaining process = high connection to actors
Bargaining advantages	Profession's actor in the bargaining process lacks any control over information, and lacks political or public allies = low bargaining advantages Profession's actor in the bargaining process has either control over information or allies (political or public) = moderate bargaining advantages Profession's actor in the bargaining process has control over information and political or public allies = high bargaining advantages
Skill	Profession's actor in the bargaining process does not speak during the bargaining process = low skill Profession's actor in the bargaining process makes poor arguments, is not well understood, or fails to counter arguments made by competing professions' actors = moderate skill Profession's actor in the bargaining process makes good arguments, is well understood, and counter arguments made by other professions' actors = high skill
Will	Profession's actor does not mention bargaining advantages = low will Profession's actor makes little reference to bargaining advantages = moderate will Profession's actor discusses bargaining advantages at length, uses them to advance his case = high will

Each of the operationalized indicators, above, can be considered a sufficient component of "bargaining." As such, these indicators can be considered additive. In other words, they represent a fuzzy or continuous set within the concept of "bargaining."

I will use the following evidence to test H4 and its sub-hypotheses.

TABLE 6

EVIDENCE REQUIRED FOR BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS PROCESS HYPOTHESES

Hypothesis	Evidence Required
H4a	An actor takes a policy stand that will benefit his agency budgetarily. An actor takes a policy stand that is indicative of his agency's mission (i.e. Secretary of State favors diplomacy; Secretary of Defense favors military action)
H4b	An actor demonstrates control over information. An actor has and utilizes a personal relationship with the president. An actor has the ability to resign and threatens to do so. An actor has and utilizes influence over other bureaucratic actors. An actor has and demonstrates a willingness to assume responsibility (politically or practically). An actor has a highly skilled supporting staff. An actor has and utilizes public support. An actor bypassing a chain of command or hierarchical agency structures. An actor engages in logrolling. An actor engages in exclusionary tactics.
H4c	No actor gets his or her fully desired outcome. Actors make concessions to one another. Actors reach agreement on a middle ground. Multiple actors decide together on a solution.

3.6 Methodology and Case Selection

To test my theory against the alternative explanation, bureaucratic politics, I use a series of two case studies. I employ case study analysis because congruence testing and process tracing allows me to fully test my hypotheses against each case. In so doing, I am able to correctly identify the causal mechanism at work. Further, I am able to address any endogeneity issues head on by exploring the timing of each event in the case.

There are many possible cases from which to select. Examples include military logistics in the 1990s, nuclear weapons strategy in the 1950s, paramilitary operations in

the 2000s, the Ebola crisis in 2010s, the military assistance programs in the 1950s, counterinsurgency in Vietnam in the 1960s, cyber security in the 2000s, and military budgeting in the 1960s.

Below is a truth table that shows all the different possible combinations of my theory's causal mechanism (theory column), the causal mechanism proposed by the alternative, and possible outcomes. In the theory and alternative columns, "1" means that the causal mechanism is at work and "0" indicates it is not at work. In the outcome column, "1" means that civilians gain responsibility for the task; "2" means that there is a mix of responsibility; and "3" means that the military gains responsibility for the task. The totality of the table gives all possible case types that might be explored in the context of this project.

TABLE 7

TRUTH TABLE FOR CASE SELECTION

	Theory	Alternative	Outcome
1	0	0	1
2	0	0	2
3	0	0	3
4	1	0	1
5	1	0	2
6	1	0	3
7	0	1	1
8	0	1	2
9	0	1	3
10	1	1	1
11	1	1	2
12	1	1	3

Key: for theory, alternative: 1= present; 0=absent
for outcome: 1=civilian; 2= mixed; 3= military

The goal of this research is to examine cases in which the "theory" causal mechanism is present. This means I am primarily interested in cases that could be represented by combinations found in rows 4-6, and 10-12 of the table. However, in rows 10-12, the causal mechanism of the alternative explanation is also at work. This means that these rows represent cases where either the theory *or* the alternative explanation could produce the outcome. In short, cases that are represented by rows 10-12 are

"overdetermined," and "if the goal of the case study analysis is to investigate the causal mechanism X [theory], then one clearly wants to avoid the overdetermining ones."[105]

After excluding the overdetermined rows from the list of cases I am interested in, I am left with rows 4-6, meaning I want to find cases where the theory's causal mechanism is the only one that can produce the outcome. To that end, I propose to examine the following case: nuclear weapons strategy, 1945-1960. This case is an example of a case in row 5.[106]

However, I cannot be guaranteed that any case I select has only one causal mechanism functioning. In fact, "the reality is that in any given case there are almost always alternative explanations to the outcome."[107] To that end, I propose, as Goertz suggests, to select an additional case that is "overdetermined" to specifically confront both explanations within a given case. Countering the insurgents in Vietnam, 1960-1968, is an example of a case in row 12. The countering the insurgents in Vietnam case allows me to compare my theory's causal mechanism to the causal mechanism of bureaucratic politics in the federal government.[108]

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[105] Goertz, Gary (2012) "Case Studies, Causal Mechanisms, and Selecting Cases"

[106] My theory is the only explanation that predicts the outcome "mixed" for the nuclear weapons strategy case, which means that when my theory is present, the alternative cannot be used to explain the outcome "mixed," allowing this case to be an example of line 5.

[107] Goertz, 2012

[108] For the countering the insurgents in Vietnam case, both my theory and the alternative predicts the outcome "military," meaning that either my theory or alternative 1 could explain the outcome, allowing this case to be an example of line 12.

In addition to these methodological reasons for selecting those two cases, several more points should also be made. First, the cases vary in time during the period in which this paper identified the puzzle as being prominent (i.e. post-World War II). Having varying time periods allows for the exclusion of alternative explanations for why particular professions gain rights and responsibilities for particular tasks (for example, outcomes cannot be attributed to external temporal events, like wars).

Second, each case represents a competition occurring between military professionals and civilian professionals. Such a selection speaks directly to the puzzle that this proposal identified in the introduction: who are contemporary military professionals?

Third, these cases are relatively free from potential data and evidence problems like classified/confidential information, due to their historical nature. As such, a reasonable account the events can be pieced together.

Finally, a brief note about a null case is in order. In the truth table, no case where both the causal mechanism and an outcome are absent is listed. The dependent variable, task assignment varies over three types rather than being either present or absent. However, if I suspend the logic that the dependent variable is a typology, and assume that if competition is absent and the result is that the task may remains unassigned, then I can think about what might constitute a null case.

The medical corps case regarding the establishment of the medical school in the Uniformed Service University of Health Sciences can serve as an illustration of this type of case. If I assume that the establishment of a military medicine specialist is a change in demand of type of service provided, and then a "new military task" may be said to exist.

If a "new military task" is said to exist, the theory would predict that the medical profession and the military would compete to gain full responsibility for accomplishing the task. However, no civilian medical school ever developed a competing "military medicine" specialty program. Further, the graduates of the Uniformed Service University Medical School only made up twenty-five percent of the active duty officers in the medical corps.[109] In other words, neither the military nor the medical profession ever made aggressive attempts to establish dominant responsibility for the "military medicine" specialty. As neither attempted to gain responsibility, there was no ultimate task assignment, thus functioning as a null case.

Yet, as I argued in the previous chapter, the labeling of a "military medicine" specialty as a "new military task" is at best a conceptual stretch. However, it does aid in illustrating how a null case for this theory might appear.

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[109] Greenwood, John T. and F. C. Berry (2005) *Medics at War: Military Medicine from Colonial Times to the 21st Century*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.

CHAPTER 4:

NUCLEAR STRATEGY 1945-1960

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I test my theory of competitive advantage against the case of nuclear strategy during the years 1945-1960. My theory of competitive advantage hypothesizes that assignment of responsibility for a task favors the profession[110] that has a competitive advantage over other professions because competition favors the profession that can provide the superior value. The president of the United States, nearly always the final arbiter, assigns the task to the profession that demonstrates a higher level of competence, efficiency, and commitment in accomplishing the task.

In August of 1945, the United States dropped two atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan. Having employed the bombs in combat and having seen the incredibly destructive nature of the weapons, the United States was faced with the task of deciding how and when to use such weapons again. Throughout the 1950s, nuclear strategy, or how to use nuclear weapons in combat, was debated heavily. In particular,

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[110] A profession is defined as "an exclusive occupational group applying somewhat abstract knowledge to a particular case" that seeks to self-perpetuate and grow. As adapted from Abbot, Andrew (1988) *The System of Professions: An essay on the division of expert labor*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

civilian strategists at the RAND Corporation and the airmen of the United States Air Force Strategic Air Command (USAF SAC) consistently expressed differing views on target selection, base protection, and offensive usage of nuclear weapons.

The civilian strategists' success in promoting their ideas to policymakers counters the historical precedent: never before had civilians been given such explicit deference in an issue of military strategy. Specifically, the credence given to RAND scholars regarding the base protection and targeting strategies is counter in many ways to Clausewitz's specification of the separation of "strategy" and "tactics," as it applies to civilians and soldiers. In this case, I argue that civilians were actively engaging in questions regarding "tactics." It should also be noted that for the purposes of this case, I am referring to strategy in a broader sense than does Clausewitz.[111]

Prior to this case, civilians, when working on questions of military operations had worked for the military. In this case, the civilians established themselves as independent contractors.[112] What is both truly impressive and puzzling is the extent to which the ideas of these civilian strategists influenced policymakers, despite the civilian strategists relative lack of access to the policymakers. I argue that my theory of competitive advantage offers a compelling explanation for the civilian strategists' success.

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[111] Clausewitz, Carl von, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret eds. and trans. Princeton University Press, Princeton. 1976.

[112] At the time, RAND Contracts were predominantly held by the United States Air Force. However, RAND was funded by a grant from the Ford Foundation and a bank loan from Wells Fargo. In addition, beginning in the mid-1950s, RAND began in earnest to diversify its client base. Smith, Bruce L. R. (1966) *The RAND Corporation: Case Study of a Nonprofit Advisory Corporation*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

To test my theory of competitive advantage in this case, I conduct a congruence test. As my theory has not been tested in the military case, I use the case of nuclear weapons strategy as a plausibility probe to test my theory's predictive power.[113] In this case, my theory predicts a "mixed outcome," where the RAND Corporation and the USAF SAC share responsibility for the new military task of nuclear strategy. After examining the level of consistency of the case with my theory's prediction, I explore the causal significance. To test for an alternative explanation, I examine the bureaucratic politics theory. In this case, the Bureaucratic Politics theory predicts a "military outcome." As the bureaucratic politics theory is found inconsistent with the observed outcome, this case is not "overdetermined," increasing the plausibility that my deductive theory is causally significant.

The chapter begins with an explanation of the case selection. There follows an overview of key events of the case and the outcome of the case is identified. Next, the key independent variable of my theory is presented and analyzed. After, the bureaucratic politics alternative explanation is considered and analytically compared to my theory. The chapter concludes with an analysis of my theory's performance.

4.2 Case Selection and Theoretical Predictions

In this dissertation, I define the universe of cases as competitions between professions over responsibility for new military tasks. Each case begins with the advent

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[113] George, Alexander and Andrew Bennet (2005) *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

of a new military task[114] and ends with the assignment of that task to a particular profession. The task of nuclear weapons strategy was a direct result of the creation of nuclear weapons. The creation of nuclear weapon technology fulfills the sufficiency requirement of "new military task."

Some might argue that nuclear weapons technology does not qualify as "new;" rather, nuclear weapons are simply a larger bomb. However, at the time, policymakers were not looking at the atomic bomb as simply a larger bomb, but as a new kind of military technology needing a new kind of strategy and approach. A memo written by the commanding general of the Manhattan Engineer District described how nuclear weapons would significantly alter the future of the military in terms of composition, force requirements, and both peace and war operations.[115] That nuclear weapons were considered to be such an impetus for change indicated that nuclear weapons can be considered a new piece of technology.

The emergence of nuclear weapons created the need for professionals to complete the task of developing a nuclear weapons strategy. The competition for rights and responsibilities for this task might be easily confused as a competition over ideas rather than for rights to a task. However, the task of nuclear weapons strategy can be defined as creation of a plan of action, which until enacted, can be considered a collection of ideas.

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[114] A new military task is defined as a task that is motivated either by technology creation or by a change in demand for the type of service provided.

[115] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1946, General; The United Nations, Vol. 1. , Document 600. Accessed May 31, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v01/d600

The competition over the creation of nuclear strategy can be considered a competition over what profession had the rights to offer ideas about strategy and the responsibility for coming up with the ideas about strategy.

Both the civilian strategists at the RAND Corporation and the airmen of the USAF SAC attempted to demonstrate their ability to create a nuclear weapons strategy that integrated the weapons into the overarching strategic posture of the United States. Both professions were interested in gaining responsibility for the task of nuclear weapons strategy because that responsibility could be directly tied to increased prestige and budgetary priority, which would ultimately improve the profession's ability to self perpetuate and grow.

4.3 Overview of Key Events

4.3.1 Abstract Knowledge and the Genesis of Competition

The task of nuclear strategy emerged after the first use of nuclear weapons against the Japanese during World War II, when the United States government underwent a transitional period wherein nuclear weapons were integrated into the overarching arsenal of the United States military.[116] The question of how those weapons would be used demanded an answer, and the civilian strategists at RAND and the airmen of SAC rushed to provide that answer. However, civilian strategists and the airmen came to very different conclusions regarding how U.S. nuclear strategy should operate. These different

[116] For a complete history of the integration, refer to Peter Fever's *Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992.

conclusions occurred because the civilian strategists and the airmen of SAC were distinct professional organizations that each applied their unique body of abstract knowledge to the task of developing a nuclear strategy.

The airmen and civilian strategists were not always at odds in their conclusions. RAND began as the brainchild of the Air Force[117] and representatives of the Douglas Aircraft Company, who recognized that the valuable collaboration of civilians and soldiers, which had occurred during the war, was unlikely to continue in peacetime.[118] The Air Force Chief of Staff was interested in investing his remaining $30 million of research and development funds in scientists[119] for continued advice on "numerous aspects of planning, operations, and weapons-development policies" made highly desirable by the complexity of modern warfare. The original RAND contract read: "Project RAND is a continuing program of scientific study and research on the broad subject of air warfare with the object of recommending to the Air Force preferred methods, techniques and instruments for this purpose."[120]

In the beginning, the RAND-USAF relationship was highly supportive. Some scholars even call it enlightened. A particular asset was General Curtis LeMay, the Deputy Chief of Air Staff for Research and Development, who oversaw the USAF-

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[117] Kaplan, Fred (1983) *The Wizards of Armageddon*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

[118] Smith, 1966

[119] Due to a misperception about the willingness of universities to take on projects of a classified nature, RAND was established outside the ivory tower. The original offices were located at Douglas Aircraft Company. Smith, 1966; Kaplan, 1983.

[120] Kaplan, 1983, p. 59.

RAND contracts.[121] In this role, LeMay was critical in helping RAND to secure independent status, and establish itself firmly in its role.[122]

However, the honeymoon days for the Air Force and the RAND Corporation did not last. As the 1950s wore on, the Air Force-RAND relationship became tense: the Air Force felt that over time, RAND had grown away from its sponsorship. The relationship grew so strained that between 1957 and 1962, the USAF SAC actually broke all "diplomatic ties" with RAND. This change in relationship underlies the puzzle explored in this chapter: Why did RAND shift from the goal of providing support to publicizing ideas that had the potential to embarrass the Air Force, or even subject it to a congressional investigation? [123] I argue that the distinct bodies of abstract knowledge utilized by these two professions drove them in different directions when tackling the task of developing a nuclear strategy.

When developing the tenets of a nuclear strategy for the United States, the civilian strategists at the RAND Corporation utilized social science methodology: specifically, systems analysis and game theory.[124] Systems analysis is a process of considering

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[121] Kaplan, 1983

[122] LeMay later expressed his displeasure at the civilian strategists work: "Volunteers who couldn't land or take off in a Piper Club are willing to state in elaborate detail their program for a complete remapping of the Fighter business or the Bomber business or the Missile business." Gen. LeMay, Curtis E. and MacKinlay Kantor (1965) *Mission with LeMay: My Story*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc, p. 477

[123] Smith, 1966; on the congressional investigation issue, see p. 223

[124] Early on, some strategists at RAND were also proponents of classical historical analysis, but this largely fell out of style at RAND, see Herken, Gregg (1985) *Counsels of War*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, p. 75, 100. Strategists also used human gaming for insights into action-reaction cycles in force developments and possible crisis behavior of leaders. Davis, Paul (1996) "Analytic Methods," in *Project Air Force 50th Anniversary*, ed. Brent Bradley, Jim Thomson, Donald H. Rumsfeld. p 47-51. The RAND

decisions in as broad a context as necessary and then reducing the complex problem to its component parts for analysis.[125] During the 1950s, RAND's systems analysis concentrated "holistically [on] the development of weapons, disarmament, and deterrence."[126] Game theory, or formal modeling, focused on creating a strategy by examining "how opponents would use the limited information available about one another to determine the best strategy."[127] In the early days of nuclear strategy development, game theory provided a way for strategists to develop strategy that was relevant to but not determined by East-West relations.[128] The civilian strategists, housed primarily in the economics and social sciences divisions, viewed the development of a scientifically objective defense for the United States as their primary mission. The problem was that the civilian strategists' scientifically objective defense strategy did not always favor the Air Force.[129] The work of the civilian strategists of the 1950s led to the conclusion that nuclear strategy should be designed to avoid war, and "that war can best

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Corporation. Accessed September 3, 2015. Available at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/www/external/publications/PAFbook.pdf

[125] Enthoven, Alain C. and K. Wayne Smith (2005) *How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program 1961-1969*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.

[126] Kuklick, Bruce (2006) *Blind Oracles: Intellectuals and War from Kennan to Kissinger*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p 34; Some scholars argue that systems analysis can be difficult to define, and suffers from hubris, assuming its methodology ipso facto produces better results. See Green, Philip (1966) *Deadly Logic: The theory of nuclear deterrence*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, pp 19-23, 90-93, and 255-276. In response, systems analysis later expanded to include "policy analysis," which focused on so-called soft factors like values and subjective judgments. Davis, 1996.

[127] Davis, 1996 p 49

[128] Freedman, Lawrence (1989) *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*. 2nd edition. New York: St. Martin's Press. For a more in depth analysis, see chapter 12.

[129] Kuklick, 2006

be deterred by an ability to act with rationality and precise control."[130] But, this approach to questions of strategy and the conclusions the civilian strategists reached called into question fundamental assumptions of Air Force strategic doctrine.[131]

In contrast to the civilian strategists at RAND, the airmen believed that nuclear weapons could be used in pursuit of a military victory. This conclusion was based in the airmen's understanding of the authoritative, informal doctrine[132] of strategic bombing.[133] Between the World Wars, the Air Command Tactical School (ACTS) began to articulate a respected theory of precision, high altitude, daylight strategic bombing.[134] The theory postulated that an air force, having determined the key elements in an enemy's industrial infrastructure, could destroy that economy efficiently through aerial attacks against those

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[130] Digby, James (1990) *Strategic Thought at RAND, 1948-1963: The Ideas, Their Origins, Their Fates*, N-3096. Santa Mocia: The RAND Corporation.

[131] Smith, 1966, p 105

[132] Benjamin M. Jensen offers a useful analysis of doctrine as a body of professional knowledge in his paper "The Doctrine Puzzle: Knowledge Production in Military Organizations" presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, New Orleans, February 18-21, 2015.

[133] Doctrine in the Army Air Service, from after WWI through the Korean war, was based heavily in the tactical mission of the air force, or the provision of close support for ground troops. The first Air Corps doctrine manual, FM 1-5 *Employment of the Aviation of the Army* in April 1940 did not include reference to strategic attack. FM 100-20, published in 1943 likewise focused on tactical air forces, including only three paragraphs on strategic bombing. This manual remained the Air Force's basic doctrine through the Korean War. Mowbray, James A. (1995) "Air Force Doctrine Problems 1926-Present" in *Airpower Journal*, Winter 1995. Accessed March 10, 2016. Available at: http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj95/win95_files/mowbray.htm

[134] Mowbray, 1995; Apart from not being formally published in a field manual, the ACTS theory of strategic bombing in the interwar period was based predominantly on theory and technology, only two of the three pillars of good doctrine (the third being history). Meilinger, Philip S. (2012) *The Bomber: The formation and Early Years of the Strategic Air Command*. Maxwell Airforce Base: Air University Press.

'key node' or 'bottlenecks.'"[135] However, the precision bombing of military targets that the Army Air Service had conceptualized in the interwar period proved elusive in its achievement during World War II—more often than not, bombs missed intended targets and produced civilian casualties.[136] As the war progressed, frustration with the weather and prolonged conflict led Americans to target "just about everything they could think of, hoping to hit upon some means of affecting enemy behavior…they often engaged in area attacks on cities."[137] This strategy culminated in the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The widely held view that the nuclear bombs had been decisive in Japan's surrender cemented the claims of victory-through-air-power doctrine that shaped the thinking of the USAF SAC during the 1950s.[138] The USAF approached the development of nuclear strategy using a combination of the ACTS informal strategic bombing doctrine and the bombing experiences of WWII.[139]

The differences in abstract knowledge, as applied to nuclear strategy became the basis for three areas of disagreement and competition to determine which group of professionals should have responsibility over the task of nuclear strategy.

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[135] Biddle, Tami Davis (2002) *Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. p 291

[136] Biddle, Tami Davis (1995) "British and American Approaches to Strategic Bombing: Their Origins and Implementation in the World War II Combined Bomber Offensive" *Journal of Strategic Studies*. 18(1), p 91-144.

[137] Biddle, 2002 p 292

[138] Herken, 1985

[139] The combination of these factors is reflected in the 1954 publication of USAF Manual 1-8 "Strategic Air Operations." Biddle, 2002

Today, nuclear strategy is generally considered to focus on a few key questions: What is the nature of the adversary? What is the role of military policy between the U.S. and other nuclear powers? What is the nature of military capabilities?[140] These key queries are not new: much of the debate was originally established in the late 1940s through the 1950s.[141] The competition over nuclear strategy between the civilian strategists of the RAND Corporation and the USAF SAC reflects these debates. The three major disagreements focused on in this chapter follow the three key questions: (1) target selection (nature of the adversary); (2) limited nuclear war (role of military policy) and (3) air base vulnerability (nature of the military capabilities).

4.3.2 Target Selection

The first aspect of nuclear strategy debated by the civilian strategists and the airmen was over the nature of the adversary. In order to select targets, it was necessary to first determine what the adversary would value most: military or industrial targets (counterforce) or their civilian population (countervalue). The civilian strategists at RAND and the airmen of SAC came to different conclusions.

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[140] This is paraphrased from Glaser, Charles (1990) *Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy*. Princeton University Press, Princeton. Glaser identified the second question as "the role of military policy in the U.S.-Soviet relationship." (p3). However, as the Soviet Union is no longer a recognized government, I broadened the second question to better reflect the current strategic environment.

[141] Glaser, 1990, identifies these key debates as: "first strike and second strike capability, counterforce and countervalue targeting, credibility of threats, crisis stability, and arms race stability" p. 4-5. Counterforce and countervalue targeting is captured by the target selection section; credibility of threats is partially captured by the limited nuclear war section; and first and second strike capability is captured by the base vulnerability.

The first targeting plans were drawn up for the Joint Outline Emergency War Plan BROILER in 1947.[142] The next November (1948), the National Security Council released a report stating that the United States' primary objective was to reduce the Bolsheviks' control.[143] Based on the widely held belief that "the atomic bomb played a decisive role in Japan's surrender,"[144] atomic weapons were favored as the best way to counter the Red Army.[145] To reduce Bolshevik control, SAC was given top priority: SAC's main mission became a swift U.S. atomic offensive.[146] These first plans called for 196 bombs to be dropped on 20 urban targets. The problem was that the United States had only nine atomic bombs at the time.[147] With so few weapons target selection was crucial.

Civilian strategists argued that counterforce targets were more critical than countervalue targets when planning an initial nuclear strike. The first civilian strategist to articulate this view was Bernard Brodie in his "no-cities" approach. Brodie saw the targeting plan as a misreading of the 1945 United States Strategic Bombing Survey. In particular, he "reasoned that the final surrender of the Japanese in the Pacific war resulted not from atom bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but from the implicit threat of more atom bombs on their way if the Japanese did not give up then." In other words,

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[142] LeMay and Kantor, 1965, p. 15

[143] Rosenberg, David Allen (1983) "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960," *International Security*, 7:4, pp. 3-71.

[144] Herken, 1989 p. 24

[145] Gaddis (2005) *Strategies of Containment*: *A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

[146] Rosenberg, 1983

[147] Mellinger, 2012

Brodie argued that cities should not be targeted in the first round of bombing. Rather, the cities should be left as hostages to a second round of bombs.[148] This view was also articulated by Victor Hunt, who outlined the logic of going after military targets and leaving cities to a later round in a six page RAND memo: "the forces were time-urgent targets: you had to hit them or they would escape, and they could hurt you if they were not eliminated. But the cities would remain and could be struck later. More importantly, the threat of hitting cities could be used to coerce the enemy."[149]

The concept of counterforce also resonated with civilian strategist Joseph Loftus, who came to RAND in 1954. For Loftus, the primary goal was to target Soviet airfields, leaving them inoperable for upwards of a week after being hit. His study, known as ATD-751 was finished in late 1952,[150] and was amended and implemented in the 1953 SAC Emergency War Plan (EWP). But when the EWP was released, it was clear that the programming people in Air Targets had moved the "aim points" to a location between the airfield and the city, in order to hit the city as well.

Frustrated by the increasingly divergent views between themselves and the Air Force, both Brodie and Loftus brought their ideas to the RAND Corporation.[151] There, they helped establish the Strategic Objectives Committee (SOC). The committee's discussions focused on "the value—specifically including the deterrent value—of a

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[148] Kaplan, 1983, p. 47

[149] Digby, 1990 p. 13

[150] At this time, Loftus was working with the Air Intelligence Division. Kaplan, 1983

[151] Brodie was fired from the USAF in 1951, for reasons unknown to Brodie; Loftus quit Air Intelligence in 1954, Kaplan, 1983

capability to execute carefully controlled and limited attacks, especially on those enemy forces that could hurt you."[152] The work of the committee culminated in a counterforce study conducted from 1955-1957.

SAC, influenced by Air Force strategic bombing doctrine and the recent experiences of the Army Air Force in WWII,[153] took a different view on targeting. General Curtis LeMay, then head of USAF SAC, argued that the first priority in targeting ought to be the psychological well-being and lives of the enemy's civilians.[154] LeMay's logic was that SAC could make the most of its resources if it concentrated its assault against "industrial areas where bombing would yield 'bonus' damage to civilian urban centers."[155] Searching out and destroying specific, individual industrial targets increased the risk to aircraft and crew.[156] Instead, LeMay proposed SAC lead a centralized targeting authority where theater commanders would select the targets for JCS approval.[157] In 1951,

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[152] Digby, 1990 p. 14

[153] Biddle, 2002

[154] Herken, 1985

[155] Williamson, Samuel R. and Steven L. Rearden (1993) *The Origins of U.S. Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1953*. New York: St. Martin's Press; The logic of the "Bonus" hits was not necessarily to kill civilians but to wreck enemy economies. In World War II, the British and the Americans' precision bombing of industrial facilities proved ineffective, causing them to shift focus to urban population centers. Betts, Richard K. (2011) *American Force: Dangers, Delusions, and Dilemmas in National Security*. Colombia University Press, New York.

[156] Williamson and Rearden, 1993

[157] Mellinger, 2012

General LeMay met with a high level Air Force target panel to discuss concerns "about isolated targets, reconnaissance requirements, and bonus."[158]

Decisions regarding the nuclear targets evolved over time. Following the original plan of 196 bombs, the JCS approved the delivery of 292 bombs the next year.[159] Until 1950, all United States Air Force aerial campaigns were modeled on the air force strategic doctrine that had been used for campaigns conducted during World War II.[160] But these plans came into question when the Harmon Report released findings that, "even if all 133 bombs detonated precisely on their aim points, this would not in itself 'bring about capitulation'…Soviet military capability to take 'selected areas' of Western Europe, the Middle East, and Far East 'would not be impaired.'"[161] The report also concluded that the economic and psychological impact would be dependent on Soviet recovery time and propaganda.[162]

So, in 1950, the Air Intelligence Division began work on a new targeting plan which would emphasize three types of critical targets: "Delta," or disruption of vital elements of the war economy; "Bravo," or blunting the Soviet nuclear capabilities; and

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[158] Rosenberg, 1983, 18

[159] The United States still did not have (any where close to) this number of nuclear devices. However, it is relatively unsurprising that the JCS were unaware of this fact, as the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) kept all nuclear information under closely guarded secrecy. In fact, it was not until the United States was engaged in Korea that the President transferred physical custody of the weapons to the military. Williamson and Rearden, 1993.

[160] Mandelbaum, Michael (1979) *The Nuclear Question: The United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1946-1976*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[161] Rosenberg, 1983, p. 16

[162] Mellinger, 2012

"Romeo," or retardation of Soviet advances.[163] The problem with this new plan was that 77% of military and industrial targets were within three miles of city centers, making it relatively easy to achieve "bonus" damage.[164]

The debate over target selection was focused on what would be most effective in stopping the enemy –or over what the enemy would value most. Civilian strategists at RAND, like Brodie and Loftus argued that military targets were paramount; they believed that the Soviets placed greatest value on political and military control. In contrast, the airmen and Air Force targeteers believed that economic and civilian targets would be more effective; they believed that based on Soviet actions during World War II, the Kremlin cared most about population losses.[165] In 1950 the Bravo, Romeo, Delta targeting plan was intended to put emphasis on counterforce targets, but the nearness of population centers to Delta targets allowed SAC to focus on urban areas.[166]

4.3.3 Limited Nuclear War

The second aspect of debate between the airmen and the civilian strategists over nuclear strategy dealt with the role of military policy regarding the United States' position in the international community. For four years, the United States held a monopoly on nuclear weapons. In these early years of the atomic age, nuclear weapons

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[163] Kaplan, 1983

[164] Mellinger, 2012

[165] Glaser, 1990

[166] Mellinger, 2012

were not considered for use against conventional military targets partially because the U.S. nuclear arsenal was small. However, as the U.S. nuclear arsenal expanded and other states gained nuclear weapons of their own, using nuclear weapons against conventional targets became plausible. For civilian strategists who disliked the idea of city busting, the use of tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefront became a tantalizing alternative. The Air Force, who had staked their claim as an independent service on the use of strategic bombing with nuclear weapons, had other ideas.

Civilian strategists, increasingly concerned with the potential destructive power of nuclear weapons,[167] saw tactical nuclear weapons as a way to compensate for the West's lack of conventional manpower when compared to the USSR and the PRC. Tactical weapons were also seen as favoring the defender: "the proposition was that offensive action required the concentration of forces, and that once so concentrated these forces would provide an attractive target."[168]

However, it was difficult to determine what precisely was a *tactical* nuclear weapon and what was a *strategic* nuclear weapon. The strategists began to realize that any use of nuclear weapons would lead to escalation and full-blown nuclear war.[169] So, the civilian strategists began to rethink the overall strategy.

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[167] Kaplan, 1983 describes this reaction: "Lipp [a RAND employee] laid…damage circles over a map of Western Europe to see how many soldiers and civilians would be killed if H-bombs were used ….after doing some calculations, he discovered that…nearly two million people would be killed. He nearly threw up." p.78

[168] Freedman, 1989 p.107

[169] Brodie, Bernard (1978) "The Development of Nuclear Strategy" *International Security*, 2:4, pp. 65-83.

In particular, William Kaufmann, a political scientist working at Princeton and later at the RAND Corporation, began to consider the concept of limited war, and its uses against the Soviets. Kaufmann believed that if the United States used nuclear weapons, it would likely suffer the same costs as it inflicted. In short, complete reliance on nuclear weapons was an unwise and dangerous policy because it encouraged piecemeal aggression or limited wars,[170] and the United States was not preparing itself to fight these constrained conflicts. In fact, Admiral Radford, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, proposed reducing all Army deployments in Europe and Asia to small atomic forces in the mid 1950's.[171] Such a reduction would mean that if conventional war broke out in Europe or Asia, the United States would not have the ground troops in theater to fight the war.

In contrast, the Air Force saw strategic nuclear weapons as the way to ensure victory, arguing that anyone who advocated for using nuclear weapons in any way other than a strategic mode "did not have the best interests of the U.S. security at heart."[172] SAC's war plan in the early 1950s called for up to 734 bombers to hit Soviet screens from all directions: "all designated targets would be struck in this single massive blow in order to minimize the time U.S. bombers would have to remain in hostile air space,

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[170] Kaplan, 1983

[171] Gen. Taylor, Maxwell D. (1960) *The Uncertain Trumpet*. New York: Harper; this policy was later leaked to the New York Times, and recalled. Later a revised version was released as the Wilson-Radford plan

[172] Freedman, 1989 p.69

maximize destruction, and reduce the need for costly follow-up strikes."[173] At this time, the Air Force had been given primary responsibility for strategic bombing with nuclear weapons. If nuclear strategy shifted towards tactical nuclear weapons or away from nuclear weapons all together, the Air Force would lose budgetary priority and influence to the Army.[174]

When Eisenhower took office in 1953, his administration introduced a policy known as the "New Look." While the term that caught the attention of the world was "massive retaliation," the central idea of the policy was asymmetric response.[175] The Administration took a middling approach to the question of tactical versus strategic nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons in concert with other U.S. forces would be considered for use along a continuum and would be meted out as fit the provocation. The United States would continue to reserve the right to respond with a massive nuclear retaliatory strike, but it would not necessarily do so automatically.[176]

The limited nuclear war debate centered on the role of U.S. military policy in relation its position in the international community, in particular to its relations with the USSR. The civilian strategists, championed by Kauffman, argued that sole reliance on

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[173] Rosenberg, 1983, p. 34-35

[174] In 1949, the Air Force had approximately 12% of the total military budget. This budgetary allotment increased overtime to 35% by 1953. Throughout this time period, the Army budget dropped from a high of approximately 56% in 1949 to 37% in 1953. Mellinger, 2012; for a full chart of numbers, see p299.

[175] Gaddis, 2005, defines asymmetric response as: "reacting to adversary challenges in ways calculated to apply one's strength against the other side's weaknesses, even if this meant shifting the nature and location of the confrontation. The effect would be to regain the initiative while reducing costs. Nuclear weapons were a major component of that strategy" p. 147

[176] Freedman, 1989

nuclear weapons in military policy was a dangerous choice because it left open vulnerabilities.[177] In contrast, the airmen were in favor of military policy being based predominantly on nuclear weapons because it meant that the Air Force was the primary military tool that would be used by the United States. In response, the Eisenhower Administration chose to split the different by declaring its retaliatory response would be selected from a continuum of options from tactical to strategic.[178]

4.3.4 Air Base Vulnerability

The final aspect of nuclear strategy debated by the civilian strategists and the airmen was over the nature of the military capabilities needed by the United States. In 1951 and again in 1952, the Air Force indicated to RAND that a report on foreign bases would be desirable.[179] At the time, the B-29 aircraft that would be used in an attack on the Soviet Union would utilize overseas bases as a staging and refueling point prior to launching the "Sunday Punch."[180] While the original intention of Air Force leadership was to determine how to spend additional funds for new bases overseas, the request

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[177] This is the underlying assumption in asymmetric response. Gaddis, 2005

[178] While Eisenhower never accepted Kaufmann's ideas about limited warfare in the form of changing budgetary priorities, his work towards establishing arms control treaties can be considered to demonstrate changing ideas about the use of nuclear weapons in combat during the later years of his presidency. For a concise and clear presentation of these treaty attempts, see: Strong, Robert A. (2005) *Decisions and Dilemmas: Case Studies in Presidential Foreign Policymaking Since 1945*. New York: M.E. Sharpe. Chapter 2.

[179] Smith, 1966

[180] Herken, 1985; Mellinger, 2012

began a decade long debate about air base vulnerability.[181] The civilian strategists at RAND and the airmen of SAC each came up with a solution.

At the RAND Corporation, the civilian strategists, led by Albert Wohlstetter began work on a basing study. The team released a draft version of the report in December 1951. A central concern raised in this early report was the question of aircraft vulnerability on the ground.[182] Over the next three years, Wohlstetter expanded his study into a four hundred-page report known as R-290. Using systems analysis, Wohlstetter's team proposed creating shallowly buried concrete shelters to house each aircraft.[183] Wohlstetter's proposed changes were so much cheaper than the Air Force plans, many individuals thought Wohlstetter had created fake Air Force Plans to make his suggestions look better in comparison.[184]

The problem was that any spending on vulnerability was at the cost of spending to improve offensive capability. In short, Wohlstetter's report was not well received by SAC Commander General LeMay.[185] The generals, and others within the USAF SAC were concerned that if the substantial changes called for in the draft were implemented, SAC

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[181] Smith, 1966

[182] Smith, 1966

[183] Freedman, 1989

[184] Wohlstetter's findings were supported by a report released by the Technological Capabilities Panel (the Killian Panel) in 1955; Kaplan, 1983

[185] Kaplan, 1983

might be embarrassed before Congress or be required to undergo a congressional investigation.[186]

SAC argued that if there was a problem with overseas bases, there were other possible solutions. First, the United States had the option of engaging in a preventive first strike. However, as many felt this option was antithetical to the nation's principles, it was never formally proposed to the White House.[187] Second, Air Force Doctrine and the nation's nuclear policy agreed that a preemptive strike would be both military necessary and morally acceptable if the United States was in danger of being attacked. SAC leadership believed that diplomatic warning or political tension would precede any attack.[188] To this end, SAC moved to conduct a series of tests beginning in November 1956[189] "to evaluate the human and material requirements of holding one-third of the bomber force on fifteen minute ground alert."[190] The purpose of the tests was to increase the response time of the wings,[191] under the logic that if the planes were in the air, they could not be destroyed if the base was attacked.[192]

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[186] Smith, 1966

[187] Herken, 1985

[188] Kuklick, 2006

[189] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1955-1957, Volume XIX, National Security Policy. Document 85. Accessed May 31, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v19/d85

[190] Rosenberg, 1983, p. 46

[191] "Wings" is the term used to refer to approximately 60 bombers. It would be the rough equivalent to an army brigade.

[192] Rosenberg, 1983

Third, SAC proposed the use of in-air fueling. This plan would reduce the need for foreign bases and thus reduce or eliminate insecurities at foreign bases. However, the plan presented technical problems[193] until the KC-135 jet tanker was developed in 1955. Finally, SAC proposed that if the planes were in danger on their bases, then SAC needed more planes to ensure that a larger number got off the ground in the event of an attack. In the early 1950s, SAC's nuclear force was made up of modified B-29s. There had been an attempt to upgrade the force to B-36s, but that aircraft was obsolete almost as soon as it came online. SAC wanted to invest heavily in the expensive B-52, which had the capability to carry the heavier hydrogen bomb and could deliver substantially more conventional bombs. SAC was also intent on acquiring the B-47, whose range and technological capability would eventually earn it the designation of a weapons system.[194] However, acquiring this technology was expensive and fraught with delays. For example, in 1955, SAC received an additional $500 million in funding. The funding allowed SAC to increase plane production, but only by 3 planes per month.[195]

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[193] In-air refueling was "cumbersome, time consuming, difficult and somewhat hazardous, but it worked." SAC had put together its first air refueling squad in 1948, and by the end of 1954, it had 683 tankers in 32 squadrons. However, in-air refueling techniques struggled to keep pace with fueling and flight requirements for the bombers. For example, the tankers were too slow to refill the B-47 properly. In order to compensate, both planes were required to porpoise which required very skilled pilots flying both planes. Mellinger, 2012, p 261

[194] The B-52 was first flown in 1952, but didn't become part of the operational force until 1954-56. The first shipment of B-47s in 1951 was not suitable for combat. They were not declared operational until 1952 and were not sent overseas until 1953. Mellinger, 2012.

[195] Rosenberg, 1983

The debate came to a head after Wohlstetter's final R-290 report was published in April 1954.[196] The report resulted in "the formation of a special-blue-ribbon commission, under the auspices of the National Security Council, but outside any staff of line command." It was named the "Security Resources Panel of the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization" but it was better known as the Gaither Committee.[197]

Led by Robert Sprague,[198] the Gaither Committee's original mandate was to examine the United States' response should an outbreak of nuclear war occur. The committee met frequently with military and government officials, and with RAND employees.[199] But most importantly, Albert Wohlstetter was able to brief the committee on his base vulnerability report. His presentation greatly influenced the committee into focusing on strategic vulnerability.[200]

The committee also visited SAC in 1957 and was informed by General LeMay that SAC was not in significant danger from a missile attack.[201] In order to affirm LeMay's claim, Sprague asked for an SAC readiness demonstration: "The alert signal

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[196] Wohlstetter was never able to present his report directly to the President. Herken, 1989

[197] Kaplan, 1983, p. 125

[198] Other members of the committee included: H. Rowan Gaither, William C. Foster, James A. Perkins, William Webster, Jerome Weisner, Robert C. Perm, Hector R. Skifter, Robert Calkins, John J Corson, James Baxter, and later Col. George A. Lincoln, and Paul Nitze. Halperin, Morton H. (1961) "The Gaither Committee and the Policy Process" *World Politics*. 13:3, pp. 360-384.

[199] Halperin, 1961

[200] Herken, 1989

[201] Rosenberg, 1983

was sent out to all bases. Over the next six hours, the amount of warning time the United States might receive in the event of a surprise Soviet bomber attack, not a single airplane was able to take off from the ground." Yet at the demonstration's end, LeMay was unconcerned. He believed that the Soviets would not be able to coordinate an attack that would strike all SAC bases simultaneously.

The Gaither Committee presented their findings to the National Security Council.[202] Their recommendations were ranked and top priority was given to Wohlstetter's strategic vulnerability proposals.[203] In addition, Sprague requested and was granted a special audience with President Eisenhower to address the committee's distress about SAC's readiness demonstration.[204] Given about thirty minutes, Sprague outlined the failed test and the committee's grave concerns regarding air base vulnerability. Unfortunately for the Gaither Committee and the civilian strategists, Eisenhower did not

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[202] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1955-1957, Volume XIX, National Security Policy. Document 153. Accessed May 31, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v19/d153; for the report, see *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1955-1957, Volume XIX, National Security Policy. Document 158. Accessed May 31, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v19/d158

[203] For a record of the discussions regarding these proposals, see: *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1958-1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament. Document 1. Accessed May 31, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v03/d1; *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1958-1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament. Document 2. Accessed May 31, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v03/d2; *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1958-1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament. Document 9. Accessed May 31, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v03/d9; *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1958-1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament. Document 51. Accessed May 31, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v03/d51

[204] Record of this meeting is in FRUS, 1957 #156

find the Sprague's report nearly so alarming as did Sprague himself.[205] Nonetheless, Eisenhower did have his National Security Council specifically examine the Gaither Committee's findings.[206]

The debate over air base vulnerability was focused on what, if any, programs were necessary to limit the level of damage the United States could sustain in a nuclear war and still retain the ability to strike back at the Soviet Union. The civilian strategists argued that bases were in danger, and that programs designed to reinforce airbases were imperative in ensuring that the United States could conduct a counterattack. In contrast, the airmen argued that air base vulnerability was less important if they had more planes, shorter response times, and in-air refueling, as these programs would allow SAC to conduct a counterattack without implementing additional security measures at air bases.

Ultimately, Eisenhower did not follow the Gaither committee's recommendations to increase expenditures on air bases to decrease vulnerability. But Eisenhower did take the recommendations seriously, calling for a concerted effort to improve SAC's tactical warning and rapid response times.[207]

4.4 The Outcome

As explained in the theory chapter, three possible outcomes exist: a military outcome, wherein the military gains sole responsibility for the task; a civilian outcome,

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[205] Kaplan, 1983, p. 132

[206] Kuklick, 2006

[207] Rosenberg, 1983

wherein the civilian profession gains sole responsibility for the task; and a mixed outcome, wherein the military profession and the civilian profession share responsibility for the task.

By the end of the 1950s, the task of nuclear strategy can best be categorized as a "mixed outcome." This categorization is evident in each of the three strategic areas described above. When considering the competition over determining target selection, the counterforce priorities stressed by civilian strategists were given greater credence, but the "no cities" policy promoted by other civilian strategists was dropped in favor of a "bonus hit" strategy favored by the Air Force. When considering the strategy of limited nuclear war, SAC's nuclear delivery dominance remained paramount in overall strategy, but Kauffman's limited war analysis gained enough traction to prevent Eisenhower from approving large-scale drawdowns of U.S. forces stationed in Europe.[208] Finally, when considering the issue of air base vulnerability, Albert Wohlstetter's conclusion that the bombers were under threat, and therefore insecure was accepted by decision makers. However, rather than implement Wohlstetter's proposal for increased bomber protection on air bases, the President adopted SAC's in-air refueling plan and required them to decrease their readiness time to fifteen minutes. In each case, both the civilian strategists of RAND and the military airmen of SAC shared a piece of the responsibility in creating U.S. nuclear strategy.

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[208] Taylor, 1960

4.5 Competitive Advantage in Military Tasks

My theory of comparative advantage hypothesizes that assignment of responsibility for a task favors the profession that has a competitive advantage over other professions because competition favors the profession that can provide the superior value. The observed outcome in this case is "mixed," meaning I am testing hypothesis H1b: If all professions possess advantages but no profession has a comparatively higher competitive advantage, then the outcome will be mixed authority. Therefore, if my theory is correct, I should expect to see the civilian strategists and the SAC airmen demonstrating equal levels of "competitive advantage."

Recall from the theory chapter that I conceptualize "competitive advantage," as five sufficient indicators: member retention, organizational unity, competency, commitment, and efficiency. This means, if my theory is correct, I should expect to see relatively equal membership scores in the competitive advantage fuzzy set for both the civilian strategists and the SAC airmen.

4.5.1 Member Retention

Member retention refers to the rate of change in the number of professionals employed in the profession from year to year. If a profession retains all or most of its members, then it will have a competitive advantage over a profession that cannot provide a sufficient number of professionals.

Civilian strategists. During the period in question, the number of civilian strategists directly engaged with the question of nuclear strategy steadily increased over time. After the bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, civilian strategists

flocked to answer questions of where, when, why, and how nuclear weapons should be used. In particular, scholars at Yale (later Princeton) focused on these questions. In addition, after the RAND Corporation's founding in 1945, it expanded rapidly in scope,[209] reaching a peak of over 2,500 employees in the mid 1950s. Recruitment in the early years of RAND remained high due to the number of qualified individuals whose career paths had been interrupted by World War II.[210]

Airmen. The Air Force was also founded during the period in question, giving rise to soldiers specifically trained to fight with airplanes, which were the primary delivery systems for atomic weapons. Specifically, the Strategic Air Command, founded in 1946, was explicitly focused on the delivery of nuclear weapons. However, SAC struggled to maintain its existence during its very early years. In the immediate years following WWII, the entire military was undergoing a drawdown in funding and in personnel.[211] While drawdowns occurred across the board, the Air Force retention rates in 1948-1949 were abysmally low in comparison. In 1948, some units saw one-quarter of the personnel turn over in a two-month period. Despite the relatively steady increase of total personnel in the early 1950s, the stress of the job still had a terrible impact on retention rates.[212] It was not until the mid-1950s that reenlistment rates started to improve.

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[209] Kaplan, 1983

[210] Smith, 1966

[211] Williamson and Rearden, 1993

[212] Mellinger, 2012

From 1954-1955, SAC retention rates increased by five percent.[213] However, in 1956, LeMay testified to Congress that SAC's biggest deficit was in skilled manpower.[214]

4.5.2 Organizational Unity

Organizational unity refers to the strength of a centralized organization that facilitates group action on the part of the profession. If a profession has a strong, centralized organization with a hierarchical organizational structure, then it will have a competitive advantage because it will be able to act as a unified group.

Civilian strategists. The establishment of the RAND Corporation, and its ability to attract civilian strategists to its employ meant that an increasing number of civilian strategists were working in a centralized location, sharing ideas, and generally making it easier for them to work as a unit. However, the organization in RAND was flat and decentralized. Each department operated as a semi-autonomous unit, and within each department individual researchers had "a wide degree of latitude to work on subjects that interest[ed] them, to formulate the issues they [thought] significant, and within broad limits, to set their own deadlines and work on their own schedules."[215]

Airmen. Being a military branch, the Air Force (and SAC) is a single professional group, with a hierarchical organizational structure. In addition, SAC capitalized on its hierarchical structure by moving its headquarters such that it was more

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[213] LeMay and Kantor, 1965; in his autobiography, LeMay attributes this drastic improvement to the establishment of auto clubs (garages) as a form of recreation of SAC bases, p. 453.

[214] Mellinger, 2012

[215] Smith, 1966 p 151

centrally located,[216] increasing its centrality and improving its ability to act in a unified manner.

4.5.3 Competency

Competency refers to the profession's ability to carry out the task over which it is competing. If a profession has high quality and strict training and educational requirements for members, then it can better demonstrate the capability of its members to complete tasks.

Civilian strategists. The civilian strategists at RAND consistently were among the most highly qualified individuals in their respective fields, harkening from institutions such as Harvard, Yale, and Princeton. All would have had a post-baccalaureate degree, and many had won fellowships and other academic honors.[217]

Airmen. During the period in question, SAC went through extraordinary improvements in training, capabilities, and readiness. In the beginning, recruits had poor test scores and were under qualified. At any given time, half the bomber force was grounded: "By the end of 1946, only three bomb groups could report an operational effectiveness of between 60 and 69 percent." By 1948 that number had increased to 6 crews and by 1949, SAC had only weak capability of taking offensive action.[218] When Curtis LeMay was given command of SAC, he instituted a new, rigorous training

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[216] LeMay and Kantor, 1965

[217] Digby, 1990

[218] Mellinger, 2012 p. 89

program, enforced standard operating procedures, and had his men write manuals for each position. In describing the program, LeMay said: "We spread it out, we amplified the program as rapidly as increasing resources permitted. We fathered a master war plan. Everyone knew, eventually, what he was going to do. Each crew was assigned an enemy target, and they studied those targets."[219] These lead crews devoted the entirety of their pre-flight time to studying the target so that if the weather was marginal, they could still hit it.[220] LeMay had taken a ragged command and turned it into the most effective piece of the United States Air Force through his intensive training program.[221] LeMay also encouraged officers and enlisted personnel to attend military schools and/or civilian colleges for graduate degrees.[222]

4.5.4 Commitment

Commitment refers to the profession's interest in the task at hand. If a profession comes to the task of its own volition (i.e. the U.S. government does not ask it to complete the task), then it is more likely to be committed to completing the task effectively.

Civilian strategists. The civilian strategists showed a great deal of commitment to the issue of nuclear strategy. These professionals all became interested in the task independently of one another before joining the RAND Corporation. In addition, the

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[219] LeMay and Kantor, 1965

[220] Mellinger, 2012

[221] LeMay and Kantor, 1965

[222] Mellinger, 2012

civilian strategists were persistent in promoting their theoretical work to policy makers.[223] For example, Albert Wohlstetter spent eight months in Washington D.C. giving briefings on his air base vulnerability study.[224]

Airmen. SAC was given the task of delivering nuclear devices to their intended targets,[225] but it pursued dominance in deciding what those targets were, and when the United States should decide to drop the bombs. In short, I argue SAC pursued the task of nuclear strategy. SAC was given the task of nuclear delivery in 1948, but as early as 1951, General LeMay was meeting with a high level Air Force target panel to discuss the need for greater SAC input on target selection. By 1955, SAC had gained influence in targeting.[226] SAC's work towards inserting itself into strategy discussions is demonstrative of their commitment to the task.

4.5.5 Efficiency

Efficiency refers to the profession's ability to complete a task cheaply and quickly. If the profession can demonstrate its ability to complete a task in less time and with fewer resources, then it gains a competitive advantage over professions who complete the task more slowly or expensively.

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[223] Kaplan, 1983

[224] Smith, 1966

[225] Rosenberg, 1983

[226] Rosenberg, 1983

Civilian strategists. The civilian strategists demonstrated their ability to complete tasks cheaply when they formed the independent RAND Corporation. Securing external funding from the Ford Foundation for the RAND Corporation[227] proved that the Civilian strategists could complete the task, and complete it without being fully financed by the government. However, the civilian strategists' ability to complete the task in a relatively short period of time was questionable. For example, Albert Wohlstetter identified the vulnerability issues with the SAC bases in 1951, but waited three years to release his full report, partly on the basis that he needed to do additional work before presenting any findings.[228] In a similar fashion, from the time that Joseph Loftus and Bernard Brodie began working on a counterforce targeting strategy to the time that such a strategy was formally advocated to the government was four years.[229]

Airmen. In comparison, the airmen of SAC also proved that they could complete the task cheaply. In fact, the same individuals who were already employed by SAC would simply be taking on additional roles in determining where to drop bombs. Specifically, LeMay intended the theater commanders to select the targets.[230] Further, the airmen were already studying each of their targets intensely.[231] It would not have been a significant step to integrate this piece of SAC training into an overarching target selection strategy. However, the strategy they proposed generally cost more in additional equipment and personnel. SAC continuously called for a bigger force in order to carry out the war plans.

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[227] Kaplan, 1983; Smith, 1966

[228] Smith, 1966

[229] Kaplan, 1983

Within the SAC plan, there was also a lot of redundancy in targeting: some targets were duplicated or even triplicated.[232]

4.5.6 Analysis

For this case, both professions performed moderately well on whole. The civilian strategists at RAND scored well in terms of member retention, given the increasing number of civilian strategists who came into RAND's employ during the time period; on commitment, as the civilian strategists came to the topic of their own volition and were interested in fully participating in the task; and on competency because they held post-baccalaureate degrees. The civilian strategists scored less well in the area of efficiency, due in large part to the long timelines required by their research projects and their reticence to circulate preliminary findings. Finally, the civilian strategists scored moderately on the variable of organizational unity, a lack of hierarchy detracting from centralization of professionals. In sum, the civilian strategists demonstrated a moderate to high level of competitive advantage based on the average scores across all key indicators.

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[230] Mellinger, 2012

[231] LeMay and Kantor, 1965

[232] Mellinger, 2012

TABLE 8

SUMMARY OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE INDICATORS

Competitive Advantage	Civilian strategists	Airmen
Member Retention	*High member retention* RAND expanded by three divisions during this time and was actively hiring civilian strategists out of universities.	*Moderate member retention* SAC struggled to maintain its existence and suffered from very low retention rates until the mid 1950s, when rates markedly improved.
Organizational Unity	*Moderate organizational unity* • One professional group: RAND = high • Organizational structure: flat organization= low	*High organizational unity* • One professional group: SAC = high • Organizational structure: hierarchy = high
Competence	*High competence* Degree requirements: post-baccalaureate degree = high	*High competence* Degree requirements: intensive training program = high
Commitment	*High commitment* Civilian strategists sought to participate in the competition = high	*High commitment* Airmen sought to participate in the task = high
Efficiency	*Moderate efficiency* • Cost projections: profession demonstrated the ability to complete the task below estimated cost via outside grant = high • Time projections: profession demonstrated tendency to complete task after the deadline = low	*Moderate efficiency* • Cost projections: profession demonstrated ability to complete the task at the estimated cost = moderate • Time projections: profession demonstrated ability to complete the task at the deadline = moderate

In comparison, the airmen also scored high in three categories. SAC's organizational unity was high due in particular to its hierarchical organizational structure, and LeMay's intensive training program gave SAC a high level of competence. Airmen also scored well in commitment to the task. While SAC was originally assigned to the task of nuclear delivery, the airmen came to the task of nuclear strategy on their own and

pursued it throughout the time period in question. The Airmen hold moderate scores in the two remaining indicators. Efficiency was problematic for the airmen, as SAC's nuclear strategy plans often involved increased numbers of personnel and equipment. Finally, airmen struggled in the area of member retention into the 1950s, when their numbers began to improve. On whole, airmen demonstrated a moderate level of competitive advantage.

Recall from the theory chapter I stated that this hypothesis could be falsified if a profession that does not display a clear competitive advantage gains rights and responsibilities for a task, or if a profession that has a clear competitive advantage does not gain rights and responsibilities for a task. In this case, neither the SAC airmen nor the civilian strategists demonstrated a higher level of competitive advantage when compared to the other. As the observed outcome is mixed responsibility, this hypothesis correctly predicts the observed outcome, and as such, this hypothesis is not falsified.

My theory of competitive advantage is consistent with the nuclear weapons strategy case. In other words, my theory predicted the observed outcome in the case. However, as George and Bennet[233] caution, one cannot take consistency as providing unquestionable proof that the theory is causally significant. Therefore, I consider the possibility that there exists another variable that makes my theory's competitive advantage variable spurious, lack priority, or that could bring about the outcome in the absence of competitive advantage. In this case, the most salient alternative variable is "bargaining," from the bureaucratic politics theory. First, the observed outcome in this

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[233] George, Alexander and Andrew Bennet (2005) *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

case is "mixed." Bargaining could easily explain a "mixed" outcome as it could have been caused by the need for compromise. Second, bargaining could also explain task assignment in a case where competitive advantage is absent as policymakers are likely to discuss which profession to assign to the task before making the actual assignment.

In the following section, I test the bureaucratic politics theory. If the bureaucratic politics theory fails to correctly predict the observed outcome, then the causal significance of my theory is strengthened.

4.6 Alternative Explanation: Bureaucratic Politics

In the following section, I test an alternative explanation: Bureaucratic Politics. As I show below, the bureaucratic politics theory predicts an outcome other than "mixed," meaning the case is not overdetermined. However, given that a "mixed" outcome can also appear indicative of political compromise, is the most likely alternative explanation for the observed outcome.

The Bureaucratic Politics theory predicts that assignment of responsibility of a task is the result of political bargaining. As the observed outcome in this theory is "mixed," I am specifically testing hypothesis H3b: If multiple policy-makers have the skill and will in using bargaining advantages, then the outcome will be mixed authority for the professions that they support. If the bureaucratic politics theory is correct, I should expect to see the civilian strategists of RAND and the airmen of SAC demonstrating relatively equal bargaining abilities.

Recall from the theory chapter that I conceptualize "bargaining" as four sufficient indicators: representation, bargaining advantages, skill, and will. This means that if the

bureaucratic politics theory is correct, I should expect to see the civilian strategists and the airmen of SAC having similar membership scores in the "bargaining" fuzzy set.

4.6.1 Representation

Representation refers to the political ties that allow professions to make their case for gaining control of a profession. If the profession has a supporter at the decision making table, then that profession is more likely to win full authority.

Civilian Strategists. At various times, the civilian strategists presented their findings in Washington. For example, Brodie, Hitch, and Pleset went on the "National Security Circuit" presenting "Implications of Large-Yield Nuclear Weapons" in 1952. Wohlstetter spent time in Washington directly presenting his findings on air base vulnerability to a variety of policy makers. In addition, the Gaither Committee directly presented their recommendations to Eisenhower himself. However, the civilian strategists, whose work underpinned this presentation, were not present.[234] In fact, despite the number of scientific panels that Eisenhower assembled, he had little time for the men of RAND who were critical of his defense policies.[235] Wohlstetter was never given the opportunity to present his basing study to the president; rather, he gave it to the Gaither committee to present to Eisenhower in his place.[236]

Airmen. Similarly, the airmen had several critical political connections, but only after LeMay took command. Before LeMay General Kenny was in command of SAC.

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[234] Kaplan, 1983

[235] Kuklick, 2006

[236] Herken, 1985

Unfortunately for the airmen, Kenney spent more time at the UN than he did at SAC headquarters or in DC.[237] After LeMay took command of SAC, he noted that he began making friends on the Military Affairs Committee in Congress. These were critical connections for SAC, as LeMay said, these Congressmen were, "old pros who were truly apprised to military affairs and could talk to a commander in terms he understood, and who would listen to a commander talking in terms they might understand."[238] After LeMay was relived of duty at SAC, he became the Deputy Air Force Chief of Staff, a role that allowed him to continue representing SAC.[239]

4.6.2 Bargaining Advantages

Bargaining Advantages refer to the power an actor draws from particular personal, situational, or information factors. If the actor has control over information, a personal relationship with the president, the ability to threaten to resign, influence over other governmental actors, the willingness to assume responsibility, a highly skilled staff, or public support, then the profession that actor supports is more likely to gain full authority.

Civilian Strategists. In the case of the civilian strategists, the reports coming out of RAND were impressive. RAND recommendations had a great deal of credibility because they were backed up by detailed, technical, and innovative studies.[240] As noted

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[237] Mellinger, 2012

[238] LeMay and Kantor, 1965, p. 454

[239] Mellinger, 2012

[240] Digby, 1990

above, Wohlstetter's work on air base vulnerability was so superior to previous proposals that many individuals thought that the Air Force plan to which Wohlstetter compared his plan was a fake, set up to fail. However, the civilians could not publicize their work widely.[241] It is also unclear that the actors to which the civilian strategists were connected were well placed within the government. For example, while Sprague was able to get face time with the president, he was not a member of the National Security Council or the Military Affairs Committee of Congress. In this way, the civilian strategists had excellent information but questionable political allies.

Airmen. In contrast, the airmen had good political allies: LeMay's contacts were in the Military Affairs Committee of Congress, individuals who held significant sway in critical areas, like military budgeting. In addition, LeMay's arguments regarding the targeting of urban industrial areas played to major concern of the military and presidential administrations of the time: it would be the best use of current resources.[242]

4.6.3 Skill

Skill refers to the ability of the professions to make their case for dominance over a task to decision makers. If the actor makes good use of his bargaining advantages, then the profession that actor supports is more likely to gain full authority.

Civilian Strategists. In this case, the actors connected to the civilian strategists were not very skilled in their political abilities. For example, while the Gaither Committee was able to present their paper in an alternative formal from normal NSC

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[241] Digby, 1990

[242] Williamson and Rearden, 1993

papers, the presentation was not well matched to their audience. Further, when pursuing their arguments beyond the NSC meeting, the Gaither Committee went outside of the President's decision making advisory system. Eisenhower would not implement changes when recommendations did not come through the right channels.[243] Such a presentation of the bargaining advantage seriously undermined the ability of the civilian strategists to gain full responsibility for the task. Even when the civilian strategists were speaking for themselves, they were often misunderstood. The counterforce proposals put forward by Loftus were not implemented as intended. When Wohlstetter presented his own views on air base vulnerability, it was interpreted as a warning about a "missile gap."[244]

Airmen. In comparison, the airmen had only some skill in using their bargaining advantages. However, as LeMay noted in his autobiography, he had never had experience dealing with Beltway politicians before becoming head of SAC, and at times, he was wont to make careless statements in public.[245]

4.6.4 Will

Will refers to the preparedness of a profession to use its bargaining advantages. If the actor is willing to effectively use his bargaining advantages, then the profession that actor supports is more likely to gain full authority.

Civilian Strategists. In this case, the civilian strategists were incredibly willing to use their bargaining advantages. In fact, the civilian strategists were actively looking to

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[243]Halperin, 1961

[244] Kaplan, 1983

[245] LeMay and Kantor, 1965

share their ideas, to work their connections, and did so with a sense of urgency. For example, in 1952, Brodie, Hitch, and Pleset presented their presentation, "Implications of Large-Yield Nuclear Weapons," to anyone in Washington willing to hear them. Wohlstetter was more than willing to push the Gaither Committee towards looking into the issue of air base vulnerability, but he was relatively unwilling to put his ideas into writing.[246] The Gaither Committee also showed incredible willingness to push for their recommendations, as they leaked their results to the public.[247]

Airmen. In comparison, the airmen were also willing to use their bargaining advantages. The SAC commanders were more than willing to share their feelings about nuclear strategy recommendations made by civilians—a high level of distrust.[248] In addition, LeMay had no qualms about sharing his unfiltered opinion with his political connections, as he said: "I'm proud I developed a reputation for standing up and telling them exactly what I thought."[249]

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[246] Digby, 1990

[247] Halperin, 1961

[248] Both LeMay and Power, who succeeded him, expressed feeling this way at various points. LeMay and Kantor, 1965; Rosenberg, 1983

[249] LeMay and Kantor, 1965, p. 456

TABLE 9

SUMMARY OF BARGAINING INDICATORS

Bargaining	Civilian strategists	Airmen
Representation	*Moderate representation* Profession is represented by high level political actors in the bargaining process: e.g. Sprague = moderate	*High representation* Profession represents itself in the bargaining process: e.g. LeMay = high
Bargaining Advantages	*Moderate bargaining advantages* Profession's actor in the bargaining process had control of information but lacked political allies = moderate	*High bargaining advantages* Profession's actor in the bargaining process had control of information and had political allies = high
Skill	*Moderate skill* Profession's actor in the bargaining process failed to make convincing arguments (e.g. Loftus, Wohlstetter) = moderate	*Moderate skill* Profession's actor did not make convincing arguments (e.g. LeMay) = moderate
Will	*High will* Profession references bargaining advantages frequently = high	*High will* Profession's actor uses bargaining advantages to advance his argument = high

4.6.5 Analysis

For this case, the airmen scored high on three indicators and moderately well on one indicator. SAC was consistently represented at the bargaining table, they possessed strong bargaining advantages, and SAC commanders demonstrated great willingness to use their bargaining advantages. The only criteria in which the SAC commanders did not perform well was in skill, where they only performed marginally well, LeMay's penchant for saying the wrong thing in public and his lack of prior experience in dealing with politicians hurting SAC's overall score. In sum, the airmen possessed a high level of bureaucratic politics acumen.

In contrast, the civilian strategists performed well on one indicator and moderately well on three. Civilian strategists did well in their willingness to share their ideas and influence their political connections to focus on the strategic issues they felt were most salient. However, the civilian strategists did only moderately well when it came to representation. While the civilian strategists were out sharing their ideas with everyone who would listen, they did not possess a consistent presence in high level decision making circles, as SAC did. Even in the cases where their representatives were able to gain high-level access, like the Gaither Committee report, the access was neither consistent nor lengthy.[250] The civilian strategists also only did moderately well in their bargaining advantages, where their reports gave them an edge when it came to information, but their lack of political allies hurt them. Finally, the civilian strategists also lacked the skill to use their bargaining advantages well. The inability for them to clearly communicate their ideas, as evidenced by the difficulty had by both Loftus and Wohlstetter, and the dramatic, fear inducing presentation by Sprague all showed a lack of skill in using their bargaining advantages in the best way. In sum, the civilian strategists possessed a moderate level of bureaucratic politics acumen.

Recall from the theory chapter that I stated this hypothesis could be falsified if only one policymaker with the skill and will to use his bargaining advantages is evident, but the profession he represents does not gain full rights and responsibility for the task. Based on the findings above, the Bureaucratic Politics theory would predict an outcome of military dominance in the area of nuclear strategy. However, as described above, the

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[250] Sprague was given one, less than 30 minute, session to speak face to face with Eisenhower. Kaplan, 1983

situation at the end of the 1950s was clearly more of a mixed responsibility, split between SAC and RAND. Thus, I find the bureaucratic politics theory falsified.

4.6.6 Analytical Comparison

In this case, I conducted two congruence tests to assess the consistency of my theory of competitive advantage and the most challenging alternative explanation, the bureaucratic politics theory against the case of nuclear weapons strategy. I found that my theory of competitive advantage was consistent with the observed outcome while the bureaucratic politics theory was not. When considering why my theory was consistent while the bureaucratic politics theory was not, I found that my theory could function as the alternative variable that made the bureaucratic politics model lack causal depth in this case.

A lack of causal depth occurs when there exists an alternative variable that causes the outcome when the originally proposed variable is absent.[251] In this case, my theory's variable, competitive advantage, can be argued to have brought about the "mixed" outcome in the absence of political bargaining. Take for example, the decisions surrounding the issue of base vulnerability. It is fairly clear that early on Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Twining could have effectively used their command over information to bar the civilian strategists from contributing. In 1955, General Twining made a strong and thorough argument against

[251] George and Bennet, 2005

SAC vulnerability that the President accepted.[252] This argument was followed up a year later by an inclusive Air Force study on SAC vulnerability, positioning its work as being more comprehensive than similar civilian run studies.[253]

Yet, despite the control over information demonstrated by those favoring the airmen's ideas, the President consistently sought the advice and counsel of civilian strategists. In particular, he appointed a Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Dr. James Killian, who was often called upon to give opinions regarding strategy. In addition, the President not only commissioned the Gaither Committee Report in 1957,[254] but also continued discussions of the major aspects of the report for several months into 1958.[255] It was clear that something other than the airmen's bargaining advantages was

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[252] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1955-1957, Volume XIX, National Security Policy. Document 28. Accessed May 31, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v19/d28

[253] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1955-1957, Volume XIX, National Security Policy. Document 85. Accessed May 31, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v19/d85

[254] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1955-1957, Volume XIX, National Security Policy. Document 153. Accessed May 31, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v19/d153; *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1955-1957, Volume XIX, National Security Policy. Document 158. Accessed May 31, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v19/d158

[255] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1958-1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament. Document 1. Accessed May 31, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v03/d1; *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1958-1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament. Document 2. Accessed May 31, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v03/d2; *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1958-1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament. Document 9. Accessed May 31, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v03/d9; *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1958-1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament. Document 21. Accessed May 31, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v03/d21; *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1958-1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control

driving the President's decision to continue seeking out the input of civilian strategists. My theory of competitive advantage explains why the President sought the input of the civilian strategists—these men had a relatively similar level of capacity in completing the task of nuclear weapons strategy development as the airmen of SAC.

4.7 Conclusion

The case of nuclear strategy of 1945-1960 is a case of competition for task dominance between the civilian strategists of the RAND Corporation and the airmen of the Strategic Air Command. Based on assessment of the key independent variables of my theory, a mixed outcome was predicted. In contrast, the bureaucratic politics model predicted a military outcome. Given the evidence presented here, my theory better predicts the observed outcome in the case.

4.7.1 Critical Indicators

In this chapter, the analysis of the indicators associated with the main independent variable, competitive advantage, that appeared to be most salient in determining the competitive advantage were competency and commitment.

In examining these two indicators, both the airmen of USAF SAC and the civilian strategists of RAND demonstrated high levels of competency and commitment. High competency allowed the two groups to compete effectively for a task that demanded the production and advocacy of ideas about strategy. Given that both the civilian strategists

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and Disarmament. Document 51. Accessed May 31, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v03/d51

and the airmen possessed high levels of competency meant that both perspectives were valued despite the differences in strategy that the unique bodies of abstract knowledge ultimately produced.

The two professions' commitment to the task at hand also proved critical in allowing neither profession to gain a competitive advantage over the other in developing nuclear weapons strategy. In particular, the commitment of the civilian strategists at RAND to advocating for their ideas made them a true challenger to the airmen of USAF SAC in gaining responsibility for the task.

CHAPTER 5:

COUNTERING INSURGENTS IN VIETNAM 1960-1968

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I test my theory of competitive advantage against the case of countering insurgents in Vietnam during the years 1960-1968. My theory of competitive advantage hypothesizes that assignment of responsibility for a task favors the profession[256] that has a competitive advantage over other professions because competition favors the profession that can provide a greater value in completing the service. The president of the United States, nearly always the final arbiter, assigns the task to the profession that demonstrates a higher level of competence, efficiency, and commitment in accomplishing the task.

In the 1960s, the United States committed itself to preventing a communist takeover in the country of Vietnam. The communists operating in South Vietnam, known as the Viet Cong, consisted of an insurgent group that was terrorizing government

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[256] A profession is defined as "an exclusive occupational group applying somewhat abstract knowledge to a particular case" that seeks to self-perpetuate and grow. As adapted from Abbot, Andrew (1988) *The System of Professions: An essay on the division of expert labor*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

officials and recruiting and taxing the rural population in hopes of establishing a communist government over a reunified Vietnam.[257] Today, there is widespread agreement that the proper strategy to counter an insurgent threat requires participation by military, social, and political agencies.[258] Yet, during the period of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the U.S. Army was given overwhelming support, resources, and authority. Why did the civilian agencies, who arguably make up two of the three critical pieces of a modern conception of good counterinsurgency strategy, fail to obtain the same level of support and responsibility? This result is particularly puzzling given the volume at which civilians called for a combined strategy.

This chapter examines the dominance of the U.S. Army during the period of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. In particular, it examines three instances in which the civilian agencies (CIA, AID, and the Department of State) attempted to gain increased responsibility for combating the Viet Cong, and why they failed to make any significant progress. In this chapter, I focus on the historical debate on the appropriate response to providing assistance to a foreign state suffering an insurgent threat. This chapter is not

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[257] Herring, George C. (1979) *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

[258] For example, according to Andrew Krepinevich, "the elements of a successful strategy for the counterinsurgent involve securing the government's base areas, separating the guerilla forces from the population, and eliminating the insurgent infrastructure. In an area infested by insurgency, the army must concentrate enough force to either destroy or expel the main body of guerillas in clear-and-hold operations to prepare the area for pacification, that is, for those actions taken by the government to assert its control over the population and to win its willing support…To be successful, counterinsurgency requires coordination among many government organizations, of which the military is only one, albeit the largest. Because of the political and social nature of the conflict and the myriad nonmilitary institutions involved, a unified approach that orchestrates the multidimensional elements of the government's counterinsurgency strategy is essential. " Krepinevich, Andrew (1986) *The Army and Vietnam.* Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, p. 13-15

intended to serve as a critique of the Army's strategy in Vietnam, nor as a retrospective critique of the United States' involvement in that country.[259]

In this case, my theory predicts a "military outcome," where the U.S. Army gained and held responsibility for the task of counterinsurgency in Vietnam. However, the bureaucratic politics model of foreign policy decision-making likewise predicts a "military outcome." As the case is overdetermined, I examine the process by which policymakers arrived at their decision to grant full responsibility to the U.S. military. In the end, I argue that my theory provides a more concise and convincing explanation for the decisions made in this case.

The chapter begins with an explanation of the case selection. There follows an overview of key events of the case and the outcome of the case is identified. Next, I test the outcome hypotheses of both my theory of competitive advantage and the bureaucratic politics theory (H1 and H2). After, I test the hypotheses related to the process by which policymakers assign professions to specific tasks (H3 and H4). The chapter concludes with an analysis of my theory's performance.

5.2 Case Selection and Theoretical Predictions

In this dissertation, I define the universe of cases as those beginning with a new military task[260] and ending with the assignment of that task to a particular profession. I

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[259] See Hess, Gary R. (2009) *Vietnam: Explaining America's Lost War*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, for an excellent overview on the different arguments regarding the United States' involvement in Vietnam, including the orthodox view that the United States was wrong to intervene and the revisionist view that the United States could have won the war, had it not pulled out when it did.

argue that counterinsurgency strategies in Vietnam can be considered a new military task. In 1961, Kennedy announced a foreign policy focused on preventing the steady erosion of the Free World through limited war, which included non-nuclear, sub-limited and guerilla warfare. Kennedy stated that the role of the United States in these conflicts would be to provide assistance to local forces at work against overt attack, subversion, and guerilla warfare.[261] This type of assistance in limited wars can be considered a "new military task" because it fulfills the sufficiency requirement of "change in the type of service demanded."

As noted below, the United States began engagement with Vietnam through the Military Assistance Advisory Group in 1954. Yet, I chose to frame this case as beginning in 1960. I did so for two reasons. First, Kennedy's call for working on limited wars or assistance wars changed the United States' approach to the situation in Vietnam, opening the door for a greater level of involvement. As I argue, it was this change in demand that begot the new military task. This changed demand was carried through into the Johnson Administration, as Johnson felt obligated to continue on Kennedy's perceived course of action. Second, it was around 1960 that the insurgency in Vietnam became more aggressive.

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[260] A new military task is defined as a task that is motivated either by technology creation or by a change in demand for the type of service provided.

[261] Kennedy, John F. (1961) "Special Message to the Congress on the Defense Budget," March 28. Available at: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=8554; Accessed February 9, 2016.

Literature on the Vietnam conflict frequently qualifies the use of counterinsurgency as "new."[262] Some might point to the experiences of the United States in the Philippines as a counterinsurgency, in which case, it would not fulfill the sufficiency requirement. It might be argued that the Marine's involvement in the "Banana Wars" in Nicaragua and the resulting publication of the USMC's *Small Wars Manual*, in 1940 also constituted prior military experience with counterinsurgency of the type practiced in Vietnam.[263] However, in the Philippine War (1898-1902), the United States was a colonial power, putting it in a different and more powerful position than in Vietnam.[264] The United States was not "assisting" the local population in the way that was demanded by the situation in Vietnam.[265] Similarly to the U.S. Army's experience in the Philippines, the Marine's first priority in Nicaragua was to secure American lives and American economic interests. In their campaigns against the Nicaraguan insurgents, the Marines, "constantly pursued Sandino [the insurgents], keeping his forces away from

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[262] See for example, Blaufarb, Douglas (1977) *The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance.* New York: Free Press, p 2: "counterinsurgency was conceived of as a response to a danger that appeared to threaten U.S. global interests and did so in a guise which made it difficult to detect in timely fashion and even if detected, to deal with effectively. It was seen as novel and unprecedented and, for these reasons among others, exceedingly dangerous." and Krepinevich, 1986, p 15-16: "for the United States Army, and army that 'won its spurs' through winning conventional wars, the reorienting of thought and process, of doctrine and organization, to acclimate itself to what was for it, a 'new' conflict environment in Vietnam presented a major challenge"

[263] Peterson, Michael E. (1989) *The Combined Action Platoons: The U.S. Marines' Other War in Vietnam*. New York: Praeger. Makes this argument..

[264] Linn, Brian McAllister (1989) *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.

[265] A "White Paper" out of the State Department echoes this idea, stating that the conflict in Vietnam was unlike those in Greece, Malaya, or the Philippines. U.S. Department of State (1965) *Aggression from the North: The Record of North Vietnam's Campaign to Conquer South Vietnam*. Publication 7839, Far Eastern Series 130, Washington D.C.

populated areas,"[266] which is different than the "clear-and-hold" type strategy described in Marine doctrine. Additionally problematic to this argument is the role of civic action, which in the Nicaraguan case, failed to offer solutions to the insurgency problem. Finally, after the publication of the *Small Wars Manual* in 1940, it was rarely used or taught: "In [one] instance, a Marine officer preparing a 1960 study on counterinsurgency operations was not even familiar with the *Small Wars Manual*'s existence."[267]

I argue that in this case, any body of professional knowledge that could have or did develop had effectively been lost by the time the United States found itself intervening in Vietnam.[268] In short, when President Kennedy requested that the military begin to consider wars of lower-intensity conflict, it was a change in the type of service demanded—a shift from the mid-intensity conflict in which the United States had engaged since the turn of the century.

Finally, some might argue that the United States military would have had the opportunity to observe other countries, specifically Great Britain, engage in counterinsurgency operations and this observation could have impacted the United States military's response. In other words, the task wasn't a "new military task" because other

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[266] Macak, Richard J. (2008) "Lessons from Yesterday's Operations Short of War: Nicaragua and the *Short Wars Manual*," in *U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare, 1989-2007*, ed. Col. Stephen S. Evans. Quantico: United States Marine Corps University, p. 82

[267] Macak, 2008, p. 85

[268] Krepinevich, 1986 argues that the Army's focus on conventional conflict during and after the world wars resulted in a distinct lack of doctrine focused on unconventional or low-intensity conflict, p. 5. In comparison, Peterson notes that while the Marines had a field manual, entitled *Small Wars Manual* that described counterinsurgency doctrine as a clear-and-hold operation, originally published in 1940, it was replaced in 1962 with *Operations Against Guerilla Forces*, which was heavily influenced by the Army doctrine on guerilla warfare—doctrine that did not emphasize clear-and-hold operations. Peterson, 1989.

countries had already been practicing it. Puzzlingly, the United States military chose not to emulate the British in their practice of counterinsurgency. The most likely explanation for the United States military's failure to emulate comes from the literature on military innovation,[269] which argues that military emulation results from the cross-national exchange of professional military norms.[270] However, once cultures are set, some opportunities for innovation are less likely to be seen.[271] Likely, the United States military, set in its cultural conceptualization of what it meant to fight as a professional soldier, failed to see the British strategy as one worth emulating, *regardless* of its level of effectiveness.

The United States' use of counterinsurgency in Vietnam fulfills the sufficiency requirement of "new military task." Both the civilians at the CIA, AID, and the State Department and the soldiers of the U.S. Army attempted to demonstrate their ability to practice effective strategies to counter the Viet Cong insurgents in Vietnam. Both civilians and soldiers were interested in gaining responsibility for the task of

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[269] Military innovation being defined as "changing the manner in which military formations function in the field…[being] signifanct in scope and impact...[and] tacitly equated with greater military effectiveness." Grissom, Adam (2006) "The future of military innovation studies" *Journal of Strategic Studies*. 29:5, pp. 905-934; p. 907. The British emphasis in Malaya on protection of the populace and intelligence gathering would have been a military innovation for the United States, had the military chosen to emulate these practices. Blaufarb, 1977

[270] Farrell, Theo (2002) "World Culture and the Irish Army, 1922-1942" in *The Sources of Military* Change, ed. Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Elizabeth Kier also offers explanation as to how culture can impact military doctrine. See: Kier, Elizabeth (1997) *Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the* Wars. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Other explanations for military innovation, like new technology, failure on the battlefield, and direct civilian intervention do not explain the cross-national emulation examined here. Posen, Barry (1984) *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

[271] Grissom, 2006, p. 917

counterinsurgency because that responsibility could be directly tied to increased prestige and budgetary priority, which would ultimately improve the profession's ability to self perpetuate and grow.

5.3 Overview of Key Events

5.3.1 Abstract Knowledge and the Genesis of Competition

The task of counterinsurgency in Vietnam emerged when President Kennedy began actively calling for a focus on low-intensity conflict. Today, scholars and policymakers are clear that counterinsurgency is best accomplished utilizing a combination of military, social, and political agencies. However, when the task emerged in the early 1960s, such a consensus did not yet exist.

While both the military and the civilian agencies—CIA, AID, and the State Department—agreed that the Viet Cong insurgents in South Vietnam were problematic, they different in their approach to solving the problem. This difference in opinion occurred because the civilian agencies and the military were distinct professional organizations that each applied their unique body of abstract knowledge to the task of counter-insurgency.

The military viewed insurgents[272] as partisan agents that operated under the regular forces of a foreign nation.[273] In Vietnam, the Army saw the Viet Cong as

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[272] It should be noted that in much of the Army literature, the reference is to "guerillas." In this dissertation, I use the term "insurgents" throughout for clarity and consistency.

[273] Peterson, 1989

supported and supplied by the North Vietnamese Communists.[274] In order to determine the appropriate response to this threat, the Army turned to military doctrine.[275] The Army did not possess a coherent body of doctrine specifically concerning countering insurgencies.[276] Between 1945 and 1965, over ten different field manuals[277] made reference to some sort of counter-insurgent strategy or tactics. These manuals were regularly edited and revised, with recommendations changing frequently. Despite the lack of an explicit doctrinal manual referring to counterinsurgency, it is clear that there was some consensus that the Army, as a whole, could and should be able to deal with insurgents[278] using basic military principles, including emphases on the offensive, mobility, and cutting supply lines.[279] In short, in order to defeat the insurgency in the South, the Army argued that the lines of supply and communication between the North

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[274] Krepinevich, 1986

[275] Benjamin M. Jensen offers a useful analysis of doctrine as a body of professional knowledge in his paper "The Doctrine Puzzle: Knowledge Production in Military Organizations" presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, New Orleans, February 18-21, 2015.

[276] In 1958 all doctrine concerning counter-insurgency was taken out of field manuals, when FM 31-20 and FM 31-21 were combined. However, in 1960, a new edition of FM 7-100 was released containing seven pages on counter-guerrilla warfare. Then, in 1961, FM 31-15, *Operations Against Irregular Forces* was published, and was updated later that decade as FM 31-16, *Counterguerrilla Operations.* It should be noted that sources disagree as to the publication date of FM 31-16. Krepinevich, 1986, states that it was published in 1967, but Birtle, Andrew J. (2006) *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Counterinsurgency Operations Doctrine, 1942-1976*. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, states that it was first published in 1963.

[277] Including: FM 27-10, FM 30-20, FM 30-21, FM 31-15, FM 31-16, FM 31-22, FM 33-5, FM 41-10, FM 100-1, FM 100-5. From Birtle, 2006.

[278] Krepinevich, 1986 p. 37, 43

[279] Birtle, 2006; Nagl, John A. (2005) *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

and the South needed to be cut, and attrition tactics should be used against conventional forces.[280]

In contrast, the civilians viewed the insurgents as being indigenous and part of a political movement within a country that could be independent of external help.[281] In order to counter this strategy, the civilians turned to their abstract knowledge base: political and economic systems.[282] If the insurgents are members of the population, then the obvious way to counter the insurgent movement is to win over the population to your side. Commonly known as the "hearts-and-minds" strategy, the prescription called for "gaining control of villages, providing security against communist forces, working with peasants, and introducing reforms to improve [the peasants'] lives."[283] In the words of CIA director Hilsman: "we must institute a program of civic action which will tie the villagers to their districts and to their central government."[284] The CIA, AID, and the State Department argued that winning the political loyalty of the population was a critical first step in countering the insurgency because political loyalty was a prerequisite for

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[280] Peterson, 1989

[281] Peterson, 1989

[282] The State Department is tasked with the diplomatic mission of the United States, and thus has a body of abstract knowledge that views tasks from a distinctly political point of view. The CIA, when it was established in 1947, was tasked with collecting foreign intelligence and conducting covert action: both highly political in nature. CIA (2013) "CIA Vision, Mission, Ethos & Challenges" at https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/cia-vision-mission-values. Accessed February 10, 2016. AID was created with the express purpose of uniting development into a single agency responsible with administering aid to foreign countries to promote social and economic development. AID (2015) "AID History" at www.AID.gov/who-we-are/AID-history. Accessed January 30, 2016.

[283] Hess, 2009 p 112

[284] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1961-1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 54. Accessed May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v02/d54

providing local security.[285] A memo from the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State underlines this assertion: "the more we can think and speak of Viet-Nam struggles in terms of 'pacification and winning the allegiance of the people' as contrasted with 'winning the war' the more we will find success."[286] In Vietnam, the CIA's goal was to provide support such that the threatened government of South Vietnam could gain popular support. AID's mission was to focus on economic development and modernization.[287]

In sum, both the U.S. Army and the civilian governmental organizations were attempting to aid the Vietnamese government in countering insurgent operations. Both also referred to their efforts as pacification, meaning "those actions taken by [or on behalf of] the government to assert its control over the population and win its willing support."[288] The difference was in the prioritization of actions that would gain the South Vietnamese government control: the Army believed that military and combat aspects of counterinsurgency should be dealt with first, whereas the civilian governmental organizations believed that in order to stop the escalating violence, addressing the needs and concerns of the rural population was most important.

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[285] Hunt (1995) *Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam's Hearts and Minds*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, p 18

[286] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1961-1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 85. Accessed May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v02/d85

[287] Blaufarb, 1977

[288] For clarity, I use a modification of Krepenevich's (1986) definition of pacification, p. 13

5.3.2 U.S. Army Strategy: "Search-and-Destroy"

The U.S. military became involved in South Vietnam as early as 1954, with the creation of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG). MAAG was established to provide military support to the newly formed South Vietnamese Army (ARVN). In 1961, under "Operation Beef-up" the MAAG was reorganized under the Military Advisory Command to Vietnam (MACV).[289]

Ground troops were introduced in 1965, and were shortly after given the authority to engage in combat with the enemy.[290] Ground troops remained in Vietnam for the next eight years; the final troops pulled out in 1973, with the signing of the Paris Agreement.[291]

During the time that the ground troops, under the command of General William Westmoreland, were present in Vietnam, they followed a strategy best known as "search-and-destroy." In military terms, the strategy is more correctly termed a war of attrition. The relatively limited manpower of the Vietnamese made attrition a practicable strategy in South Vietnam,[292] it emphasized the Army's advantages in firepower and strategic mobility, and came with the promise of fewer casualties.[293]

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[289] Herring, 1979

[290] Ambrose, Stephen E. and Douglas G. Brinkley (2011) *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938*. London: Penguin Books.

[291] Anderson, David L. (2002) *The Columbia Guide to the Vietnam War*. New York: Columbia University Press.

[292] Gen. Westmoreland, William (1976) *A Soldier Reports*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc.

[293] Krepinevich, 1986

When Westmoreland devised the strategy,[294] he divided it into three phases. In the first phase, the goal was to secure military enclaves or logistical base areas. In the second phase, U.S. troops would engage in offensive operations and deep patrolling. Here, the goal would be to deprive the Communists of their secure base areas, from which they were staging operations, including terrorizing, recruiting and taxing the rural population. In the final phase, the U.S. Army would act a reserve force to the ARVN and conduct long-range operations. In this "mopping-up" phase, the main forces and insurgents would be cleared out and pushed across frontiers where the Army would contain them.

In short, "the army would search out and destroy as many insurgents as possible as quickly as possible, convincing the [Viet Cong] that they could not win."[295] As Westmoreland stated, "I had to get on with meeting the crisis within South Vietnam, and only by seeking, fighting, and destroying the enemy could that be done."[296] Despite the frequent use of the words "search-and-destroy" even by Westmoreland himself, the

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[294] Prior to Westmoreland's appointment, General Harkins was the commander of MACV. Harkins is described as toeing the company line in terms of doctrine and strategy. (see Nagl, 2005 p 131-137). Westmoreland held the command position until 1968, when General Abrams took over. History disagrees as to whether Abrams changed the Army's strategy away from a war of attrition, or whether he simply responded to a changing tactical situation. The major change made by Abrams was a shift away from Westmoreland's division of labor (discussed further below) and advocated for a "one war" policy. It is worth noting that at this same time, the President had begun to draw down forces in Vietnam and requested the Army begin looking towards disengagement. The decision to disengage had two major implications. First, the division of labor that Westmoreland had practiced would be unsustainable given the decreasing number of American troops. Second, the ARVN would have to be able to take over the pieces of the war that the U.S. Army was fighting when the U.S. Army left. Sorely, Lewis (1992) *Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Time*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

[295] Krepinevich, 1986 p. 151

[296] Westmoreland, 1976 p. 153

strategy focused more on cutting the enemy off from their base areas and supplies: bunkers, tunnels, rice and ammunition caches, and training camps were primary targets.[297]

Pacification was also part of the Army's strategy, and was to be ongoing throughout all three phases.[298] Westmoreland envisioned pacification efforts and combat with main force units to be accomplished under a division of labor. The ARVN would focus primarily on pacification while the U.S. Army would focus primarily on the main force units. However, each U.S. division was assigned to a semi-permanent base within their tactical area of responsibility. While at the base, the soldiers were to aid the ARVN in their area with pacification and civic action projects.[299]

The logic behind the strategy of attrition and the division of labor for pacification is fairly straightforward. Westmoreland saw the strategy of attrition as the only workable solution given the political constraints. First, he could not expand the war into Laos, Cambodia or North Vietnam. Second, he did not have enough troops to hold onto captured territory, which was uninhabitable and had no intrinsic value except that the enemy was trying to use it. Third, the enclave strategy would not force the enemy to negotiate since it caused them little damage, and the enemy had shown they only negotiated when they were hurting.

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[297] Westmoreland, 1976

[298] There is some discrepancy in the literature as to when precisely pacification was to occur. Hunt, Richard (1995) *Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam's Hearts and Minds*. Boulder: Westview Press, describes Pacification as beginning during the second phase. In contrast, Westmoreland (1976) states that Pacification was to occur during all three phases of the strategy. Likely, this discrepancy is over the definition of pacification as by the U.S. Army (Hunt) or by any group in South Vietnam (Westmoreland). I have chosen to represent Westmoreland's point of view for the purposes of this work.

[299] Westmoreland, 1976

Finally, the division of labor between the ARVN and the U.S. Army was designed to capitalize on the strengths of each. The U.S. Army possessed heavy firepower, which would be most advantageous when used against the main force units. In contrast, the ARVN had greater compatibility with the people of South Vietnam, and therefore would be better suited to working in more populated areas. This division of labor was endorsed by the success of American forces in the major battle at Ia Drang Valley in 1965.[300]

5.3.3 CIA run COIN

Throughout the period of American involvement in Vietnam, the CIA ran multiple programs designed to counter the insurgent threat presented by the Viet Cong. Four of the most prominent programs included: the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups, the Static Census Grievance Program, the Revolutionary Development Cadres, and the Provincial Reconnaissance Units.

The first of these programs, the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG), was begun by the CIA in 1961.[301] With permission from the government of South Vietnam, the CIA had U.S. special operations forces approach tribal leaders in Buon Enao proposing to arm and train the villagers in exchange for the villagers declaring support for the South Vietnamese government.[302] The program was designed to provide villagers

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[300] The bloody battle produced 1,200 KIA for the North Vietnamese and only 200 for the American forces. Krepinevich, 1986.

[301] Nagl, 2005

[302] Department of the Army (1989) *Vietnam Studies: U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961-1971*. Washington D.C.: Center for Military History.

not only with local security but also medical help, sanitation equipment, and other benefits. The CIDGs were staffed by a team comprised of both U.S. Special Operations Forces and South Vietnamese Special Forces. These Special Forces would organize, arm, and train local militia units, and in the process indoctrinate the villagers, develop intelligence and counterintelligence systems, and build fortifications.[303]

By February 1962, all forty of the originally proposed villages were participating in the program.[304] That summer, the CIA requested an additional sixteen U.S. Special Forces teams to join the eight that had arrived in May.[305] However, the Army felt that the Special Forces were being used improperly by the CIA[306] and began calling the Special Forces back to deploy them in Laos and North Vietnam. At this time the Department of Defense decided to declare the CIDG program non-covert, and declared the program should no longer be under CIA control.[307] Thus, beginning in November 1962, Operation SWITCHBACK began.[308] All CIDGs came under the control of MACV by July 1963. MACV pulled all remaining U.S. Special Forces out of the program and staffed it fully

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[303] Moyar, Mark (1997) *Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: The CIA's Secret Campaign to Destroy the Viet Cong.* Annapolis: Naval Institute Press.

[304] Department of the Army, 1989

[305] Nagl, 2005

[306] At their creation, special forces were intended to fight *as* insurgents not *against* insurgents. Nagl, 2005

[307] Krepinevich, 1986

[308] Department of the Army, 1989

with the South Vietnamese Special Forces, which eventually caused the program to peter out.[309]

The CIDG concept was briefly resurrected under the Marines in the form of Combine Action Platoons (CAPs) from 1965-1969. However, throughout the Marines' run, the program was plagued by lack of training, personnel problems, and a wide variance in success level.[310]

The second of the CIA programs was known as the Static Census Grievance Program. The CIA conducted interviews in villages to identify village grievances.[311] In addition to taking census information, the "purpose was to gain the confidence of the villagers and develop sources of information on local communists." This program eventually was folded into the CORDS operation.[312]

The third and perhaps best-known program was called the Revolutionary Development (RD) Cadres. The concept was to set up groups of South Vietnamese in a way that copied the Viet Cong organizations. However, these groups were less than effective, running and hiding rather than defending attacks from the Viet Cong.[313] This program also eventually was folded in under CORDS.[314]

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[309] Nagl, 2005; Krepinevich, 1986

[310] Peterson, 1989

[311] Moyar, 1997

[312] Hunt, 1995 p. 25

[313] Moyar, 1997

[314] Hunt, 1995

The final program was originally called the Counterterror Teams, but was later renamed the Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs). This program was also designed to copy the Viet Cong methods. PRUs were "small elite groups of North and South Vietnamese men [who] collected intelligence on the [Viet Cong's political arm] and the [Viet Cong and] then captured or killed them, usually at night."[315] The PRUs had a reputation for being hardened groups.[316] But, like the CIDGs, the PRUs were eventually put under the control of MACV.[317]

The logic behind these programs is clearly driven by the CIA's body of professional knowledge and mission in Vietnam. Each program was designed to counter the insurgents on a political level: either through collecting intelligence that could be used against the insurgents (i.e. Static Census Grievance Program) or conducting clandestine operations against the Viet Cong (i.e. CIDGs, RD Cadres, PRUs). By gathering information against the insurgents and running clandestine operations against them, the CIA hoped to demonstrate the ability of the government of South Vietnam to protect its citizens from the Viet Cong, thus winning the "hearts-and-minds" of the population.[318]

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[315] Moyar, 1997, p 38

[316] Hunt, 1995

[317] The transfer occurred in 1969. Hunt, 1995 p 246

[318] Moyar, 1997, and others describe the Vietnamese "mandate of heaven" a social norm in Vietnam that political power and authority would be granted to the group most worthy to wield it.

However, all four of the major programs on counter insurgency run by the CIA ended up under control of the military, either through direct transfer or by incorporation into CORDS.

5.3.4 AID in Vietnam

While the CIA ran the bulk of the programs during the early 1960s, several other public agencies and private organizations were also active in the civilian driven "hearts-and-minds" pacification strategy, including the United States Information Agency and the Joint U.S. Public Affairs. However, the most prominent of these was the newly formed United States Agency for International Development (AID).[319]

During this time, AID had the largest number of programs underway in Vietnam.[320] AID was made an official agency in 1961. At that time, it took over for a variety of other organizations operating in Vietnam, including: the Economic Cooperation Administration, the Mutual Security Agency, the Technical Cooperation

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[319] Originally, the acronym for this agency was "AID." Today, we refer to the same agency as "USAID." For clarity, I use "AID" throughout.

[320] Despite the large number of programs, and the large amounts of money spent by AID, very little has been written about the organization's experience in Vietnam prior to the creation of CORDS in 1967, when CORDS took over AID's major programs.

Administration, and the International Cooperation Agency.[321] Between 1962 and 1975, Vietnam was the primary receiver of AID funds.[322]

AID was in charge of a variety of programs, including: new life development, the National Police Field Forces, and the Open Arms or "Chieu Hoi" program, and AID also ran the Vietnamese ports.[323] Each of these programs was designed to both bolster the effective governance of the South Vietnamese government and to damage the efforts of the Viet Cong. The first program, new life development, was designed to offer economic assistance to the rural areas of Vietnam. The second program, the National Police Field Forces program was a paramilitary organization made up of combat police. The goal of this force was to attack the Viet Cong's political infrastructure directly. But, the National Police Field Forces were fairly ineffectual and inactive.[324] The third program, Chieu Hoi, or the Open Arms initiative, was designed to offer amnesty to defectors of the Viet Cong. Known as "ralliers" these Viet Cong defectors often provided information on the Viet Cong.[325] The major issue the Chieu Hoi program encountered was the integration of

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[321] AID, 2015, "AID History"; National Archives (n.d.) "Foreign Aid and Counterinsurgency: the United States Agency for International Development (AID) and other United States Foreign Assistance Agencies in Vietnam, 1950-1967" at https://www.archives.gov/research/foreign-policy/assistance/vietnam/. Accessed January 30, 2016.

[322] Leepson, Mark (2000) "The Heart and Mind of AID's Vietnam Mission" *Foreign Service Journal*. April. pp20-27.

[323] This was in addition to the work AID did in support of nation-building in areas of public administration, economic stabilization, education, and public health.

[324] Moyar, 1997

[325] "Ralliers" would defect for a number of reasons: they had already been captured by the government and rallying would prevent jail time or torture, some considered life as a Viet Cong too difficult, others did so for familial reasons or because other members of their cadre were defecting. Some rallied at the direction of Viet Cong leadership, although this occurred rarely. Moyar, 1997

defectors back into the system as allies.[326] In running logistical operations at the Vietnamese ports, AID's goal was to move the material assistance into Vietnam to bolster the Vietnamese economy.

The logic underpinning AID's programs are clearly tied to the economic system of the country. AID believed that if the South Vietnamese government could increase the economic growth of the population, then they would win the population's support. In addition to the economic development assistance that AID gave to the people of South Vietnam,[327] AID knew that these economic gains needed to be protected from the taxation of the Viet Cong,[328] which inspired the emphasis on the National Police Field Force program. In addition, AID saw the need to reintegrate Viet Cong members who were swayed by the more lucrative life the South Vietnamese government was offering, which inspired the Chieu Hoi program.

5.3.5 Mr. Vietnam and CORDS

In early 1966, President Johnson named Robert Komer the chief adviser on pacification. In a push to coordinate among all organizations engaged in pacification (the CIA, military, AID, State, USIA, and Joint US Public Affairs Office), control of all American efforts towards pacification was given to the Office of Civil Operations

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[326] Hunt, 1995; some ralliers were organized into cadres known as the "Kit Carson Scouts" under the military. These small units did reconnaissance work or acted as guides to U.S. military units. Moyar, 1997

[327] These programs included construction projects, medical programs, and food distribution programs. Peterson, 1989.

[328] see Moyar, 1997, chapter 2 for a detailed description about the ways that the Viet Cong taxed the population.

(OCO). However, the OCO was quickly replaced by Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), which was launched in 1967, reached its peak in 1969, and was abolished in 1973.

The reassertion of civilian run pacification programs began after it became evident that the war of attrition being practiced by the military would take time. In February of 1966, President Johnson met with South Vietnamese officials in Honolulu to discuss the South Vietnamese run pacification programs and the future of pacification in South Vietnam. At that time, pacification programs were predominantly run by U.S. civilian agencies and staffed by the Government of South Vietnam, and these programs were struggling to bring about desirable results. The U.S. civilian agencies that were advising and providing other kinds of support to the Vietnamese pacification programs at this time were failing to coordinate or collaborate.[329]

In order to overcome these inherent problems, the Johnson Administration decided that there needed to be a "Mr. Vietnam," or someone in charge of all pacification efforts in Washington. To that end, Johnson appointed Robert Komer to the position of chief adviser to the president on Pacification in March 1966.[330] In this position, Komer was "authorized to draw support from the secretaries of state, defense, treasury, agriculture, health, education, and welfare; the administrator of AID; and the directors of the CIA and USIA. His authority extended as well to military affairs insofar as they affected the other war. Komer had responsibility for military resources in support of civil

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[329] Blaufarb, 1977; Hunt, 1995; Moyar, 1997

[330] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 102. Accessed May 15, 2016; Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d102

programs and for proper coordination of pacification with the deployment of combat forces and the conduct of military operations"[331]

In his new position, Komer suggested three ways to change the American practice of pacification in Vietnam. First, he suggested giving full control of all U.S. pacification efforts to deputy ambassador Porter. As a second option, Komer proposed separate civilian and military commands in Vietnam, while putting a pacification officer in MACV. Finally, Komer suggested giving all support to General Westmoreland, and placing full responsibility for pacification efforts on MACV.[332]

In response to these suggestions, Johnson first created the OCO under deputy Ambassador Porter in November 1966, giving it authority over all civilian agencies engaged in pacification.[333] The unification was not complete: "Porter lacked the authority to transfer funds from one program to another, an impediment that hampered the reprogramming of money and resources to deal with unexpected problems."[334] In addition, Johnson gave the OCO a ninety-day trial period to show marked improvement in pacification efforts, and the OCO struggled to fill all personnel positions within this time period. In many ways, it was clear that the OCO was not given a fair chance to succeed in any meaningful way. Rather, the decision to implement the OCO can be

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[331] Hunt, 1995 p. 73

[332] Hunt, 1995

[333] Moyar, 1997

[334] Hunt, 1995, p. 83

viewed as "a way to prepare the civilian agencies for their placement under military command."[335]

Placement of civilian agencies under military command came with the creation of CORDS in 1967.[336] CORDS was placed under military control because the military held most of the resources in Vietnam, pacification required establishing security in the country side, and the government administration outside of Saigon was already primarily under military control.[337]

In the literature on CORDS, the level of civilian authority within the program is often called remarkable.[338] While it is true that for the first time, civilians were integrated into the military line of command, CORDS leadership emphasized these civilian roles in order to reassure the civilian agencies who were now under military control. In fact, the military did curtail the amount of power the civilians had,[339] and Komer was upset about

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[335] Hunt, 1995; Moyar, 1997, p. 48

[336] Hess, 2009; The primary goals of CORDS was to protect the rural population from insurgents and to generate rural support for the government of South Vietnam. Of secondary importance was neutralizing the VC. Komer, Robert (1971) "Impact of Pacification on Insurgency in South Vietnam," *Journal of International Affairs*. 25:1, pp48-69. For a complete list of new programs under CORDS, see Hunt, 1995, chapter 7; and Komer's 1971 article.

[337] Komer, 1971

[338] see for example, Moyar, 1997 p. 49; Krepinevich, 1986, p. 218; even Komer himself was quick to point out the level of civilian control in his 1971 article.

[339] For example, Westmoreland made sure that Komer's title was not that of commander in order to ensure that he would not have control over any American troops should Westmoreland or his deputy commander be out of commission. Hunt, 1995.

where his position fell in the over all hierarchy with American operations in Vietnam.[340] In addition, throughout its existence, military personnel outnumbered the civilians 6:1.[341]

5.4 The Outcome

As explained in the theory chapter, three possible outcomes exist: a military outcome, wherein the military gains sole responsibility for the task; a civilian outcome, wherein the civilian profession gains sole responsibility for the task; and a mixed outcome, wherein the military profession and the civilian profession share responsibility for the task.

At each of several critical decision points, the military—specifically, the U.S. Army—was given authority and responsibility for the practice of counterinsurgency in Vietnam. First, in 1962, when the CIA's clandestine CIDG pacification program began to bear fruit, Secretary of Defense McNamara declared the program non-covert, and ordered its placement under the Department of Defense.[342] Almost immediately, a 'phase down' of CIDG forces began and CIDG personnel were absorbed into another force or were demobilized. The goal was to reduce these troops from 116,000 to 0 by 1965.[343] In 1966,

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[340] See Hunt, 1995 p. 87

[341] Krepinevich, 1986, p. 218

[342] Krepinevich, 1986 p. 72; *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1961-1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January-August 1963, Document 18. Accessed May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d18

[343] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1961-1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January-August 1963, Document 18. Accessed May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d18

the military argued that if such a program were to continue, it would cause the Vietnamese government to collapse.[344] The last vestiges of this program, the Marines who ran the CAPs, were also slowly but surely reintegrated back into the main force units of the U.S. military forces.[345]

Second, when it became clear that AID was unable to keep track of the resources it was utilizing in its programs, the programs were placed under the authority of the U.S. Army.[346] Specifically, AID lost its responsibility for maintaining the Vietnamese ports in 1966.[347]

Third, when the civilians made a last stand to introduce their concept of counterinsurgency through winning the "hearts and minds" of the Vietnamese population, the military was given final and full authority over the program. The OCO was dropped in favor of CORDS, which fell under the authority of the MACV. Even though civilians were integrated into the military line of command, General Westmoreland was still at the top of the hierarchy. Further, the position of Komer, as head of CORDS, was not as prestigious or powerful as he had expected.[348] Thus, it is clearly observed that over time, the U.S. Army gained full control of all programs related to countering the insurgents in Vietnam.

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[344] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 61. Accessed May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d61

[345] Peterson, 1989

[346] Hunt, 1995 p 73

[347] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam 1966, Document 149. Accessed May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d149

[348] Hunt, 1995

5.5 Competitive Advantage

My theory of competitive advantage hypothesizes that assignment of responsibility for a task favors the profession that has a competitive advantage over other professions because competition favors the profession that can provide the superior value. The observed outcome in this case is "military," meaning I am testing hypothesis H1c: "If a military profession has a significant competitive advantage over the other professions, then the outcome will be military authority." Therefore, if my theory is correct, I should expect to see the U.S. Army demonstrating a clear competitive advantage over the civilian agencies.

Recall from the theory chapter that I conceptualize "competitive advantage" as five sufficient indicators: member retention, organizational unity, competency, commitment, and efficiency. This means, if my theory is correct, I should expect to see a higher membership score in the "competitive advantage" fuzzy set for the U.S. Army than for the civilian agencies.

5.5.1 Member Retention

Member retention refers to the rate of change in the number of professionals employed in the profession from year to year. If a profession retains all or most of its members, then it will have a competitive advantage over a profession that cannot provide a sufficient number of professionals.

Civilian Agencies. During the period in question, the CIA and AID suffered from personnel shortages. AID relied on civilian volunteers[349] and the CIA relied on military personnel in its programs. CIA offices were often run by military personnel, and when the CIA's CIDG program was in full swing, it heavily depended on the U.S. Special Operations Forces.[350] In 1962, the director of the CIA was quoted as saying, "we need more U.S. company officers and NCOs to assist on the spot." He noted that "there are no effective gimmicks to substitute for people…the real solution is men who will get out into the jungle, live there, and close with the enemy."[351] AID also consistently suffered from member retention problems. As early as 1962, in a memo internal to the Policy Planning Staff, it was noted that, "our economic AID program is not in very good shape…Perhaps if there were no lack of skilled people, technicians, and administrators, both the long and short range activities could be carried out."[352] In 1966, Komer, in his role as "Mr. Vietnam" reported that "AID has on board only 2,900 plus of the 3,900 U.S. and local employees called for…nor is 3,900 probably enough."[353] In another report that

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[349] Leepson, 2000

[350] Krepinevich, 1986; Moyar, 1989

[351] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1961-1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 54. Accessed May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v02/d54

[352] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1961-1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 63. Accessed May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v02/d63

[353] *Foreign Relations of the United States,* 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 155. Accessed on May 15, 2016, Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d155

same year, McGeorge Bundy noted that "the rapid turnover among senior Americans—especially AID—has been a topic of Vietnamese talk."[354]

U.S. Army. During the Vietnam War, the U.S. Army considered counterinsurgency the responsibility of the entire army.[355] In order to obtain the number of men needed for deployment, the Army utilized volunteer enlistments and the draft, bringing total Army strength up to nearly 1.5 million men.[356] In 1964, U.S. military strength in Vietnam was approximately 24,000 men. By the end of 1965, it had increased to 185,000, and continued to increase steadily over the next two years (385,000 in 1966; 490,000 in 1967). Army personnel made up approximately two-thirds of the total strength.[357] However, throughout the time that the Army was actively engaged in Vietnam, General Westmoreland consistently requested ever increasing numbers of troops, which the President was also consistently hesitant to approve.[358]

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[354] *Foreign Relations of the United States,* 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 77. Accessed on May 15, 2016, Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d77

[355] Krepinevich, 1986

[356] Stewart, Richard W., ed. (2010) *American Military History Volume II: The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917-2008*. Washington D.C.: Center for Military History; Anderson, 2002

[357] Stewart, 2010

[358] In 1965, 1967 Westmoreland, with the support of Chairman Wheeler asked for the call up of the reserves in addition to his troop requests. At both points, the President authorized fewer troops than requested, and did not authorize the calling up of the reserves. Barrett, David M. (1993) *Uncertain Warriors: Lyndon Johnson and his Vietnam Advisers*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

5.5.2 Organizational Unity

Organizational unity refers to the strength of a centralized organization that facilitates group action on the part of the profession. If a profession has a strong, centralized organization with a hierarchical organizational structure, then it will have a competitive advantage because it will be able to act as a unified group.

Civilian agencies. From 1954 until the creation of the OCO in 1966, there were no formal bureaucratic ties between any of the agencies operating in Vietnam. Each agency had its own leader in Vietnam, with direct access to the Ambassador.[359] The Department of State made no effort in those years to exercise any kind of serious control.[360] This fact was recognized as problematic as early as 1962, when a report noted the disjoint aspects of the civilian programs.[361] In other words, the civilians had a flat organizational structure. The OCO was the civilians' solution: "it had authority to direct all American civilian staffs in Saigon concerned with pacification support and all American civilian programs outside Saigon."[362] Yet OCO's authority was in name only, it did nothing to impede the agency autonomy. Specifically, Deputy-Ambassador Porter, who headed the organization, lacked the authority to transfer funds between programs, making it impossible to deal with unexpected problems.[363]

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[359] Hunt, 1995

[360] Komer, Robert W. (1986) *Bureaucracy at War: U.S. Performance in the Vietnam Conflict*. Boulder: Westview Press.

[361] *Foreign Relations of the United States,* 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 63. Accessed May 15, 2016, Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d63

[362] Hunt, 1995 p 83

[363] Moyar, 1997; Hunt, 1995

U.S. Army. Being a military branch, the U.S. Army is a single professional group, with a hierarchical organizational structure. Specifically, the MACV, established in 1961, further unified and solidified the Army's presence in Vietnam. However, even MACV suffered from some organizational abnormalities. For example, the Marines, which were formally under MACV control, but not under the Army, were able to establish the Combined Action Platoon Program in 1965, against the Army's wishes.[364]

5.5.3 Competency

Competency refers to the profession's ability to carry out the task over which it is competing. If a profession has high quality and strict training and educational requirements for members, then it can better demonstrate the capability of its members to complete tasks effectively.

Civilian agencies. During the 1960s, AID sent volunteers to Vietnam. Most had a minimum of a baccalaureate degree in their specific field of expertise, none had country-specific training.[365] Komer noted that AID failed to competently handle the logistics of operating in Vietnam: AID could not account for its goods and could not provide usable data for what it needed.[366] In comparison, the CIA's personnel likely varied in education

[364] Peterson, 1989

[365] Leepson, 2000, notes: "The agency…sent thousands of agricultural experts, doctors, nurses, teachers, engineers, intelligence agents, and civilian advisers," p21.

[366] Hunt, 1995

level.[367] In addition, there was little to no country specific training afforded the civilians. According to State Department Diplomat and Asia Specialist Chester Cooper, "None of the courses given at the Foreign Service Institute, and none to the experience of AID specialists and Foreign Service Officers elsewhere, seemed relevant to what was going on in Vietnam."[368]

U.S. Army. Competency in the U.S. Army at this time has often been critiqued heavily as the U.S. Army as a whole failed to implement what later scholars would deem the "correct" strategy in dealing with insurgents in Vietnam.[369] Here, I assess the competency of the soldiers in the context of fulfilling the strategy they were asked to carry out by the U.S. Army. It is clear throughout this time period that adequate training for working in Vietnam was lacking. Until 1965, the Army was carrying out an advisory mission in Vietnam. However, few officers deployed there had adequate language skills to advise properly.[370] After 1965, with the introduction of ground troops, language skills did not improve. Further, the soldiers deployed to Vietnam were "poorer and less educated than the average of young Americans at the time;" about eight percent were

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[367] This evaluation is based on the current CIA descriptions of the "Intelligence and Analysis" and "Clandestine Service" personnel. Likely, the requirements would have been either the same or less strict in the 1960s. CIA (2015) "Offices of the CIA: Intelligence and Analysis: Who We Are" at https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/intelligence-analysis/who-we-are.html. Accessed February 11, 2016; CIA (2015) "Offices of the CIA: Clandestine Service: Who We Are" at https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/clandestine-service/who-we-are.html. Accessed February 11, 2016.

[368] As quoted in Komer, 1986

[369] Krepinevich, 1986 provides the best explanation of this argument; see also: Cable, Larry (1986) *Conflict of Myths: the Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War*. New York: New York University Press; Cable, Larry (1991) *Unholy Grail: the US and the wars in Vietnam*. New York: Routledge; and Nagl, 2005.

[370] Krepinevich, 1986; Hunt 1995

from working class families. [371] In addition to the lower average level of general education of the deployed troops, there was a distinct lack of training specific to the region in which they were operating. Finally, the one-year combat tour policy meant that all draftees were sent home after a single year of service and replaced by brand new soldiers.[372]

5.5.4 Commitment

Commitment refers to the profession's interest in the task at hand. If a profession comes to the task of its own volition (i.e. the U.S. government does not ask it to complete the task), then it is more likely to be committed to completing the task effectively.

Civilian agencies. While the level of commitment to the task of countering the VC insurgents varied across agencies, on whole, it could never be described as particularly high. In a 1966 report, it was noted that, "about three civilians turn us down (funny how they develop physical disabilities) for every one who accepts. Our best FSO candidate for Economic Counselor in Saigon suddenly turns out to have diabetes."[373] Of all the agencies, the CIA can be considered to have the highest level of commitment. For example, the CIA took on additional responsibilities for the pacification programs begun

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[371] Anderson, 2002

[372] Sorely, 1992

[373] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 131. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d131

by the government of South Vietnam after the assassination of Diem in 1963.[374] Further, in a series of memos between 1965-1966, the CIA strongly advocated for the political approach to counter insurgency.[375] AID, on the other hand, was often described as needing prodding from Washington and being unwilling to ask Congress for increased support.[376] It can be said, however, that each individual agency was committed to keeping control of their individual projects and with maintaining direct contact with the Ambassador.[377] Yet on whole, commitment was lacking: as Komer noted in a telegram to the President in 1966, "the key point is that neither Porter in Saigon nor the civilian agencies are thinking boldly enough or pushing hard enough."[378]

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[374] Moyar, 1997

[375] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June-December 1965, Document 34. Accessed May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v03/d34; *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 174. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d174; *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 181. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d181; *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 248. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d248; *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 263. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d263

[376] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 77. Accessed May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d77; *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 155. Accessed on May 15, 2016, Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d155

[377] Hunt, 1995

[378] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 155. Accessed on May 15, 2016, Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d155

U.S. Army. In this case, the U.S. Army was very clearly assigned to the task of countering the insurgency in South Vietnam by President Kennedy.[379] In this case, the level of commitment can be difficult to discern: many scholars view the lack of commitment to the "hearts-and-minds" strategy by the Army as a lack of commitment to the task of counterinsurgency in Vietnam.[380] However, as described above, the failure to appropriate what later scholars would consider the "correct" strategy does not in this work constitute a lack of commitment to countering the insurgents in Vietnam. While the Army did not whole heartedly buy into the President's request for counterinsurgency when he first addressed them in 1961, and while they failed to create new doctrine for dealing specifically with counterinsurgency, the Army did create a directive to increase counterinsurgency training. Despite counterinsurgency training making up a relatively small piece of the overall infantry school, it is clear that the Army at that time believed that regular infantry soldiers would and should be capable of applying traditional infantry training to counter insurgents.[381] At some level, soldiers are meant to be general purpose forces designed to meet a variety of contingencies.[382] The Army was committed to fulfilling its mission in Vietnam. Then, in 1966, the JCS stated clearly that to achieve

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[379] Blaufarb, 1977

[380] This is the main argument of Krepinevich, 1986. Other scholars, including: Larry Cable, 1986 and1991, and John Nagl, 2005, make similar arguments. In addition, several former military officers also offer this opinion, including John Paul Vann, David Hackworth, and Edward G. Lansdale—as cited in Hess, 2009.

[381] Krepinevich, 1986: for the creation of doctrine, see p 39

[382] Komer, 1986, makes this argument (p49), but as he notes, "the prevailing Pentagon concept that conventional forces designed to meet the worst-case contingency—high intensity nonnuclear conflict—would also be suitable for lesser contingencies [did not] prove to be as valid as expected."

optimum effectiveness, they believed all US programs in Vietnam should be placed under the MACV.[383]

5.5.5 Efficiency

Efficiency refers to the profession's ability to complete a task cheaply and quickly. If the profession can demonstrate its ability to complete a task in less time and with fewer resources, then it gains a competitive advantage over professions who complete the task more slowly or expensively.

Civilian agencies. The civilian agencies, due to the nature of their strategy, struggled to demonstrate progress in their reports; AID projects often took years of concerted effort.[384] But AID's projects were considered so inefficient that Komer advocated for "our military to provide temporarily as many logistical services as it can do more efficiently by simple extension of its existing machinery, e.g. take over scheduling of AID shipping, Saigon port, the bulk of in-country transport, medical supply, etc. Otherwise, we just won't get the job done soon enough."[385] In comparison, the CIA was stripped of its most successful program: the U.S. Army took over the CIDG program and within a year, outsourced the entirety of it to the ARVN, who decimated progress. The

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[383] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 269. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d269

[384] Peterson, 1989

[385] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 155. Accessed on May 15, 2016, Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d155

fact that the CIA had to return again and again to request additional increases in Special Forces meant that they were continuously asking for additional resources to complete their project. Additionally problematic was the constant "improvement" of pacification measures, which denied the civilians any ability to demonstrate increasing success over time.[386]

U.S. Army. In some ways, the Army was able to demonstrate a high level of efficiency. The body counts, used a markers of progress, allowed the military to present clear evidence of their progress to the administration.[387] In addition, the Army argued that their strategy of "search-and-destroy" would take far fewer troops than any type of "clear-and-hold" pacification operation.[388] However, by 1968, U.S. manpower and resources were far more deeply committed than even worst-case scenarios of 1961 had predicted.[389] In addition, every troop request Westmoreland made exceeded the number of troops in the existing force structure.[390]

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[386] Enthovan, Alain C. and K. Wayne Smith (2005) *How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969*. Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation.

[387] While these body counts were impressive in that they were clear demonstrations of "progress" it should also be noted that they were easily manipulated. Gaddis, John Lewis (2005) *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. In addition, these counts, while impressive were not good indicators of decreasing strength of the enemy: the Viet Cong could deal much better with higher body counts than could the Americans. Enthovan and Smith, 2005.

[388] Hess, 2009; this fact is refuted by statistics that came out of the Department of Defense. A 1967 DOD report discovered that "clear-and-hold" operations of this type could be done with 167,000 troops. At its peak, the U.S. deployed 550,000 troops to Vietnam, Krepinevich, 1989. However, Westmoreland's assertion that search and destroy would both face fewer casualties and require fewer troops was never questioned seriously by policymakers.

[389] Gaddis, 2005

[390] Sorely, 1992

5.5.6 Analysis

For this case, the military demonstrated a competitive advantage over the civilians. The civilian agencies scored well in only one category: commitment, as the civilians actively worked to keep their agencies salient in the operations in Vietnam. They scored moderately well in one category: competency, due to the educational requirements. Finally, the civilian agencies scored low in the areas of member retention, due to their personnel shortages; organizational unity, due to their flat organizational structure and multiple professional groups; and efficiency, due to their increasing resource needs and inability to demonstrate clear progress.

In contrast, the Army scored high in two categories. The Army's member retention was high due to its ability to utilize the draft to bring ever increasing numbers of soldiers to Vietnam. It also scored high in the area of organizational unity due in particular to its hierarchical organizational structure. Soldiers scored moderately well in two categories. The Army scored moderately well in competency due to the training it provided (as required by its strategy). The Army also scored moderately well in its level of commitment to the task, due to its willingness to commit all available troops and resources to the task at hand. Finally, the Army scored low in one category: efficiency, due to its inability to accomplish the task at the proposed cost, and its inability to finish the task by the proposed deadline.

TABLE 10

SUMMARY OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE INDICATORS

Key Indicators of Competitive Advantage	Civilian Agencies	U.S. Army
Member Retention	*Low member retention* The CIA, AID, and State all struggled to place the needed required number of men in the field.	*High member retention* Through its use of the draft, the Army was able to maintain the needed number of soldiers deployed, and in fact, expanded that number over time.
Organizational Unity	*Low organizational unity* • Multiple professional groups = moderate • Organizational structure: flat organization= low	*High organizational unity* • One professional group: Army= high • Organizational structure: hierarchy = high
Competence	*Moderate competence* Degree requirements: baccalaureate degree = moderate	*Moderate competence* Degree requirements: training program = moderate
Commitment	*High commitment* Civilian agencies sought to participate in the competition = high	*Moderate commitment* Army was assigned to the task and worked to complete it = moderate
Efficiency	*Low efficiency* • Cost projections: profession demonstrated the ability to complete the task over estimated cost = low • Time projections: profession demonstrated tendency to complete task after the deadline = low	*Low efficiency* • Cost projections: profession demonstrated ability to complete the task over the estimated cost = low • Time projections: profession demonstrated the ability to complete the task after the deadline: = low

Recall that in the theory chapter I stated that this hypothesis could be falsified if a profession that does not display a clear competitive advantage gains rights and responsibilities for a task, or if a profession that has a clear competitive advantage does not gain rights and responsibility for a task. In this case, the military demonstrated a clear

competitive advantage over the civilians. As the observed outcome is military responsibility, this hypothesis correctly predicts the observed outcome, and as such, this hypothesis is not be falsified.

5.6 Alternative Explanation: Bureaucratic Politics

In the following section, I test an alternative explanation: Bureaucratic Politics. The Bureaucratic Politics alternative explanation predicts assignment of responsibility of a task is the result of political bargaining. As the observed outcome in this case is "military," I am specifically testing hypothesis H3c: if a policy maker representing a military profession has the skill and will in using his bargaining advantages, then the outcome will be full authority for the military profession." If the bureaucratic politics theory is correct, I should expect to see the U.S. Army demonstrating dominance at the bargaining table.

Recall from the theory chapter that I conceptualize "bargaining" as four sufficient indicators: representation, bargaining advantages, skill, and will. This means, if the bureaucratic politics theory is correct, I should expect to see the U.S. Army with a higher membership score in the "bargaining" fuzzy set than the civilian agencies.

5.6.1 Representation

Representation refers to the political ties that allow professions to make their case for gaining control of a profession. If the profession has a supporter at the decision making table, then that profession is more likely to win full authority.

Civilian agencies. Overall, the civilian agencies possessed only weak representation in Washington.[391] The individuals who were often in the best position to argue on behalf of the civilian position, like the Ambassadors, were tied to posts in Vietnam—halfway around the world from the policy discussions in D.C.[392] In addition, several of the ambassadors felt that interjecting their opinions into the decision-making meetings was inappropriate.[393] Another problem the civilians faced was the hawkish orientation of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State during the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. As the State Department was nominally supposed to be coordinating all the agencies, it was a powerful blow to the civilians that the Secretary of State often sided with the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on decisions for Vietnam.[394]

U.S. Army. In striking contrast to the civilians, the military had clear representation in Washington. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Wheeler, always fully supported the requests made by General Westmoreland, and advocated them to the President. In addition, for most of the early 1960s, the Army enjoyed the support,

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[391] Of note: many individuals present in the decision making circles who were not in favor of a military solution argued in favor of no involvement in Vietnam on the part of the United States. Undersecretary of State George Ball is the best known of these individuals, but Senator Mike Mansfield (D-MN), former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and UN Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, were among those who advocated disengagement from Vietnam. Barrett, 1993. While against the military solution, these individuals cannot be considered to be for the civilian solution either.

[392] Barrett, 1993: during some of the biggest decisions of the war, including the 1965 decision to commit ground troops, the Ambassadors were not present in the decision making meetings, but were only available by cable.

[393] Krepinevich, 1986, notes that Taylor thought it was inappropriate for an ambassador to interfere in what he considered military operations, so he did not push for increased civilian participation. In addition, Ellsworth Bunker, ambassador from 1967-1973, was often non-committal in policymaking (see Barrett, 1993).

[394] Ambrose and Brinkley, 2011

not only of Secretary of Defense McNamara, but also National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, and the Secretary of State Dean Rusk.[395] In addition, other major decision-makers, including Secretary of Defense Clifford, National Security Adviser Rostow, Senator Richard Russell (D-GA), and Judge Fortas, were vocal in their support to giving responsibility for countering the insurgency in Vietnam to the Army.[396] Finally, Westmoreland felt comfortable expressing his opinion on behalf of the Army.[397] While he could only contribute directly while he was in town, he did so with great candor.[398] However, as the American involvement wore on in Vietnam, the Army lost critical supporters. For example, in the months leading up to his retirement, Secretary of Defense McNamara began advocating for a greater emphasis on hearts and minds.

5.6.2 Bargaining Advantages

Bargaining Advantages refer to the power an actor draws from particular personal, situational, or information factors. If the actor has control over information, a personal relationship with the president, the ability to threaten to resign, influence over other governmental actors, the willingness to assume responsibility, a highly skilled staff,

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[395] Barrett, 1993; Ambrose and Brinkley, 2011; Gaddis, 2005.

[396] Secretary of Defense Clifford was appointed after the retirement of Robert McNamara in 1967. National Security Adviser Rostow was appointed after the resignation of McGeorge Bundy in 1966. Judge Fortas was a Supreme Court judge who held regular meetings with President Johnson wherein they often discussed the Vietnam conflict. Senator Russell (D-GA) was the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Barrett, 1993.

[397] Particularly in comparison to the commanders who came both before and after him. For more on Gen, Harkin, see Nagl, 2005; for more on Gen. Abrams, see Sorely 1992.

[398] Barrett, 1993.

or public support, then the profession that actor supports is more likely to gain full authority.

Civilian agencies. On whole, the civilians generally lacked control over useable data. One exception to this was the CIA's ability to use prior experience with the MACV's takeover of programs when arguing against the creation of CORDS. In a 1966 internal memo, the CIA noted, "Past experience (CIDG/Switchback; the Saigon Port) does not indicate that civil programs are likely to improve if the U.S. military takes them over."[399] But, when faced with coming up with an alternative to giving the military responsibility for CORDS, the CIA, AID, and the State Department were unsure as to what kind of alternative to offer.[400]

U.S. Army. The U.S. Army was in a unique position in regards to bargaining advantages due to the ability to the military to use the Cold War to their advantage. If the Army proved successful in their application of "search-and-destroy" in South Vietnam, it would be proof to the world that the United States military was powerful. Such a clear demonstration of American military power had the ability to enhance the power, prestige, and credibility of the United States, as compared to the Soviets.[401]

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[399] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam 1966, Document 263. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d263

[400] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam 1966, Document 263. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d263

[401] Gaddis, 2005

5.6.3 Skill

Skill refers to the ability of the professions to make their case for dominance over a task to decision makers. If the actor makes good use of his bargaining advantages, then the profession that actor supports is more likely to gain full authority.

Civilian agencies. For the civilian agencies, the lack of consistent representation in policy meetings makes it difficult to assess "skill." Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who would normally have spoken for these agencies, was staunchly hawkish in his orientation. Each agency did have their own director. However, these directors were inconsistent in either meeting attendance or expressing their opinions. There is some evidence of Director Helms of the CIA making an effort to express the point of views of his agency. However, he fails to make a thoroughly convincing argument using all of his bargaining advantages.[402] In addition, in a 1966 memo that describe the AID and State Department's opposition to the placement of CORDS under MACV, the civilians were also described as "uncertain about how to proceed in fighting it or what to offer in way of an alternative."[403]

U.S. Army. The most consistent actor in bringing forward the Army's position was General Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. General Wheeler had a certain

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[402] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 181. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d181

[403] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam 1966, Document 263. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d263

amount of skill in presenting the situation to favor the requests made by the Army.[404] However, every request made by the military for expanding the war, increased troop levels, was not met as requested.[405] Of particular example was the request for an additional 206,000 troops after the Tet Offensive. Wheeler fully endorsed the plan to the President. However, when he was contradicted by the Deputy Commander of the MACV, who stated that no new troops were needed, Wheeler made a complete reversal in his stance.[406]

5.6.4 Will

Will refers to the preparedness of a profession to use its bargaining advantages. If the actor is willing to effectively use his bargaining advantages, then the profession that actor supports is more likely to gain full authority.

Civilian agencies. The civilian agencies also suffered from unwillingness to use their bargaining advantages. The actor with the most potential to be influential, Secretary of State Rusk, had made clear his preference for a military solution in Vietnam. In addition, the director of the CIA during the mid-1960s, Richard Helms, was not wont to offer opinions without first being asked directly,[407] despite several members of his agency

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[404] Barrett, 1993; Krepinevich, 1986

[405] Barrett, 1993

[406] Sorely, 1992 p 226; it is interesting to note that the deputy commander made that contradictory statement solely because he was unaware that General Westmoreland had made the 206,000 troop request.

[407] Barrett, 1993

prodding him to do so in several memos.[408] By being unwilling to push their case in Congress, AID also showed their unwillingness to use bargaining advantages. In short, the civilians lacked actors willing to speak on their behalf.

U.S. Army. When its actors were in favor the military solution, these men argued strongly for the military. For example, when McNamara argued in favor of the Army solution, he dominated and often put down those who argued against him. In another example, Senator Russell argued strongly for "virtually every military option except using nuclear weapons." Like Russell, National Security Adviser Rostow also not only advocated for military responsibility, but often argued to increase the area of responsibility for the Army.[409]

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[408] see *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 174. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d174; *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 248. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d248; *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 263. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d263; *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 270. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d270

[409] Barrett, 1993, p 97

TABLE 11

SUMMARY OF BARGAINING INDICATORS

Key Indicators of Bureaucratic Politics	Civilian Agencies	U.S. Army
Representation	*Low Representation* The profession is not represented in the bargaining process = low representation	*High connections to actors* Profession represents itself in the bargaining process: e.g. Westmoreland, Wheeler = high
Bargaining Advantages	*Low bargaining advantages* Profession's actor in the bargaining process lacks any control over information, and lacks political or public allies = low bargaining advantages	*High bargaining advantages* Profession's actor in the bargaining process had control of information and had political allies = high
Skill	*Moderate skill* Profession's actor in the bargaining process failed to counterarguments by competing profession's actors = moderate	*Moderate skill* Profession's actor did not make convincing arguments (e.g. Wheeler) = moderate
Will	*Low will* Profession's actor does not mention bargaining advantages = low will	*High will* Profession's actor uses bargaining advantages to advance his argument = high

5.6.5 Analysis

For this case, the Army scored high on three indicators and moderately well on one indicator. The Army was consistently represented by influential political actors, they possessed strong bargaining advantages, and the Army Generals and representative political actors demonstrated great willingness to use their bargaining advantages. The only criteria in which the Army did not perform well was in skill, where they only performed marginally well. Wheeler's inability to turn his presentation of the situation in Vietnam into the requested number of troops means that he was not as persuasive as he

could have been. In sum, the Army possessed a high level of bureaucratic politics acumen.

In contrast, the civilian agencies performed moderately well on one indicator and poorly on three. Civilian agencies did moderately well in using their bargaining advantages skillfully. However, they did not always have a good counterargument to the military's position. The civilian agencies did poorly when it came to representation. Unlike the military who consistently advocated for itself and had multiple connections to high level political actors, the civilian agencies failed to speak for themselves. The civilian agencies also did poorly in their bargaining advantages. The civilian agencies failed to gather enough useable data and when faced with presenting that data to the President, did not do so effectively. Finally, the civilians suffered most in the area of will. That the civilian's representatives at the bargaining table more often argued for the other side or failed to speak at all meant that the civilians lacked a representative willing to use their meager bargaining advantages to forward their cause.

Recall from the theory chapter that I stated that this hypothesis could be falsified if only one policymaker with the skill and will to use his bargaining advantages is apparent, but the profession he represents does not gain rights and responsibilities for this task. In this case, the policymaker with the skill and will to use bargaining advantages were those actors that represented the U.S. military. The outcome observed in this case was military responsibility. Therefore, the theory correctly predicted the outcome and is not falsified.

5.6.6 Analytical Comparison

In this case, my competitive advantage theory of military task assignment predicted a military assignment based on the U.S. Army's higher membership score in the "competitive advantage" fuzzy set. The bureaucratic politics theory also predicted a military assignment, based on the U.S. Army's higher membership score in the "bargaining" fuzzy set. Since both theories predicted the observed outcome, it is difficult to argue which theory provides a better explanation based on outcome hypotheses alone. Therefore, in the next section, I test two additional hypotheses to better elucidate the process underlying the task assignment decision.

5.7 Process of Task Assignment Decision Making

As both my theory of competitive advantage and the bureaucratic politics theory predicted the same (and observed) outcome: "military," neither theory can be ruled out as an explanation due to an incorrect prediction. In this section, I test two additional hypotheses that explore each theory's explanation of the process that underlies how policymakers assign professions to tasks.

The following tests will provide a good challenge for my theory. Given the values associated with the outcome hypotheses explored above, this case is an example of a most-likely case for bureaucratic politics theory.[410] The bureaucratic politics theory's independent variable "bargaining" has a greater membership score for the military than

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[410] Using the definition of a most-likely case from George, Alexander and Andrew Bennet (2005) *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: MIT Press, "the independent variables posited by a theory are at values that strongly posit an outcome or posit an extreme outcome."

does my theory's independent variable "competitive advantage." Therefore, it is more likely that the process driving the outcome is the bargaining suggested by the bureaucratic politics theory.

5.7.1 Competitive Advantage: Process

My theory of Competitive Advantage hypothesizes that the selection process for the assignment of a new military task is driven by the capacity of the profession to fulfill the task. If my theory is correct, I should expect to see discussions among policymakers that focus on the relative capability of either profession to fulfill the task.

Throughout the time that the United States was involved in countering insurgents in Vietnam, policymakers were concerned with the capability of the various professions who would be tasked with carrying out the counterinsurgency policy. For example, beginning in 1962, concern was already being noted about AID. In a memo from a joint meeting with the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of staff, it was noted that "AID is the weakest element in the civic action program…we should not expect too much from AID and we may have to move the MAAG into the field of police type action and training."[411] In this example, it is clear that policy makers were concerned with the ability of AID to carry out the task at hand. Also of note is that this statement came not from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in an attempt to gain additional organizational power over AID, but from CIA director Hilsman.

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[411] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1961-1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 54. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v02/d54

Another example of policymaker concern with a professions' capacity to complete the task in assigning responsibility was also in regards to AID: "AID is simply not geared up to the unfamiliar task of providing at least half the needs of a civil economy in wartime. Unlike its operations in other countries (where it works through a halfway decent local government and infrastructure) AID has to do just about everything in Vietnam…and AID is understandably less efficient."[412]

In both of these examples, it is clear that the policymakers are concerned not about whether or not their agency is gaining organizational prestige, as bureaucratic politics might suggest. Nor are these policymakers engaged in lobbying for the task to be given to the profession they represent. Rather, these policymakers are clearly concerned with the capability of the civilian agency, raising concerns about whether or not the agency has the capacity to fulfill the task at hand.

To better refine this argument, I test two sub-hypotheses related to the above prediction. First, my theory predicts that if the profession who is most capable of fulfilling the task does not pursue the task, they may still be assigned the task. In this case, if my theory proves correct, I should expect to see the military being assigned to the task, regardless of whether or not they are interested in being assigned to the task. I may also expect to see evidence of policy makers prioritizing capability to complete the task over the profession's commitment to or interest in the task.

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[412] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 155. Accessed on May 15, 2016, Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d155

In this case, the military did not actively pursue the task of countering insurgents. However, they were continuously assigned increasing amounts of responsibility for this task throughout the time the United States was involved in Vietnam.

When President Kennedy originally approached the U.S. Army about engaging in counterinsurgent activities, the Army was slow to respond in creating individualized training for anti-insurgent warfare.[413] Later, when the U.S. Army was first authorized to engage directly in South Vietnam, they outlined their goals: "objectives would be to neutralize enemy power, give heart to the war weary ARVN and provide adequate maneuverable fire power to attack the enemy formations wherever they can be found and fixed."[414] Even here, the concept of search-and-destroy is not fully outlined.

Despite the U.S. Army's lackluster interest in gaining responsibility for the task at hand, their competitive advantage in doing so was clearly important to the policymakers in Washington. After Komer was named Special Adviser to the President regarding pacification in Vietnam, he almost immediately recognized the capacity of the U.S. Army in accomplishing the task of countering the Vietnamese insurgents. In 1966, Komer asked the MACV to keep an eye on the CIA's RD Cadre programs, citing the CIA's lack of personnel as the reason the agency was unable to do the entire job.[415] Komer reiterated the

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[413] Krepinevich, 1986

[414] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June-December 1965, Document 17. Accessed May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v03/d17

[415] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 171. Accessed on May 15, 2016, Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d171

importance of capability again in a memo to Secretary of Defense, McNamara, stating, "the military are much better set up to manage a huge pacification effort…The alternative of unified management under civilian control falls down because most assets involved are military, and because only the US military staff and advisory resources in Vietnam are big enough to manage pacification on the scale we seek."[416] In a memo to the President, Komer again reiterated his belief that the military was more capable and should therefore be assigned the task: "Give pacification to Westy [General Westmoreland]. You've heard my voice on this. I'll just say again that we won't get up real momentum in pacifying hamlets until you give it to the only people who can do most of the job." [417]

Despite the insistence that the military had a competitive advantage and could thus provide a greater value in accomplishing the task, the Joint Chiefs of Staff remained ambivalent about whether or not the task was assigned to them. In a memo from the Joint Chiefs to Secretary McNamara, they acknowledged their capacity, "to achieve early maximum effectiveness, the pacification program should be transferred to COMUSMACV." However, they also indicated that they would not object to the program being placed under the control of another profession: "if for political reasons a civilian-

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[416] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 249. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d249

[417] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 262. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d262

type organization should be considered mandatory by the President, they would interpose no objection."[418]

When President Johnson finally weighed in on the question of task assignment, it was clear that the military's relative capability influenced his decision. In a letter to the U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge, Johnson wrote, "There does not seem to me to be any difference between your ideas of what is needed to make pacification work, and those of my chief advisers and myself. Bob McNamara and the Joint Chiefs realize, as does General Westmoreland on the basis of the dispositions he is increasingly making, that a limited number of U.S. combat forces must be detailed to be the catalysts for the Vietnamese…As a matter of fact, getting the U.S. military more heavily engaged in refocusing the ARVN on the heart of the matter is one reason why we here have seriously considered charging MACV with pacification. I hope you will ponder whether this is not in the end the best way to achieve the aim you seek."[419]

In considering the decision to finally turn over all efforts of countering the insurgents in Vietnam to the military, two aspects become apparent. First, the MACV did

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[418] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 269. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d269; it should be noted that the "political reasons" to which the JCS refer are likely those politics as occurring between the Vietnamese government and the United States. In a series of memos and conversations relating to the placement of American combat troops in Vietnam, there was a large amount of debate that centered on the unwanted appearance of the United States acting as a colonial power in Vietnam. See for example: *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June-December 1965, Document 17. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v03/d17

[419] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 310. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d310

not put forth high levels of effort in pursuit of the task. Second, the policymakers charged with the decision showed primary concern for the military's capability to complete the task, as they considered which profession should be given responsibility.

Finally, I test a second sub-hypothesis related to the process specified by my theory: if presidential advisers heavily favor assignment of a task to a profession that does not possess a competitive advantage, that profession is unlikely to be assigned the task. In this case, if my theory is correct, I should expect to see any evidence of arguments made by presidential advisers advocating for the assignment of a less capable profession being dismissed in favor of a profession who possesses a competitive advantage.

In this case, there were presidential advisers who advocated for the assignment of the task to the CIA. As I argued above, the CIA did not possess a clear competitive advantage over the other competing profession: the U.S. Army. Therefore, if the above hypothesis is correct, I should expect to see the president favoring the U.S. Army over his advisor's arguments for assigning the task to the CIA.

When it became clear that the U.S. government was considering assigning a single profession responsibility for all programs related to countering the insurgents in Vietnam, the CIA began advocating for a civilian rather than military assignment. The agency used a variety of arguments. In response to a memorandum from Komer on the issue, the CIA wrote: "the most serious defect in the memorandum arises from its misconception of the nature of pacification, which prompts action recommendations we feel would be counterproductive…He [Komer] goes on to argue that improvement in the pacification effort is 'essentially a matter of better management of US/GVN resources,

and of generating enough resources to meet the need.' Management and resources are both important, but the essential aspect of pacification is one of doctrine. Without the proper doctrine, management and resources can accomplish little."[420] Here, the CIA argues that despite their relative lack of competitive advantage, they should be given responsibility for the task because they have the right ideas about how to accomplish it.

CIA Director Helms made a very similar argument in July 1966 when he addressed the issue of turning over the CIA's RD Cadre Program to the military: "The problem of supervision of the RD Cadre teams is one on which I believe our Station is making considerable progress at this time, although I cannot contest your statement that we cannot match the MACV presence throughout the districts. Against the apparent desirability of this greater engagement of local Americans with the teams however, I do suggest that some thought be given to the impact of this attention on the mission and political content of the work of the teams."[421] In this example, the CIA is once again emphasizing that their concept of how to do the work is more important than whether or not they have the competitive advantage needed to offer a greater value in accomplishing the task.

A few months later, after Secretary McNamara formally recommended to the President that MACV take over all programs related to countering the insurgents in

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[420] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 174. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d174

[421] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 181. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d181

Vietnam, the CIA reiterated their argument that the military lacked the right approach: "the fact remains that revolutionary development (which is what we ought to be talking about, not pacification) can only succeed if it is something in which the civil populace engages itself. If an attempt is made to impose pacification on an unengaged populace by GVN or U.S. military forces, that attempt will fail."[422]

Despite the CIA's repeated arguments that approach mattered most, the President seemed to place greater emphasis on the value he would get from assigning the to the task. On October 5, 1966, President Johnson said in a telephone conversation with Secretary McNamara, "I feel strongly that [pacification] ought to go to the military."[423] In a subsequent letter to the U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam on November, 16, 1966, Johnson wrote that assigning the military to the task was the best way to achieve the desired outcome: "we have seriously considered charging MACV with pacification. I hope you will ponder whether this is not in the end the best way to achieve the aim you seek. I genuinely believe it is."[424] Komer underscored this thought process when he wrote to Johnson on November 17, "I think (as you do, judging by your latest letter to Lodge)…if

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[422] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 270. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d270

[423] Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape 66.27, Side B, PNO 2.

[424] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 310. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d310

we want solid results by end-1967 we'll have to give it to Westy [General Westmoreland]."[425]

Despite arguments that the military would not be well suited to the task of countering the insurgents in Vietnam, as made by the CIA, it is evident, both that Johnson felt that the military ought to be given responsibility, and that the reason was because the military had a greater capacity to do so.

In the theory chapter, I noted that these hypotheses could be falsified if a profession gained rights and responsibilities for a task despite its lack of competitive advantage and the assignment was driven by either the professions' pursuit of the task, or lobbying on the professions' behalf by a presidential adviser. As the above evidence indicates, it is clear that the policymakers were concerned with the professions' capability to fulfill the task when making the decision to place responsibility for all counter insurgent activities under the U.S. Army.

It could be argued that the short lived Office of Civilian Operations (OCO) presents a conflicting evidence: the pacification programs were originally placed under the authority of the Department of State through the Vietnamese Embassy: Deputy Ambassador Porter was assigned to head up a new office concerned with activities designed to counter the insurgents in Vietnam. However, evidence exists that undermines this counter-argument to my competitive advantage theory.

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[425] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 311. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d311

The predominant argument against OCO being an assignment of responsibility to a profession that lacked a competitive advantage is that OCO was designed to fail. As described above, OCO was given a period of only 90-120 days in which to become fully operational. When the Department of State cabled the directive to establish the OCO office to the Embassy in Vietnam, Secretary of State Rusk noted, "we had considered putting the entire program under COMUSMACV to achieve these ends; and this may ultimately prove to be the best solution…we are prepared to try a solution which leaves the civilian functions under civilian management." From the phrasing, it is clear that policymakers were far more interested in assigning responsibility to the MACV. In fact, Rusk's telegram went on to say, "this new organizational arrangement would be on trial for 90-120 days, at the end of which we would take stock of progress and reconsider whether to assign all responsibility for RD to COMUSMACV."[426] This trial period can be considered an indication that the policymakers were setting up the civilians to fail. As the CIA noted that: "the trial will not be 'fair' if major quantifiable results are anticipated in a matter of months."[427] But it was Komer who was most candid regarding the civilian

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[426] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 290. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d290

[427] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 248. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d248

organization: "I think…that even the new civilian organization won't really be able to do the job…we'll have to give it to Westy."[428]

The focus of the major policymakers, led by the President, on the military's capability to complete the task of countering the insurgents in Vietnam, can be argued to have driven the assignment of the U.S. Army to the task.

5.7.2 Bureaucratic Politics: Process

The bureaucratic politics theory hypothesizes that the selection process for the assignment of new military tasks is driven by political bargaining between organizationally influence policy-makers within the U.S. government. If the bureaucratic politics theory is correct, I should expect to see political deals being made over assignments.

In this case, the decision that depicted any evidence of bargaining was the choice to place all counterinsurgency programs under the MACV with the establishment of CORDS. The other two major decisions in the military's favor prior to this point, the MACV takeover of the CIA's CIDG and of AID's port control and broader logistical programs, did not display overt evidence of bargaining.

The proposal to place all programs designed to counter the Viet Cong insurgents under the authority of the MACV was met with criticisms from the Department of State,

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[428] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 311. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d311

the CIA, and AID. The State Department argued that the optics were all wrong;[429] the CIA argued that the military doctrine was ill suited for countering the insurgents in rural Vietnam,[430] and AID created a counterproposal that consisted of a "complex system of committee and deputies for [Revolutionary Development], who would then report to a Deputy Ambassador for Pacification."[431]

However, it is unclear if CIA, State, and AID's arguments and proposals were ultimately given credence in the final decision to place full control of the task in the hands of the U.S. Army.

To refine this argument, I also test three additional sub-hypotheses related to the above prediction. First, I test the organizational influence of the policymakers by predicting that if policymakers are influenced by their organizational position, then actors will express stands on issues consistent with that organization's preferences. In this case, if this hypothesis is correct, I would expect to see high level presidential advisers, such as the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense arguing for assignments that gave responsibility to professions associated with their organizations.

In this case, Secretary of Defense McNamara appears to make organizationally dominated arguments. In 1965, he argued strongly for the introduction of U.S. Army

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[429] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 248. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d248

[430] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 174. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d174

[431] *Pentagon Papers*, Gravel Edition, Volume II, Beacon Press. p. 392

combat troops, and the budget to increase the overall size of the regular armed forces and the Reserves and National Guard.[432] However, in a lengthy memo to the President in 1966, McNamara, in laying out his views on the current state of the insurgency in Vietnam appears to espouse ideas that are closer to the civilian side of the argument. The first solution he offers to the lack of progress being made in the area of countering the insurgents is to "consolidate all US activities…and all persons engaged in such activities, providing a clear assignment of responsibility and a unified command under a civilian relieved of all other duties." He goes on to state that, "From the political and public-relations viewpoint, this solution is preferable—if it works. But we cannot tolerate continued failure. If it fails…the only alternative…is to place the entire pacification program—civilian and military—under General Westmoreland."[433] McNamara's presentation of options in this particular memo makes it appear as though in his view, assigning the responsibility to the military should only be done as a last resort. If McNamara was acting in an organizationally influenced way, he should have been arguing first for increased military support and the budgetary increases that would have accompanied it.

It might be possible to explain McNamara's argument by saying that giving the military control over programs that had been begun by civilians would be counter to the

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[432] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June-December 1965, Document 67. Accessed May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v03/d67

[433] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 268. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d268

organization's missions. However, if this was the case it would not explain the response by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to McNamara: "The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed you earlier that, to achieve optimum effectiveness, the pacification program should be transferred to COMUSMACV."[434] If this assignment had been truly outside the organization's mission, then it is highly unlikely that the Joint Chiefs would have indicated that they were the best suited profession to take on that responsibility.

In addition to Secretary McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk also appears to make organizationally driven arguments. There does exist evidence that Secretary Rusk was against placing all programs related to countering the Vietnamese insurgents under the control of the U.S. military. In a memo between Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Wheeler and General Westmoreland, General Wheeler described Rusk as having "strong objections" to transferring all counterinsurgency programs to the military.[435] However, across the record, this appears to be the only direct reference to Secretary Rusk's objections.

Rather, there is a greater amount of evidence that points towards Rusk acting in ways that are opposite organizational orientation. For example, when the United States was considering the introduction of combat troops into Vietnam, Rusk went so far as to suggest barring George Ball, another individual from his own department from presenting his views at large meetings because Ball believed that greater involvement by the military

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[434] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 269. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d26

[435] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 274. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d274

would not bring about the desired policy solution in Vietnam.[436] About a year later, in a telegram that instructs the Embassy on the creation of the OCO, Rusk implies that giving the military full responsibility for the task might actually bring about better results.[437]

Unlike McNamara, it is difficult to see how Rusk's positions in these matters might be explained by stating that the task falls outside the State Department's organizational mission. In an internal memo, the CIA described the major players arguing for civilian rather than military control of the programs countering the insurgents as including members of the State Department.[438] That the department was at minimum split over the issue rather than fully against it suggests that Rusk was acting counter to organizational interests. Maintaining civilian control of the counterinsurgency programs would have likely increased the State Department's budget and influence, given the level of importance that the President was placing upon the task at that time, and the likelihood that the State Department would have been placed in charge of the effort.

The two major players who would have been most likely to act in accordance with their organizational mandate, Secretary of Defense McNamara and Secretary of State Rusk at times made strong arguments that ran counter to organizational mission.

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[436] As noted by George Bundy in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June-December 1965, Document 42. Accessed May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v03/d42

[437] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 290. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d290

[438] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 263. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d263

A second sub-hypothesis that expands upon the bureaucratic process predicts that if a policymaker possesses superior bargaining advantages or engages in political bargaining, then that policy-maker is likely to heavily influence the final decision. In this case, I am looking to see if there were actors utilizing bargaining advantages in order to attain an outcome that they find favorable.

In this case, the two actors that one might expect to be heavily engaged in debate regarding the assignment of the task, McNamara and Rusk, do not appear to engage in any bargaining with one another at all.

Rather, the majority of discussions regarding the assignment of the task to the military was in a series of correspondence between Robert Komer and President Johnson.[439] Occasionally, Secretary McNamara offered an opinion,[440] but there exists no evidence that Secretary Rusk directly engaged in bargaining on this particular issue.

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[439] see for example: *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 120. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d120; *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 131. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d131; *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 155. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d155; *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 171. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d171; *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 262. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d262; *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 268. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d311

[440] see for example: *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 245. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d245; *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 268. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d268

Finally, it is clear that while the CIA, AID, and members of the State Department were interested in engaging in bargaining, they had neither high level representation nor the skill and will to enter into real bargaining on the subject.[441]

A final sub-hypothesis expanding on the bureaucratic politics process predicts that if bureaucratic politics occurs, then evidence of a compromise will be evident. In this case, if this hypothesis is correct, I should expect to see no policymaker getting his preferred outcome, policymakers making concessions to one another, and/or policymakers agreeing on a middle ground.

In this case, the only appearance of something resembling a compromise would have been the short-lived Office of Civil Operations. In many ways, the OCO was presented as though it were a compromise. When President Johnson wrote to Ambassador Lodge of the establishment of the OCO, he referred to it as a compromise: "I am willing to try out for a time a compromise solution."[442] However, it is difficult to determine whether the OCO was truly a compromise or whether it was merely the first step in turning over all programs focused on countering the insurgents over to the U.S. Army.

When it began, the OCO was given a trial period of 90-120 days. During this time, the OCO was not only supposed to create an organization, but that organization was

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[441] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 263. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d263

[442] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 310. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d310

supposed to be able to show real results. If the OCO did not show "real results" at the end of this time period, the U.S. Government would reconsider placing all programs under the MACV.[443] As the CIA noted, such a time period was hardly a fair trial: "the trial will not be 'fair' if major quantifiable results are anticipated in a matter of months."[444]

If the trial time granted the OCO was designed to fail, as the CIA seemed to indicate, then was the OCO really a compromise or was it rather a stop gap on the way to placing full responsibility with the military? Johnson's correspondence in the period of time leading up to the creation of OCO implies that he had already made up his mind to give the U.S. Army full responsibility. As early as October 5, 1966, Johnson had indicated that he felt strongly that the military should gain control.[445] This was echoed in his letter to Ambassador Lodge; despite calling the OCO a compromise, he indicated that the military might be the best way to achieve success in countering the insurgents.[446] It appeared as though Johnson had finalized his decision to grant the military full responsibility for the task. Yet, if Johnson had indeed made up his mind, why then did he bother creating the OCO? Robert Komer hints at the reason in a memo to the President

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[443] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 290. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d290

[444] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 248. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d248

[445] Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape 66.27, Side B, PNO 2.

[446] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 310. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d310

during the months in which this decision was being implemented: "we've already gone 25% of the way in the right direction. Your letter will set Lodge himself to thinking about whether to go the rest of the way."[447] The OCO can best be considered the preparatory move for transferring control to the U.S. Army.

In the theory chapter, I noted that this hypothesis could be falsified if an assignment becomes apparent, but cannot be traced back to discussions between political actors. In this case, the majority of the discussions for assigning full responsibility to the military occurred between Robert Komer and President Johnson. The correspondence between these two actors demonstrates a high level of agreement on the assignment of responsibility to the military. In short, it is difficult to say that bargaining over the outcome was actually taking place.

Even when considering the OCO as a potential compromise, there is no actual evidence that indicates that this topic was discussed at length in a National Security Council or other meeting.[448] In fact, in internal memos, the CIA indicates that President Johnson had already decided to assign responsibility to the military and that AID and the State Department were struggling to come up with any plausible alternatives.[449]

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[447] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 311. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d311

[448] To be fair, it is possible that such a meeting did occur, but no record of it survived. However, given the fact that Johnson appeared to have made up his mind long before any such meeting might have occurred, the meeting would likely not have produced the type of discussions and bargaining the theory suggests drives an outcome.

[449] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 263. Accessed on May 15, 2016. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d263

5.8 Conclusion

The case of counterinsurgency in Vietnam, 1960-1973, is a case of competition for task dominance between the civilians of the CIA, AID, and the Department of State, and the soldiers of the U.S. Army. Based on assessment of the key independent variables of my theory of competitive advantage, a military outcome was predicted. The bureaucratic politics model also predicted a military outcome. However, when analyzing the process underlying the decision to place full responsibility for the task with the military, it became clear that concern over the profession's capacity to complete the task rather than political bargaining drove President Johnson's decision.

5.8.1 Critical Indicators

The analysis in Chapter 4 noted that the competency and commitment indicators appeared to be most important in brining about the outcome of shared responsibility for nuclear weapons strategy. In this chapter, the analysis of the indicators associated with the main independent variable, competitive advantage, that appeared to be most salient in the decision making process that resulted in an outcome of military responsibility are member retention and organizational unity.

In examining these two indicators, the military exhibited high levels of both member retention and organizational unity. High member retention and high organizational unity gave the military a competitive advantage over the civilian agencies that possessed low levels of member retention and organizational unity. In other words, these two indicators can be considered the drivers of the military's competitive advantage in this case.

Member retention and organizational unity can also be thought of as the characteristics to which the policymakers looked when assessing the military's relative capability to accomplish the task of countering the insurgents in Vietnam. The civilian's lack of personnel and lack of coordination were continuously discussed as evidence that the civilian agencies were less capable than the military in accomplishing the task.

It is interesting to note the variation in apparently critical indicators between the nuclear weapons strategy case and the countering the Vietnamese insurgents case. I will return to this topic in the conclusion of the dissertation.

5.8.2 CAPs and COIN in Afghanistan and Iraq

As a final note in this chapter, I want to return briefly to the subject of the U.S. Marine's Combined Action Platoons in Vietnam. One of the obvious questions that arises in this case study is why the Marines, whose strategy was both more efficient and theoretically more successful, did not become the dominant military group in Vietnam?

I did not do an in depth analysis of the Marines' competitive advantage when compared with the U.S. Army in this chapter for two reasons. First, because such an analysis falls beyond the scope of this dissertation, which questions the professional competition between civilians and the military. Second, during their time in Vietnam, the Marines were under the control of the MACV, which was led by members of the U.S. Army. In other words, from the conception of the CAPs, they were under the control of the Army.

However, it is pertinent to ask why, if an enclave or clear-and-hold type strategy was supposedly better at solving the insurgency problem, did the Army not adopt this type of strategy over their search-and-destroy strategy? The answer is in the relative lack

of success and high risk of casualties associated with the CAPs. Strictly speaking, the Marines never performed well in the CAPs, and this poor execution meant that the Marines could never demonstrate their success. A single cruel or corrupt act by a Marine could undo months of work. Because the Army was not focused on creating relationships, individual soldiers' actions were relatively less problematic in accomplishing their strategy. The Marines also attempted to compete directly with the Army using body counts, but the body counts that came out of the CAPs varied heavily from hamlet to hamlet, making it difficult to argue that the strategy was overall more successful than "search-and-destroy." In addition, CAP Marines were relatively more likely to be wounded or killed than the soldiers associated with search-and-destroy missions.[450] In short, during the Vietnam war, the Marines struggled to prove that their clear-and-hold strategy held the key to being more successful than the U.S. Army's.

If the Marine's strategy was relatively less successful than the Army's, then why did the U.S. Army undergo doctrinal changes when approaching the insurgent heavy conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq?[451] Likely, the changes to the Army's doctrine when approaching Afghanistan and Iraq came from the assignment of full responsibility for all programs associated with countering insurgents during Vietnam. As the U.S. Army had historically been given responsibility for all aspects of countering the insurgency, the profession would have approached the Afghan and Iraqi operations with an understanding that they would continue to be held responsible for accomplishing all

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[450] Peterson, 1989

[451] See, for example, Chapter 2 in FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5: *Counterinsurgency*, December 2006

facets. That is not to say that the military would have shifted its priorities. Recall that the Army's strategy placed emphasis on dealing with the enemy combatants first, and then dealing with local security. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. Army dealt swiftly with taking down the Taliban infrastructure and the Iraqi Army before moving on to matters of local security.

CHAPTER 6:

CONCLUSION

6.1 Summary of Argument and Findings

Why does the military gain responsibility for some tasks, civilians for others, and for still others, there is a mixed outcome? In this dissertation, I argued that military and civilian professions compete with one another to gain rights and responsibilities for military tasks. Gaining rights and responsibilities brings the additional benefits of increased influence and budgetary priority, thus allowing these professions to self-perpetuate and grow. The president of the United States, who typically acts as the final arbiter, assigns rights and responsibilities for military tasks to the profession that demonstrates a competitive advantage because competition favors the profession that can provide the superior value in completing the task. In other words, the profession that demonstrates a high level of commitment, efficiency, and competency in completing the task is most likely to be assigned to the task.

To test my argument, I examined two cases of task assignment: nuclear weapons strategy, 1945-1960; and countering insurgents in Vietnam, 1960-1968. For the nuclear weapons strategy case, I studied the competition between the civilian strategists of the RAND corporation and the airmen of the USAF Strategic Air Command. I found that these two professions ultimately ended up sharing responsibility for the task of developing nuclear strategy. To test my theoretical explanation that this assignment was

the result of relatively equal levels of competitive advantage in these two professions, I conducted a congruence test. I found my theory consistent with the observations I made in the case, and that the theory fit the case quite well. In order to further test my theory's causal significance, I examined an alternative explanation for the observed outcome: the bureaucratic politics theory. However, the bureaucratic politics theory was not consistent with the observed outcome. I also concluded that my theory could predict the outcome even in the absence of the "bargaining" variable, which strengthened the causal significance of my theory.

Next, I considered the competition between the civilian agencies (USAID, CIA, and State Department) and the U.S. Army over the task of countering the Viet Cong insurgents in Vietnam. In this case, I considered three major decisions that placed responsibility for the task increasingly into hands of the U.S. Army. When testing my theory of competitive advantage, I again found my theory's theoretical predictions consistent with the observations and outcomes of the case. Yet, when I tested the alternative explanation, I found that the bureaucratic politics theory was also consistent with the case. In particular, I discovered that the case of countering the insurgents in Vietnam was a "most likely" case for the bureaucratic politics theory.

In order to parse out which theory provided a better theoretical explanation for the events of the case, I tested two additional hypotheses that explored the process by which policymakers made decisions in the case. Testing these two additional hypotheses allowed me to conclude that my competitive advantage theory better explained the reasoning behind the decision to assign the task to the U.S. Army. The President and his closest advisers were more concerned with the capability of the U.S. Army to fulfill the

task at hand than they were about the organizationally driven arguments of the civilian agencies.

Both the nuclear weapons strategy case and the countering the Vietnamese insurgents case allow me to conclude that my theory is consistent with the observed outcomes of task assignment. In other words, my theory of competitive advantage correctly predicted the observed outcome in both cases. Further, the countering the insurgents in Vietnam case allowed me to trace the decision making process that led to the task assignment and prove that the rationale expressed by the President fit my theory more closely than the behavior predicted by the bureaucratic politics model.

In sum, my theory of competitive advantage not only stood up to the test of the military case successfully for the first time, but it also proved a better explanation for task assignment than the most plausible alternative explanation.

6.2 Analysis

As I have proven that my theory of competitive advantage in the assignment of military tasks stands up to testing against historical cases, I can begin to analyze what these results mean. In this section, I return to the question of most critical indicators and discuss how identifying these indicators can lead to additional theory development and future theory testing. I also discuss several questions that remain unanswered, including the question of task size as a determining factor in task assignment and the potential for the military to have a consistently higher probability of competitive advantage in military tasks.

6.2.1 Critical Indicators and Theory Development

In the theory chapter, I stated that competitive advantage was conceptualized as a series of five sufficient indicators: member retention, organizational unity, competence, commitment, and efficiency. In other words, the presence of a single indicator meant that the profession had membership in the fuzzy set of "competitive advantage."[452] My theory predicts that the relative levels of membership determine the outcome: a comparatively higher level of membership in "competitive advantage" will lead to the assignment of the task to that particular profession, whereas relatively equal membership will lead to a "mixed" outcome. As it currently stands, I have weighed all the indicators equally in their potential to bring about the outcome.

However, it is possible that some of the indicators matter relatively more than others in determining outcomes. For example, efficiency might matter more than commitment to policymakers in determining which profession should be assigned a task. Therefore, I identified in each case, the indicators that seemed most important in determining the outcome based on the evidence presented in the chapter.

I found the commitment and competency indicators to be most critical in determining the outcome in the nuclear weapons strategy case. However, in the countering insurgents in Vietnam case, I found the member retention and organizational unity indicators to be most critical. The conclusion that two very different sets of indicators as critical to the outcome makes it appear as though my original theoretical

[452] As Goertz (2006) would describe it, I am using a construction that can be thought of as a family resemblance structure.

model, that all indicators are equally weighted in their sufficiency to produce a competitive advantage is correct.

However, it is also possible that different combinations of indicators lead to different outcomes. For example, a military outcome might be linked to higher levels of member retention and organizational unity (as described in Chapter 5), while a civilian outcome might be linked to higher levels of commitment and efficiency (such a case is not explored in this dissertation).

While it is not possible to draw concrete conclusions about relative weights of the indicators based only on the two cases examined in this dissertation, it would be possible to conduct additional tests to shed light on this issue. First, additional case studies—in particular a case that depicts a "civilian" outcome would help to test the potential that different combinations of indicators lead to different outcomes. Second, conducting a qualitative comparative analysis test to determine if there are combinations of sufficient indicators for outcomes would allow me to test differing weights for different indicators and would also allow me to test the sufficiency of different combinations of indicators.

6.2.2 Unanswered Questions

While I have shown that my theory is consistent with the two cases analyzed in this dissertation, and that the process underlying the task assignment decision also supports my theoretical predictions, there are several remaining questions, including the relationship between task size and task assignment and the potential for the military to have an inherent competitive advantage.

It is possible that larger size tasks are correlated more highly with a military outcome, under the logic that once a task reaches a certain size only the military has the

existing infrastructure and personnel to carry it out. This question arises from the findings in Chapter 5. The military's member retention was a critical piece of their competitive advantage that led to their gaining rights and responsibilities for the task of countering the Viet Cong insurgents.

Since 1990, on average the military has possessed approximately fifty percent as many employees as the rest of the federal government combined.[453] If the size of a task is important in determining the outcome, then the military should have an intrinsic advantage in gaining responsibility for military tasks as it inherently has the potential to match the number of individuals needed to complete a task regardless of its size.

Member retention might then be considered a necessary condition for task assignment that leads to an inherent military advantage in gaining responsibility for military tasks—either fully or shared. But member retention is not necessarily the same as member counts. There are numerous examples that exist of the military exhibiting a relative problem with member retention. Recall for example, the case from the introduction chapter that discussed the puzzling patterns of military and civilian contractor work in Afghanistan and Iraq. A study done by the Congressional Budget Office in 2006, noted that the Active Army met or exceeded its retention goals. However, during that same time frame, the study noted that the Army was unable to offer large

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[453] For exact numbers, see: Office of the Secretary of Defense (2014) *Population Representation in the Military Services: Fiscal Year 2014 Summary Report*. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, p. 9 for military numbers and for civilian numbers: Office of Personnel Management (2014) "Historical Federal Workforce Tables: Total Government Employment Since 1962" *Data, Analysis & Documentation: Federal Employment Reports.* Accessed on June 15, 2016, Available at: https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/data-analysis-documentation/federal-employment-reports/historical-tables/total-government-employment-since-1962/

enough critical skills retention bonuses to offset the allure of working for civilian contractors.[454] This issue in retention helps explain the increasing reliance of the U.S. government on civilian contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq.[455] As member retention would likely be coded as "high" for both the U.S. Army and the Civilian Contractors, member retention alone cannot explain the pattern of task assignment in Afghanistan and Iraq.

This brief example helps illustrate the fact that while member retention is sufficient to create a competitive advantage for a profession, it is not determinative when it comes to task assignment.

6.3 Implications for Policy and Scholarship

The finding that competitive advantage plays a significant role in determining the assignment of military tasks has several implications for both policy and political science scholarship. In this section, I consider the implications of this research for each in turn.

6.3.1 Policy Implications

My research determines why and how the United States government selects particular professionals to act as its representatives in accomplishing new military tasks. The findings presented in this dissertation, that competitive advantage drives the recognition of expert authority in a given task area, impact policy in a number of ways.

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[454] The Congressional Budget Office (2006) *Recruiting, Retention, and Future Levels of Military Personnel*. Washington D.C.: Congressional Budget Office. Accessed June 15, 2016. Available at: https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/76xx/doc7626/10-05-recruiting.pdf

[455] Avant, Deborah and Renee DeNevers, 2013, "Military Contractors and the American Way of War." *The Modern American Military*. David M. Kennedy, ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 135.

First, these findings are directly applicable to how the U.S. military, public employees and civilian contractors, and policymakers approach military task assignments. Second, these findings have significant impacts for the United States force structure and projection abilities.

Understanding the dynamics of task assignment is critical for military leaders. While the military is relatively accustomed to dealing with interservice rivalries, understanding how competitive advantage works when dealing with competitions with civilians over task assignment allows military leaders to gain a better understanding of why they may be asked to do specific tasks but not others. Further, the illumination of this dynamic may allow military leaders to better understand and conduct successful civil-military relations. Understanding the factors that lead policymakers to select specific professions for assignment to specific tasks means that military leaders have the ability to consider these factors when offering military advice.

In addition to the potential to improve civil-military relations, the findings presented here can aid in improving combat effectiveness. A clear picture of the military's competitive advantage when compared to other competing professions may allow the military to plan operations more successfully because it would given them a more complete picture of the relative strengths and weaknesses of all the players involved.

The finding that competitive advantage is critical to understanding task assignment also has important implications for public employees and civilian contractors. By shedding light on the factors that are considered critical in the assignment decision, public employees and civilian contractors have the ability to tailor their time and

resources such that they can increase their success in advocating for responsibility for military tasks. For example, the United States Institute for Peace is concerned with how the United States is responding to conflict abroad. The findings in my research will allow them to advocate for their position more effectively by highlighting what exactly it is they need to succeed in gaining rights and responsibilities for military tasks.

My research also calls upon policymakers to confront the reasons they chose particular professions for specific tasks. By acknowledging that decisions are made based on competitive advantage rather than on political bargaining, policymakers have the ability to make decisions more quickly and defend task assignment decisions more completely and concretely to the public.

In addition, knowing that issues of competency and member retention are critical indicators of competitive advantage, and therefore critical features of professions when assigning tasks, policymakers can re-evaluate policy stances on issues areas, including specific military and broad educational requirements and military budgeting.

Finally, the findings of my research highlight the changing nature of military professionals in the United States. As policymakers better understand why they make task assignment decisions, they have the ability to broaden their understanding of the U.S. force structure. Having a more complete understanding of what types of professions engage in military tasks will allow policymakers to better project American forces abroad and to ensure that force structure is best matched to current national security goals and objectives.

6.3.2 Implications for Scholarship

My research also has important implications for scholarship in both political science and sociology. First, my work applies the sociological conceptualization of a "system of professions" to the military case for the first time. In doing so, I contribute to the fields of both sociology and political science by bridging this gap in the literature of the two fields. My work contributes to sociology by demonstrating that Abbott's concept of the "system of professions" can be applied to the military case, despite his assertion that it was not well suited to that case. My work contributes to political science by introducing a new conceptualization to the study of military professionalism.

Second, my dissertation adds to the literature on bureaucratic politics. The survey of the literature on bureaucratic politics theory in Chapter 3 demonstrates that scholars have not clearly or explicitly theorized how Allison and Halperin's bureaucratic politics theory might lead to specific bargaining outcomes not associated with compromise (i.e. a bargaining "win" or "loss").[456] To remedy this gap, I conceptualized a new way to test bureaucratic politics theory to predict specific bargaining outcomes that included bargaining wins and losses. By providing a new conceptualization of "bargaining," I was able to make specific predictions about how political actors might fare at the bargaining table.

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[456] I did find one reference to the potential for a bargaining "win" in the bureaucratic politics literature. In Jones, Christopher M. (1994) "American Prewar Technology Sales to Iraq: A Bureaucratic Politics Explanation" in *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence, 2nd edition*. ed. by Eugene R. Witkopf. New York: St. Martin's Press, Jones states, "The final outcome either represents a compromise among the actors or reflects outright the policy preferences of the actors who won the political game." p 280. However, he does not specify how or why an actor might "win" the game.

Third, my dissertation also fills a significant gap in the literature on military professionalism, by examining military and civilian professions on equal terms. Past literature examined either military professionals or civilian professionals. In this dissertation, I prove that not only can military and civilian professions be considered on equal terms, but that such examination is critical to our understanding of how policymakers select particular professions to complete specific military tasks.

Finally, the findings in my dissertation refute the assertions of Abbott, who in multiple contexts stated that the "system of professions" was not well suited to the military case, and that bureaucratic politics was a superior explanation. My critique of Abbott's "systems of professions" concept and development of a competitive advantage theory not only allow for the application of the "system of professions" concept to the military case, but also showed that competitive advantage was both consistent and significant with the cases in both outcome and process of decision making. Bureaucratic politics theory did not perform as well in either case.

6.4 Areas for Future Research

In applying the "system of professions" concept to the military case for the first time, and in developing a theory of competitive advantage, my dissertation opens up several areas for future research.

6.4.1 Inter-Service Competition in the U.S. Military

The first theme for future research that could result from my findings is in the area of inter-service competition. In the United States, the military services often engage in disputes with one another over a variety of issues that can be considered "new military

tasks." For example, the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force engaged in a dispute over which service should have proprietary responsibility for nuclear weapons usage in the 1950s.

In my dissertation, I restricted the analysis to competitions between civilian professions and military professions. However, my theory of competitive advantage could easily be tested against cases in which military services compete with one another. Testing my theory against this set of cases would shed additional light on puzzles like the one hinted at in Chapter 5 between the Marines and the U.S. Army. Recall that the Marines in Vietnam were pursuing a strategy that consisted of "clear-and-hold" operations. Today such operations are widely considered to be a better strategy in the practice of counterinsurgency. However, at the time, the Marines did not gain full responsibility for the task of countering the Vietnamese insurgents, and were placed under operational authority of the U.S. Army via the MACV. While I do not explore this particular competition in my dissertation, as it falls outside of the scope of my question, it would be both possible and plausible to test my theory against this case in the future.

6.4.2 Civilian Tasks

In the puzzle presented in Chapter 1, I noted that while civilians were being assigned responsibility for tasks that would typically be considered the sole purview of the soldier, soldiers were likewise being employed in operations that one might expect to be the completed by civilians. In my dissertation, the two cases I chose centered on tasks that would clearly fall within the first piece of this puzzle: new military tasks that one might expect to be done by the military. However, it would be possible and beneficial to

extend the analysis to include cases that do not involve any armed conflict, or that one might expect to be done by civilians.

Take for example, Operation United Assistance. In 2014, the United States deployed the U.S. military to aid in efforts to combat the spread of Ebola.[457] Taking care of an international health crisis could be considered a task one might reasonably expect civilian agencies, like the Center for Disease Control, the National Institute for Health, and USAID, to be granted full responsibility. However, President Obama chose to deploy thousands of soldiers in the United States' response.[458]

Testing my theory against cases like this one can shed additional light on why the U.S. military is employed in areas that one might reasonably expect to be dominated by civilians.

6.4.3 Does the Theory Travel?

A final area for additional research would be to probe the scope of the theory. It would be possible and beneficial to question whether the competitive advantage dynamic operates in countries other than the United States. The U.S. military is considered a profession of arms. However, many other modern states possess militaries that have a similar level of professionalism. Exploring the limits of the explanatory range would aid

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[457] The Ebola crisis could be considered a "new military task" in the sense that Ebola threatened the national security of the population of the United States, and emerged as a result of a change in type of service demanded.

[458] For details on the military and associated Department of Defense response, see: Department of Defense (n.d.) "DOD Helps Fight Ebola in Liberia and West Africa" *U.S. Department of Defense*. Accessed June 15, 2016. Available at: http://archive.defense.gov/home/features/2014/1014_ebola/

in determining the full extent of my theory's power to explain decision making in the wider world.

Two additional scope variables that would certainly be worth considering in this type of test include the type of government in the state, and the level of development. The main rival explanation to my theory of competitive advantage is the bureaucratic politics theory of decision making. However, the bargaining process of the bureaucratic politics model might operate differently under different governmental conditions. This means that for some governmental types, it may provide a more critical challenge to my theory than my results in this dissertation indicate.

In addition to governmental type, level of development is another clear scope variable to consider. The United States is a post-industrial economy, which may make the potential for competition more fierce and thus the competitive advantage dynamics relatively more important. A less developed country that depends relatively more on governmental spending may not see the same type of competitive dynamics driving the assignment of military tasks.

6.5 Conclusion

In this dissertation, I questioned why civilians gain responsibility for some military tasks, the military for others, and for still others, there is a mixed outcome. I theorized that the decision to assign particular tasks to particular professions was driven by competitive advantage, and I tested this theory against the alternative of bureaucratic politics theory in two cases. My findings supported both the consistency and significance of my theoretical predictions.

In this chapter, I have attempted to extend the analysis, answer some of the remaining questions, and discuss the implications of my research. In addition, I introduced three new issue areas where my theory could be tested.

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